Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-96-156
Monday
12 August 1996

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Albania: Berisha, Party Leaders Discuss Local Elections

AU1008161896 Tirana ATA in English 0804 GMT 10 Aug 96

[Report by A. Frasheri]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, August 10 (ATA)—Structure of the Permanent Election Commission and its functioning were the topics discussed in a meeting President of the Republic Sali Berisha held Friday with representatives of Albanian political parties the Democratic Party [PD], the Republican Party [PR], the National Front, the Human Rights Union Party [PBDNj], and the Social Democratic Union Party.

Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi was also present in the meeting, because according the Law on Election a number of its members will be proposed by the government.

The previous meeting of the political parties has asked and decided a Permanent Election Commission to be set up.

"Based on this unanimous decision, I decreed the Permanent Election Commission," Berisha said at the end of the meeting, adding that "before decreeing its members which is a legal duty of the president, I thought to convene a consultation with parties not for the names because president does not deal with them, they will be decided by parties, but to discuss on the percentage of their representation and other criteria on them."

After the meeting in an interview with journalists, Berisha considered it very fruitful, as it has reached in the conclusion "that the first criterion in the commission's set up should be taken the local elections and not the general elections."

Such a decision was very important for Berisha as "in the local elections the small parties were more reliable in their representation and according to the law its election procedure has more proportional elements. There are majority elements but proportional elements are present as well."

Different opinions were expressed on the number of its members, some parties proposed 11 members while others wanted to increase it to 14.

Regarding the Law on Genocide, which was also discussed in the previous meeting, Berisha said "we agreed to amend it and it will be amended. I think its amendment may be deepened, I have always been of the idea it should be a law of the closure of files not of their opening. It should be amended to show such a thing."

The PD Chairman Tritan Shehu said: "The meeting was held in a normal round table of talks of the main political forces to discuss about the Central Election Commission, which was scheduled before president's decree."

The meeting brought into evidence the necessity to be lead by representatives proposed by government and the creation of an election office, which should be headed by its secretary.

Shehu said "there were also other elections' problems" which will be discussed in the round table between the PD and Socialist Party [PS] and "in a wider meeting the PD will initiate soon with other political forces present in the local government."

The PBDNj's chairman, Vasil Melo, said the meeting was very necessary and constructive.

He proposed the commission to be made up "according the representation of political parties in the local elections and elections for the central government and its chairman to be chosen by the commission and not nominated."

The PR Chairman Sabri Godo's proposed that "the commission's deputy chairman and its secretary should be elected from the commission which will create a fairer balance in their representation in the commission."

The left opposition parties were not present in the meeting although they have, after May 26 elections, continuously demanded the creation of a Permanent Election Commission. Such a request was repeated even in the meeting of July 18 with the president, which was named by the PS Deputy Chairman Servet Pellumbi very fruitful and constructive for the solution of urgent problems.

The PS Presidency in a statement Thursday said it would not attend the discussions with president but only the bilateral PD-PS and those with political parties.

Albania: PS Boycotts Berisha's Meeting on Local Elections

AU0908175296 Tirana ATA in English 0918 GMT 9 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, August 9 (ATA)—The Socialist Party [PS] has refused to take part in the meeting organised on August 9 by President of the Republic Sali Berisha about the composition of the Permanent Central Electoral Commission.

"The PS refuses to take part in the meeting organised by the President of the Republic to avoid any kind of political ploy intended to cover up the May 26 violence

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and manipulations," says a statement issued on August 8 by the PS Presidency.

The meetings of the President of the Republic with political parties began since July 18; they have discussed the date of local elections. Bilateral PD [Democratic Party]-PS meetings were also held in the past month on problems of local elections.

European external affairs commissioner, during his visit to Albania a short while ago, appreciated these meetings, considering them very fruitful and a guarantee for free and fair elections.

The statement says that the PS considers "the institutionalisation of the political parties round table and opposition-government dialogue" a guarantee for free and correct elections.

This topic has been discussed in the meetings between the two major Albanian parties, PD and PS, with PD Chairman Tritan Shehu and PS Deputy Chairman Namik Dokle, considering this a very constructive round table.

The PS maintains in its statement that the initiative to create a permanent Central Electoral Commission is positive and in compliance with the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] demand, but it requires that the "Permanent Central Electoral Commission be set up on a full legal basis, through an organic law."

President Berisha, after the first meetings with the political parties on July 18, stated that "the parties will discuss the present Law on Local Elections and changes to the local government structures."

Today's meeting of Berisha with political parties will discuss the composition of the Permanent Central Electoral Commission and the presentation of the candidatures for this commission by the political parties.

After the first meeting with the political parties on July 18, Berisha confirmed that "there was consensus on the date of local elections," which was also confirmed by the current socialist leader, Servet Pellumbi.

President Berisha on August 3 decreed the creation of the Central Electoral Commission, which will be a permanent body to organise, run and control the elections in the Republic of Albania, in conformity with the electoral legal provisions of the Albanian state.

Based on the Main Constitutional Provisions, the President of the Republic defines the Central Electoral Commission, based on the parties' proposals on the commission's candidatures.

PS refuses to take part in the meeting with the President of the Republic but reaffirms "its readiness to participate in bilateral and multilateral dialogue, with the constant aim of finding a solution to the current crisis."

According to analysts, with this new boycott, the PS intends to create new crises and put off the date of elections after the situation of chaos inside its structures following the motion and messages of Fatos Nano, PS leader, actually convicted of corruption and falsification of official documents while he was Albania's prime minister.

Albania: PS Statement on Withdrawal From Election Talks

AU0908163296 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 9 Aug 96 p 2

[Statement by the Socialist Party Presidium issued in Tirana on 8 August: "Genuine Dialogue, Not a Demagogic Trap"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The president of the Republic has invited the Socialist Party [PS] to a meeting with representatives of the political parties possessing representatives in local government, in order to discuss the composition of the Permanent Central Electoral Commission. The president also asked for nominations for this commission.

Having considered this invitation with the proper attention and seriousness, the PS Presidium:

1. Considers that free elections in Albania can be guaranteed solely by fulfilling the conditions put forward by the opposition in the spirit of the resolutions of the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and the European Parliament.

2. Considers that so far no genuine legal step has been undertaken to realize the eight demands of the PS submitted at the first meeting with the president of the Republic.

3. Considers that the best way of clarifying these conditions is not through noisy propaganda, but by institutionalizing a roundtable of political parties and dialogue between the opposition and the government, as the Council of Europe recommended.

4. Expresses the opinion that the creation of a Permanent Central Electoral Commission is a positive step in line with the demands of the OSCE.

5. Is worried that this initiative has been quickly caught in the trap of demagogy and is degenerating into a deceitful farce, in line with the interests of the

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Democratic Party as directly expressed by the president of the Republic, without respecting the need for balance.

5. Asks that the Permanent Central Election Commission be created on a full legal basis through a law that will define its responsibilities, composition, and all the necessary framework for its work (the number of members, the criteria for their selection, the balance of representation among the political parties, the balance between the government and the opposition, and the proportions and criteria for representation in electoral commissions at all levels).

Because Decree No. 1,568 of 2 August is unclear on all these vital points, the PS Presidium:

—considers it unnecessary to take part in the meeting organized by the president of the Republic, and opposes all political tricks intended to cover up the violence and manipulation of 26 May;

—reemphasizes once again its readiness to take part in bilateral and country's current crisis.

Albania: Opposition Rejects Berisha's Local Elections Roundtable

AU0908140396 Tirana POLI I QENDRES in Albanian 9 Aug 96 p 3

[Article by B. Morina: "The President's Devalued Discussion Table"]

[FBIS Translated Text] There will be a discussion table without the opposition at the Presidency today. Four political forces, the Social Democrats, the Socialists, the National Unity Party, and the Agrarian Party, have reported that they will not take part in the meeting called by the head of state to discuss changes to the law on local elections. As forewarned, participation in this discussion table has now been reduced to those parties that have recognized the elections and who fill the seats in parliament. Thus, Melo, Godo, Selfo, Bushati, and Laco will sit down opposite Berisha. It is not known in what commune Laco won, because his party was created after July 1992, when the most recent local elections were held.

The opposition's departure is connected to the government's continuing failure to guarantee normal elections, the manner in which Berisha has decreed the Central Electoral Commission, and the provocative manner in which participants in the meeting were selected. A declaration by the Socialist Party issued yesterday "asks that the Permanent Central Election Commission be created on a full legal basis through a law that will define its responsibilities, composition, and all the necessary framework for its work." Meanwhile, Social Democratic Party [PSD] Chairman Paskal Milo adds other reasons for the Social-Democrats' departure: "According to us, Berisha is continuing to discriminate against the PSD by not inviting Gjinushi to the meetings of the parties. It is not the president but the party congress that selects the PSD chairman."

In all the statements they have issued, the opposition parties have declared that they are fully in agreement with the creation of the permanent electoral commission, but that they cannot approve the procedures that Berisha is using to create it. They also stress that the country urgently needs a political consensus among its leading political forces, and this can be achieved by sitting down at a table. However, the ruling party has so far sabotaged this.

Arben Imami, general secretary of the Democratic Alliance, said that he was sorry about the way that the president of the Republic had abused the parties' willingness to talk and to agree to the guarantees that must be supplied by those who stole the votes on 26 May, so that we can go to the polls in peace in the local elections of 20 October. "I have the impression," Imami said, "that Berisha is trying to leave the opposition out of the elections."

The president's discussion table today is in fact compromised. The absence of the main opposition parties has turned it into a consultation among people who have nothing to say to one another. It is enough to look at the Democratic Party's statement the day before yesterday in response to the Center Pole's declaration that it will not take part in the elections without the proper guarantees to realize what the standards of behavior toward the smaller parties are and what the president's party and the president himself are trying to achieve.

Albania: PD Protests PS's 'Absurd Effort' To Boycott Election

AU0908195396 Tirana ATA in English 0919 GMT 9 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, August 9 (ATA)—The Democratic Party [PD] spokesman said that the Socialist Party [PS] Presidency statement not to attend the president's meeting to discuss about the permanent election commission is considered by the PD a "continuation of the boycott line and an absurd effort to boycott the election process. This is result of a deep crisis the PS is now passing through and no hope in victory it sees in the future local elections. This is the best proof that the PS offers nothing to its electorate but the boycott and defeat," said the PD spokesman.

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Albania: Parties React to PS Boycott of Roundtable With Berisha

AU1008144096 Tirana ATA in English 0801 GMT 10 Aug 96

[Report by Atlant Frasheri]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, August 10 (ATA)—Some of the Albanian left wing parties did not take part in the yesterday meeting between the President Sali Berisha and representatives of the political parties participating in the local government.

"The opposition took part in the meeting with the exception of the left wing representatives," said President Berisha after the meeting.

The Socialist Party [PS] confirmed it would not take part in the meeting through a declaration of its presidency, whereas the Social Democratic Party, which in the May 26, 1996 elections won around 1.6 per cent of the ballots, the National Unity Party and the Agrarian Party, which in the May elections won almost an inconsiderable number of votes, did not take part even in the first meeting of the political parties with the president.

"There were opposition parties like the National Union Party, the Human Rights Union Party, the Christian Democratic Party and others which took part in the meeting, whereas the parties which boycotted the past elections did not attend the meeting," said Berisha. He added that "this may be a further boycott or an expression of the crisis that the main opposition force is experiencing and the difficulties of the faith they have in each other. This will be clarified in the coming days."

Berisha stressed that the round table negotiations will continue despite the decisions by one of some political forces. "The round table on local government questions will continue at party level," said Berisha. "I may say that absence and denial are nothing but a self-punishment."

Democratic Party [PD] Chairman Tritan Shehu spoke about continuation of bilateral meetings between PD and PS. This meeting would also determine the beginning of a party round table which he said would be held by the beginning of the second half of this month.

"I consider their stand wrong and absurd," said Shehu, "which is related perhaps with their line of permanent boycott or with the fact that they know they cannot win in the local government elections."

Other party participants in the meeting with the president also reacted towards the non-participation of the left wing political forces in the meeting.

The chairman of the National Unity Party, Hysen Selfo, said that "their aim is destruction and the PS has always wanted to disorientate the Albanian public opinion and this was proved today."

In the first meeting, the PS asked the president to postpone the date of the elections so that they had the possibility to choose their candidates, because they had some troubles within their party. The president fulfilled this demand of PS leaving them a longer time for preparation.

"This was an unjust decision of the PS. Its declarations cause dissatisfaction among the people and show clearly their objective to take Albania backwards. Albania is resolute to go ahead on the road of democracy, even without the communists. The communists and socialists are the same," said Selfo in reply to a question by a reporter.

"The greatest evil is if no discussion is held at all," said the Republican leader, Sabri Godo, when he said that when you are invited to take part in a discussion you should go to voice your opinion but "to boycott a priori a meeting without knowing in details what it will be about, what objectives it has, is, in my opinion, an irresponsible act."

According to analysts, with this boycott the PS aims to create a new crisis and to lead to a postponement of the elections date after the chaos within its structures following the petition and messages by Fatos Nano.

Albania: Press Views Socialist 'Boycott' of Election Talks

AU0908195296 Tirana ATA in English 1254 GMT 9 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, August 9 (ATA)—Today's press devotes an important place to a statement issued by the Socialist Party [PS] Presidency on August 8.

Through the statement the socialists declare they will not take part in the meeting organised by the President of the Republic, Sali Berisha, regarding the composition of the permanent Central Local Election Commission.

ZERI I POPULLIT frontpages the statement under the title: "Real Dialogue, No Demagogic Traps."

RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE carries the reaction of the Democratic Party [PD] spokesman, considering the statement "an expression in the course of boycott and their absurd efforts to boycott the electoral process."

The paper cites the spokesman as saying that this "seems to be a result of PS's finding itself in a deep crisis

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and having no hope for victory in the upcoming local elections."

In its editorial REPUBLIKA, organ of the Republican Party, considers the boycott of the parties' round table by the socialists an act which does not serve the country's interests.

In its commentary the newspaper KOHA JONE says that the socialists' refusal "may also be considered an end to the dialogue between the two major parties."

The paper adds that the while PS has asks that the round table includes all the contending parties in the October 20 elections, the PD insists that it includes only the local government leaders.

DITA INFORMACION entitles its editorial about PS's refusal to Berisha's second invitation to dialogue: "Berisha Receives Parties: PS and PSD (Social Democratic Party) Boycott the Round Table" and "The PD Reacts: The Continuation of the Electoral Process Boycott, a Result of the Socialists' Crisis."

POLI I QENDRES carries articles entitled: "The President's Underestimated Round Table," "To the Elections Without the Opposition," and a statement of the PSD deputy chairman, Paskal Milo.

Asked: "Why the PS withdraws from the local elections?" the newspaper TRIBUNA responds: "This party has been subjected to the craziness of a group of political adventurers headed by the Enverist careerist Neritan Ceka (leader of the Democratic Alliance Party)."

"The Socialists 'Refuse' Berisha's Invitation," is the title of the statement the PD chairman, Tritan Shehu, has provided to the newspaper ALBANIA.

Shehu considers the meeting with the President of the Republic "....a significant meeting on the eve of the upcoming electoral campaign," whereas the refusal of the socialists to take part in this meeting "...a political approach based on the line of PS boycott and its absurd attempt to boycott the electoral process."

GAZETA SHQIPTARE also devotes a special place to the PS and PSD refusing the President's invitation to take part in his meeting with parties and considers them " ..unexpected responses."

Albania: RP Secretary Discusses Rift in Party Leadership

AU1108150196 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 10 Aug 96 p 3

[Interview with Cerciz Mingomataj, general secretary of the Republic Party, by Rezear Xhaxhiu in Tirana on 9 August: "Upheavals Affect the Republican Party: 'Enough of Godo'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—*"Enough of Godo, the Republican Party [PR] needs elbowroom for its leadership." The most recent confirmation of what is happening in the PR [Republican Party] leadership comes from its governing troika. General Secretary Cerciz Mingomataj attacked his boss in terms not previously used about PR Chairman Godo. Mingomataj associates the successive electoral defeats with poor leadership by the PR general Godo. The party troika hope for a smoother flight [reference to the PR's wing logo] without Godo at their head.*

[Xhaxhiu] Something seems to be amiss in the PR leadership. Is this an upheaval or a temporary hitch?

[Mingomataj] Chairman Godo's stand on participation in the government and in parliament, as well as some of his other positions, have led to the start of a major split. A section of the presidium is opposed to his views.

[Xhaxhiu] Did the clash with your boss just begin, or has it long been in the making within the PR?

[Mingomataj] This is a longstanding phenomenon, but recent political developments have brought the split within the party to the surface. Godo made a furious departure from the most recent Management Committee meeting with the words: "I will not be back for a long time. Manage the party yourselves." That was another sign of a crisis between him and the remainder of the party's leadership.

[Xhaxhiu] Godo has taken a long vacation at a time that is politically tense. Do you foresee his withdrawal from the political stage?

[Mingomataj] You had better ask him himself. I think he left at this moment to indicate to the public that there can be no PR without him. He is convinced that the party has begun to shrink and will soon be forgotten. He is therefore trying to eat his words of a few weeks ago at the presidium when he said, "Go on yourselves. I am not coming back."

[Xhaxhiu] Do you think he has accomplished his mission?

[Mingomataj] I am not saying that at all. The congress will decide his fate. However, I can say with total conviction that the successive defeats of the PR in the last few years bear a single name: Sabri Godo. They show that he has finally turned out to be a failure as a politician.

[Xhaxhiu] Does Godo remain for you the main evil, or does the party need to be completely restructured?

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[Mingomataj] Godo is one of the evils that have dogged the PR over the last few years. However, I think the most urgent need is to genuinely reconstruct the party and all its management structures, both centrally and at the grassroots, and to bring in a new kind of leader.

[Xhaxhiu] Has the party suffered from poor leadership, or has its path been consciously chosen?

[Mingomataj] It is difficult to give a precise answer. However, the desire to preserve a false unity has stifled debate and created a number one. Besides, the autarchic leadership style has sent us down a blind alley and has damaged the PR. The party will continue to suffer for some time.

[Xhaxhiu] Are these reservations merely personal, or do they reflect a broader attitude among the leadership and the grassroots?

[Mingomataj] It is not a matter of a personal attitude but of a worrisome attitude that is also coming from below. The differences with Godo began when a segment of the party centrally and at the grassroots concluded that we have had enough of Godo. We now need new, vigorous leaders to head the party, which deserves such a leadership.

Albania: Council of Europe To Send Observers to Oct Elections

AU0908192896 Tirana ATA in English
1547 GMT 9 Aug 96

[Report by R. Floqi]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, August 9 (ATA)—The President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe [CE] Mrs. Leni Fischer has confirmed the participation and assistance of a delegation of the Council of Europe to coordinate the help this council in monitoring of the local elections due on October 20, 1996, Press and Information Office of the People's Assembly of Albania reports.

"The elections will also be an important proof and contribution to the consolidation of democracy in Albania," writes Fischer in reply to an invitation send to her by the chairman of the Presidency of the People's Assembly, Mr. Pjeter Arbnori.

On July 30, Mr. Arbnori sent a letter to Mrs. Fischer through which he invited the Parliamentary Assembly to send observers for the local government elections of October 20, 1996 in Albania and to coordinate work with the Election Commission of the Republic of Albania for the monitoring of these elections.

Fischer writes that the Parliamentary Assembly of the CE had decided to send a delegation of observers in the local government elections in Albania, possibly along with members of the Congress for Local and Regional Affairs of the Council of Europe.

On September 3, the Bureau of the Assembly will decide on the composition of this delegation and the ways of cooperation with the Congress.

On June 26 the Council of Europe, after a debate in the Parliamentary Assembly, adopted the resolution of the Political Commission on the elections in Albania, which recognized the legitimacy of the Albanian elected Parliament and decided to increase assistance for Albania for the improvement of its legislation, institutions and the work in the public order bodies, always based on the European democratic principles.

Albania: Interior Minister Meets With Italian, U.S. Diplomats

AU0908193396 Tirana ATA in English
1417 GMT 9 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, August 9 (ATA)—Albanian Interior Minister Halit Shamata recently had meetings with some ambassadors and representatives of the diplomatic corps in Tirana, Interior Ministry spokesman Ndreke Gjini reports.

Both parties in the meeting with the Ambassador of the Italian Republic Paolo Foresti expressed their readiness to promote the cooperation between the police of the two countries and the need for a more efficient cooperation in the fight against crime.

Mr. Foresti congratulated Minister Shamata on the new post and said that the relations and cooperation between Italy and Albania will be promoted in the future.

Mr. Shamata briefed Mr. Foresti on some problems related with the restructuring of some structures of the police so that they be more efficient in the fight against crime.

Today before noon, Mr. Shamata had a meeting with the charge d'affaires of the U.S. Embassy in Tirana, Mr. Robert Chekuta, and the second secretary of this embassy, Lin Gurina.

After congratulating Mr. Shamata on the new post of the interior minister, U.S. diplomats discussed the great interest and support of the U.S. for the diplomatic developments in Albania.

Mr. Chekuta expressed his condolences to Mr. Shamata over the killing of two police officials and took interest in the work to uncover the authors and the truth about the two crimes.

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U.S. diplomats also asked regarding the rally that left wing opposition conducted on May 28 this year.

Mr. Shamata said that there are two cases still under investigation with regard to that rally. He said that also contacts have been established between the Interior Ministry and the parliamentary commission set up for this purpose.

The talk with U.S. diplomats also focused on questions of restructuring in the Interior Ministry conformed with European norms and standards. Minister Shamata said that in order to realise this process an intensive work is going on to make the necessary changes in the existing legislation.

Both parties in the meetings expressed the need of a close cooperation between the U.S. Embassy and the Albanian Interior Ministry.

The U.S. diplomats said that Washington is interested in the drives towards the perfection of legislation and the restructuring of this Ministry according to international standards, the report of the spokesman says.

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Bulgaria: Pavlov Denies Possibility of Military Coup

AU1208111796 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 10 Aug 96 p 4

[Interview with Bulgarian Defense Minister Dimitur Pavlov by Vasil Lyutskanov; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Lyutskanov] Minister Pavlov, could the Army be used to introduce a state of emergency or for a military coup in the fall or winter?

[Pavlov] This is simply a fabricated topic. It is not coming from the Army, the Defense Ministry, or the military branches. It is a result of the general mood in the country and the quest for law, order, and a firm hand. Perhaps the answer should be sought precisely in this direction: Our society identifies the Army with discipline and order. However, both the Constitution and the Defense Bill prevent the Army from interfering in the domestic political and social life. That means it must not cause any harm or help anyone. In addition, a military coup, which at present or in the future is absolutely out of the question, would not resolve the country's problems.

[Lyutskanov] Will there be serious changes in the General Staff and the Army branches by September?

[Pavlov] Yes, of course. This is a normal cadre reshuffle—some will be promoted, others will retire. Almost all officers whose names have been included in the presidential decrees or the minister's orders will be promoted to higher positions.

[Lyutskanov] Could we expect a surprising change at the top of the General Staff, as the case was in September?

[Pavlov] This is impossible. We have not discussed anything like this.

[Lyutskanov] When will you propose commanders for the Air Forces corps?

[Pavlov] We will propose them next week for approval by the Council of Ministers. Those appointments which are within the prerogative of the president will be submitted to him for his approval. After he signs the decrees, they will be published.

[Lyutskanov] What will happen to the surplus tanks we have now that we have received the 100 T-72 Russian tanks? Will we cut them to pieces or sell them?

[Pavlov] They are not surplus. We took them out of our Paris Treaty quota already last year, and they are intended both for elimination and for sale. In addition, we will turn some of them into tow vehicles and other means of transportation.

Bulgaria: Generals Rebel Against Plan To Revise Law

AU1208110796 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 10 Aug 96 p 3

[Staff report: "General Staff Rebels Against Revising Defense Bill"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At a 9 August meeting of the Supreme Military Council chaired by Minister Dimitur Pavlov, generals from the Bulgarian Army General Staff and the Army branches rebelled against moves to amend the Defense Law and the code on its application, TRUD learned from an informed source.

A proposal was made to place a five-year moratorium on application of six articles of the code. The code was introduced in June and is considered a Labor Code of sorts for Bulgarian citizens in uniform. At the end of July, officers and sergeants signed their first professional personnel contracts in the last 50 years on the basis of this code. Experts think the proposed moratorium on the six crucial articles of the code favors officers with insufficient education who are nevertheless occupying high positions. The articles in question include mandatory requirements on graduating from the General Staff or the Military Academy, the required number of service years or qualifications for receiving a promotion to a higher rank or appointing the officers to another commanding positions, and so forth. The proposed moratorium practically revises the Defense Law, which went into effect only five months ago on 28 February. At the end of the meeting, the defense minister withdrew the proposed revision. The Supreme Military Council realized that the uniform list of the basic and intermediate commanding positions in the Army has not been completed so far, and without this list it is impossible to carry out the fall officer reshuffle. A decision must be made on the reshuffle on 16 August at the meeting of the General Staff Military Council.

Bulgaria: Second Private Firm Licensed for Arms Trade

AU0908090996 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 9 Aug 96 p 4

[Article by Lyuboslav Kirov: "Is Kintex Behind the Private Companies in the Arms Business?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Experts reported yesterday that former employees of the Kintex Company are behind the two private companies that received arms-trading licenses.

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In the experts' view, only people in the sector who have links with our military industry and solid international contacts could develop business in special products.

However, there is great doubt that the private companies will manage to export anything, a high government official said. In his opinion, it is too early to end the state monopoly in this sensitive field. Unless the company manages to export Bulgarian arms to a value of at least $500,000, it is supposed to lose its license.

In the meantime, it has emerged that the second private company with a full arms-trading license is Sema OOD, which is fully Bulgarian owned. The first company was Gerakomers.

The Interdepartmental Committee on the Defense Industry under the Council of Ministers has confirmed that it has restored the state-owned Teraton Company's full license to trade in special products. Teraton lost the license in October last year, at the same time as Armimex. The government accused the two companies of acting to the country's detriment. In the latest developments, Armimex also had its license restored.

According to unofficial information, during the period that it had no license, Teraton exported Romanian weapons worth $7-8 million to South America. In so doing, Mladen Mutafchiev's company acted quite legally as the representative of a foreign arms concern. If some people had not been subjected to political pressure, these dollars could have come to Bulgaria, experts commented.

Bulgaria: Disc Firm Chief Dimitrov Views Business

AU0208132096 Sofia PARI in Bulgarian 23 Jul 96 p 16

[Interview with Biser Dimitrov, president of Giga Storage company, by special correspondent Svetlana Popova in Belfort, France, on 2 July: "I Am Glad To Have Something the Others Do Not"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Popova] From all my conversations with you, it becomes clear that you have not lost interest in Bulgaria. Will you play a part in the privatization process? Your name is often mentioned in connection with Bulgarian electronics companies.

[Dimitrov] I am no longer worried about visiting Bulgaria. Last year, I was worried, because if we go there to explain who has done what and why, what will my company do here? However, now the company has managed to get on without me for three months because of the investigation, and this means it is now set on a good footing and can get on by itself. I think that there is something to be done in Bulgaria, but they should seek us out, because if we seek them out, we will be asked why we are doing it and what our plans are. You know that various statements have been made—we do not want people like Biser Dimitrov, we can recover on our own. Let them just try. When they realize that they cannot put things right, then we may come and do something. I think that in Bulgaria things cannot fail to advance. We are familiar with the situation, we know the personnel, we know what is wanted and how to do it. If I were to do something there, I would want only one thing, namely that it should not be in Stara Zagora, as there has been too much noise made there. If anyone wants to be our partner, let him choose any God-forsaken town or plot of land, and we will build a new plant; that is the best solution. In my view, in our business the best place to be is in Sofia, Plovdiv, or Ruse. Of course, it is possible to manufacture magnetic heads in Razlog, and we have an inquiry from there, but we cannot start up everywhere. We first have to complete our work here; the job is already clear, and more or less finished. Later, we are expected to set up a factory in China. After this, it may perhaps be Bulgaria's turn.

Regarding DZU [Disc Memory Devices Plant in Stara Zagora] and the plant in Pravets, I have always held my own special opinion. Our system was an antisystem, and we attempted to do things that contradict all the laws of physics. The time came when people could not see this clearly. However, the teams of specialists that were formed are what is valuable, and they should be retained. Otherwise, the equipment and the plants are not of interest. Both in Bulgaria and here, in France, people are impressed by a house or a machine. In 1990, when I went to California, I was also impressed by such things; you know about my house. Later, I had the idea of privatizing some of the German Robitron plants! Premises that covered 20,000 square meters seemed to me to be something very valuable. However, the Americans said: We deal with technologies, not thousands of square meters, so that we will have to pull the plant down and rebuild it to make it suitable for our needs.

[Popova] Now that you have entered the hard disc market, you possess both technological and commercial rights; are there any chances left of you manufacturing discs in Bulgaria?

[Dimitrov] The mentality that I came across in Bulgaria was such that it is very difficult to give a factory to anyone. In the coming years, however, we will give them to everyone. Look at Germany: There they sold factories for 1 German mark. It is better to do something, even if it is wrong, than to do nothing. The idea is for people to take the product who can achieve something, who can establish it on the home market;

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they will start paying their taxes at some point. When the Americans sold Metro Goldwyn to the Japanese, did the Japanese take everything home? The state can always regulate things to suit itself. However, you have to do it in such an interesting way that the investors will come. Eastern Europe is most interesting at the moment. In this part of the world, where will you go in the high technology field? To Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Bulgaria, perhaps.

[Popova] What do you think of the privatization process in Bulgaria?

[Dimitrov] The Bulgarian worries all the time about missing something, and in this sense, I believe that it will be difficult to privatize the large concerns. Although this is correct and sensible, it will be hard to carry out. Furthermore, it will be very difficult to revitalize factories that are relics of the past. They were built and designed for the old times, for old technologies, to manufacture under the socialist ordering system, for our Russian and Soviet clients. Modern production is something quite different from what we imagined before and what we have done. In the final analysis, it is also what we copied. This means that we waited for someone to develop something and put it on the market, and then sat around for a year or two before taking it and getting our talented engineers to copy it. Accordingly, we were always five years behind. In other words, the production facilities and plants that were built produced goods that were five years behind, so that we never caught up the rest of the world, and were never even only a year or two behind. In our sector, business advances at such a dizzy rate, a product is obsolete in nine to 12 months. What Bulgaria has that is of value is the intelligentsia who were cultivated in the previous period and the people who are experts in our field. These cadres should now be utilized and their possibilities should be expanded. However, since at the moment there is practically no such production in the electronics sector, the teams of specialists are being wasted; some of them sell pizzas, while others sell kebabs. Those who are particularly intelligent are simply knocked sideways and do not know how to react. As a result, all the potential that has been created until now is being wasted; it very quickly becomes outdated, because people who have reached one level must always climb to the next level, then to the one after that. For example, in California I have seven Bulgarian engineers. When they arrived there, they were at the top in Bulgaria. However, when they came to us they started, well not in the first-year class, but in the fourth year. We believe that it will take them another year to become fully competent and reach the Silicon Valley level.

[Popova] You claim that at the moment you are earning good profits precisely because you are keeping ahead of the pack.

[Dimitrov] That is true. At the moment we are producing a 1.1 gigabyte hard disc, and have been doing so for over two months. At the end of the month, we start production of a 2.5-gigabyte storage device—1.25 gigagbytes on each of two discs, and a month later will change over to 3 gigabytes—1.5 gigabytes on two discs. In September, we will launch a 4.5-gigabyte device. Almost no one believed that this would happen. I have returned to the 5-inch format, whereas prior to this the trend was toward 3.5 inches. This is unusual in our branch, where the trend is toward miniaturization. We developed and designed the smallest product—a 1.8-inch disc. However, when I went round our clients and talked to them, it turned out that no one was interested in it, however interesting the engineering solution is, but everyone was interested in how much they had to pay per megabyte. The 5.25-inch format is the most efficient solution as regards price per megabyte of memory, so I started on this format. When I began, everyone said I was mad. However, in 1994, due to the boom in multimedia the format returned to what it was before, and everyone found that what I had started doing is sensible. Quantum came out with a 5.25-inch product a few weeks after us (later we had to stop production because of certain well-known reasons connected with the furor over my arrest). Our product is designed for three discs, whereas Quantum's is for two, so that they will need a further nine to 12 months to produce the item in its final version (for the time being). We are offering 4.5 gigabytes, while theirs offers 2.5. They will come out with a three-disc version, that is certain. Their program for their device is called Cyclops, and it envisions a 6-gigabyte device, but then we will be offering 9 gigabytes. That is how it is. We know precisely what they are doing, and they know what we are doing. The race continues, and at the moment we are glad to have something that the others do not.

[Popova] Do you regard yourselves as rivals of Quantum?!

[Dimitrov] Quantum is our biggest help. The market is big enough for everyone. Since Quantum, which is the largest producer of disc devices and the second largest company in the branch as regards turnover, is staking its money on such a program, it automatically establishes the product with this format on the market. In other respects, we harbor no illusions—the difference between us is like that between Volkswagen and Audi.... We earn profits from the moment we enter the market. It is a great satisfaction, to start from zero and do business in Silicon Valley.

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[Popova] You have already started production.

[Dimitrov] Yes, but we have not yet started producing the quantities needed. We are to open new production facilities in the Far East, in Hong Kong and Malaysia. Next year we intend to produce about 10 million units.

[Popova] So the Japanese investors have arrived.

[Dimitrov] Yes, this is the Sumitomo giant.

[Popova] There was a lot of noise about their involvement in the copper dealing scandal.

[Dimitrov] The corporation lost $1.8 billion. I would wish anyone to have Sumitomo's problems, because this amount represents 10 percent of the profits earned by the division that deals in nonferrous metals. (Author's note: The corporation consists of 600 companies.) This means, you earn a lot, lose a lot, then earn a lot more, and that planned economies mean nothing to you. In former times, we pushed our economy ahead and never went back, but you can be at the top and suddenly collapse! Anyway, in September we expect to launch a joint venture with Sumitomo.

[Popova] Only today (author's note: 2 July) you hired six more workers here, and nine people turned up for tests. Are you expanding production, or taking such risks to claim the 10 million French francs that the regional economic development agency is supposed to grant you for providing new jobs in Belfort?

[Dimitrov] We are already short of workers, and certainly need qualified engineering staff. By September or October, we should have 600 people working here. However, we will not be further increasing our payroll at the Belfort plant, because we are starting a plant with 1,200 workers in the Far East, in Sen Dzin, (spelling as transliterated) an industrial zone near Hong Kong.

[Popova] It seems to me that now all the observers of the endless discussions about the Bulgarian electronics industry link your name with the battle over which company—Giga Storage or DZU in Stara Zagora—will win the Russian orders for hard discs. People in DZU have talked about receiving $7 million from the Russian Ministry of Fuel and Energy plus a further $7.5 million in guaranteed payments, all on a Russian state project.

[Dimitrov] The Russian state is at one and the same time both poor and very rich. You cannot get money from Russia, but it is possible to do interesting things with Russia; one simply has to produce a limited quantity there. They have people who have worked in this industry and long to return to it. They are doing what they can, but the money is elsewhere.

[Popova] Why is it that you employ all kinds of other operators, but no Bulgarians? You hire Malaysians and Frenchmen, whom you are going to train, while the people who made hard discs in Stara Zagora have lost their jobs.

[Dimitrov] To the contrary, I work with many Bulgarians.

[Popova] They are all engineers.

[Dimitrov] Yes, and I know them. I talk from time to time with all my former colleagues in Bulgaria. However, I think that one has to wait for the right moment to come in Bulgaria, because at the moment, whatever I do, they say that Biser Dimitrov is engaged in money laundering, or has stolen $20 million, which later became $60 million. I do not know any more how much they say I stole. If I had only part of this money, I do not think that I would try so hard to work. I do not know why they have concerned themselves with me for all of 10 years. Way back in 1987, I was kicked out of the game there, and by none other than people like Georgi Atanasov and Georgi Georgiev, who was chief of the former Committee for State and People's Control. Players of this kind incited the young democrats, who were not even aware of what was happening. They simply exploited them very skillfully to settle old scores. As far as I understand, the game is still going on now. I cannot understand them and do not know what they are fighting for and what exactly they want.

[Popova] The people at DZU in Stara Zagora have threatened to start an action against you for patent infringement regarding the ownership of the technology of the servowriter that was developed by Pont Peripherals (author's note: the disc development company in California). How do you regard this prospect?

[Dimitrov] The only thing we have done is to hire three Bulgarian specialists on servowriters. However, every company makes its own servowriter. Whether I will do this with American or Bulgarian engineers is my business and the business of the people who come here to work for me. Accordingly, I have no problems with DZU, but if they have any problems with me, let them engage their lawyers. Incidentally, in Bulgaria they were talking about extraditing me and heaven knows what else besides.

[Popova] In Bulgaria, the myth has been spread around for six years now about the young Bulgarian lad who set off abroad with $500 and later became a big success. How far did you actually get with this amount of money?

[Dimitrov] To Vienna, actually. From Vienna I took a plane. The plane ticket does not cost $500, but nearer $1,200. This means that someone bought the ticket for

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me. However, it is true that I turned up in California with $500.

[Popova] Usually, no one buys me any plane tickets.

[Dimitrov] No one has asked me about it.

[Popova] I am asking now.

[Dimitrov] Look, I have very many friends who do not only buy me plane tickets. There, one invests in people. That is why I obtained a job immediately. Today, people there ask me what I can do for them.

[Popova] What sort of job did you get there?

[Dimitrov] I started with Conner [spelling transliterated]. The founder of this company has been my personal friend since 1984. I was a young man from Eastern Europe who showed up there, in California. Everyone knew that I had been arrested and had served time in a Bulgarian prison, but the whole crowd of them offered me business and support, and I made a start with their help. When they offered me an annual salary of $100,000, I jumped out of my skin and said, wait, I did not hear you properly. It turned out that $100,000 is not a lot of money after you have paid your taxes. That is what is nice about America. Once you have paid your taxes, you can sleep peacefully, without worrying about who said what to whom. After that, I became a consultant on a project from which I made a lot of money. In the first year, I made more money than in any year subsequently. Accordingly, I went and bought myself a house—the Bulgarian is always interested in houses and cars. You pay out $200,000 for a design, borrow $400,000, and buy your house. It is difficult to succeed in California. You have to be able to make it, and it seems that we can do it. I invite all the disc specialists to come and hear my lecture at Data Storage, which is the biggest world conference in our branch; I have been invited to speak there in October about innovations in disc design, together with Tom Mitchell. He will lecture on his 3-inch devices, while I will talk about my 5.25-inch ones.

[Popova] Giga Storage is not your only business. What about the others?

[Dimitrov] I have interests in telecommunications. This is an interesting business, especially for Bulgaria at the moment. It is a crazy business, and there is a lot of money in it. I am in the business of computer networks for transferring information. I have several companies in a number of special fields. I have made most money from digital cameras. The next generation of photographic cameras will be digital. Until now, they have been used on space satellites. The greatest thing about this story is that I started a company in 1994, then sold the manufacturing rights to Sanyo, and now Epson is selling the cameras. At the Comdex world electronics exhibition in 1995, I asked Bill Gates who was producing the most interesting products, and in reply he pulled out our camera.

At the moment, we are the leaders in this branch, but there are 15 other companies, and no doubt the leaders will change. In any event, it is a great satisfaction to be the founder of such a company.... I will tell you more about it later. In general, high-tech is an interesting profession—one thing merges into another.

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Czech Republic: Daily Views Effects of D'Amato Bill

AU0908115096 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 8 Aug 96 p 9

[Commentary by Karel Hostka: "Questionable Compromises Between Terrorism and Crude Oil"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Trade relations between the United States and the EU are usually barely balanced on a thin edge. The impulse given to them by U.S. President Bill Clinton on Monday by signing the so-called D'Amato Bill threatens to push them over to the side of confrontation.

The D'Amato Bill enables the White House to sanction any U.S. or foreign firm that invests more than $40 million per year in the oil industries of Iran or Libya. It is obviously a result of the growing conviction on the part of Washington that the two countries are the eminences grises of world terrorism (the possible involvement of Tehran in the bomb attack in Saudi Arabia in June, in which 19 U.S. Air Force men were killed is at stake, as well as the unexplained circumstances of the TWA Boeing crash a month later). Thus, Clinton continues with the policy of sanctions, which the international community agrees has a negligible effect. It suffices to recall the situation in Iraq or the Helms-Burton Bill (similar in form to the D'Amato Bill) applied against Cuba. After all, the United States imposed a complete economic blockade on Iran as long ago as June 1995—and again with very limited results.

Nevertheless, one can understand the White House, so far. The effect of international sanctions could certainly be argued, but their implementation is, after all, given by the foreign policy and domestic interests of the United States. What immediately roused disagreement on the part of, above all, the EU is the fact that the D'Amato Bill facilitates sanctions not only against U.S. firms, but also against European firms pursuing a share in the oil riches of Iran and Libya. Clinton de facto assumed the right to refuse EXIM Bank (U.S. Export and Import Bank) assistance to specific firms and companies, to ban shipments of U.S. products and hardware to these firms, and to cut off any loans provided by U.S. financial institutions.

As usual, France is protesting the loudest and seriously threatening countermeasures on the part of the EU. Bonn has also indicated annoyance, while London, Washington's traditional European ally, has assumed, albeit with objections, a wait-and-see attitude. The interests of the two economic blocs clash mostly in the instance of Iran. The question arises here of whether Clinton is not defending the interests of the powerful oil-producer lobby. Namely, the U.S. Conoco company had to clear out of Iran last year because of the sanctions imposed on Tehran and thereby lost a lucrative contract for exploration of the coastal shelf in the Sirri region. The resulting opening was immediately filled by the French Total, which thus gained an order worth $600 million. It is understandable that the Americans do not want to clear out from attractive positions in the region as economically and politically attractive as the Persian Gulf and leave them to European or other competition. If the so-called antiterrorist D'Amato Bill is, however, to protect U.S. economic interests, Clinton will have great difficulty defending and promoting it on an international scale.

Insecurity bordering on panic was also evoked by the latest White House measures in the Gulf region itself. Namely, Iran remains the regional power here and represents a factor one cannot ignore for the states in the region. The 20,000 U.S. troops deployed on the territory of Saudi Arabia since the war against Iraq symbolize the interest of the White House in the future development of this explosive region. Thus, because of its controversial ally, Arab diplomacy got into an unenviable impasse regarding Tehran. If it supports the U.S. measures, it certainly will evoke a reaction from the Ayatollahian regime. On the other hand, the experience of the war over Kuwait and the endeavors to eliminate Iran as oil-producing competition call for at least nonresistance to the U.S. strategy.

Regarding Iran itself, it understandably strictly denies any accusations of support for terrorism. Although the diplomatic activity that preceded the D'Amato Bill, at least in the sphere of rhetoric, implied the possibility of a military confrontation, the situation has been calm recently and will most probably remain so. Of course, Tehran could not but notice the sparks caused by the action of the White House between the United States and the EU and let it be known that the dialogue that has been conducted between Iran and Brussels for some time now will continue under the new conditions. This statement conceals an offer of cooperation with the EU, which, above all, the German engineering firms, but also other enterprises from France and Great Britain cannot leave unnoticed. Iran is the second-largest producer within the OPEC organization (producing 3.8 million barrels per day) and imports a lot of engineering equipment from Europe. This includes practically all of the hardware for its petrochemical industry, which, in turn, represents 80 percent of all Iranian revenues.

The D'Amato Bill has been a controversial regulation ever since its signing. Namely, it moves the idea of the struggle against world terrorism, which was recently

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supported also by the other G-7 members, into the sphere of economic competition and forces onto third countries the rules dictated by the White House. It is absolutely certain that, in the coming months, this ostentatiously celebrated measure will become a point of friction in international economic relations.

Czech Republic: Canceled Tenders Delay Army Modernization

AU0908124096 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 7 Aug 96 p 3

[Article by "bak": "Czech Army Modernization Hindered by Bidding Delays"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Problems and errors in the running of public bids by the Defense Ministry (MO) have caused delays in the planned modernization of the Army. In some instances, the combat readiness of the Army has thus been impaired. The delays are occurring even in areas for which the MO has assigned funds. The Army purchase of night sights for light firearms has been delayed by more than a year so far. For this operation the Treasury budgeted 191 million korunas [Kc] last year and Kc94 million this year. The tender was issued in March 1995, and the results were announced at the end of July. After complaints from participating firms, however, the Ministry for Economic Competition (MHS) canceled the tender because of substantial errors on the part of the issuer. A new bidding has not yet been issued. According to the decision of the MHS, it should have been done in the spring of this year. In the meantime, improvement in the ability to fight at night is one of the priorities of Army modernization.

There was a similar scenario with the order for the staff computer system. The results of the bidding were announced in November 1995 but canceled after protests from unsuccessful firms. No decision has been made on the appeal against this cancellation that was raised by the winner of the tender, the firm Unisys. Meanwhile the program is described as one of the priorities for convergence of the Czech Army's systems with those of NATO. Originally the staff computer system was to be launched in operation in 1998.

Czech Republic: Army Property Holdings Total Kc195 Billion

AU0908125396 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 7 Aug 96 p 1

[Article by "km": "The Army Has Kc195 Billion in Property"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The largest ever inventory took place in the Army, and it was determined that the value of Army property on the territory of the Czech Republic exceeds the sum of 195 billion korunas [Kc], which is more than six times the annual Army budget.

Until now, the Army did not have complete data on the value of its property; it had therefore frequently come under the barrage of public criticism for having allowed state budget funds to disappear into the depths of the Army bureaucracy without any control.

The Defense Ministry began to take the inventory after, among other things, the government threatened that, if the Army management were not made clear, the defense sector would not get any additional funds. "It has improved by about two degrees. [sentence as published] The Army is transparent now," Josef Podhorsky from the Accounting Department of the Defense Ministry said. "If the politicians decide to increase Army funding, they do not have to fear for the fate of these funds," he added.

Although the inventory shows that the Army is among the richest units of the state administration, the amount of Kc195 billion itself is not, according to ministry analysts, the decisive factor. The main thing is that it is clear now what and how much of it the Army has.

The Defense Ministry management can now check, for instance, whether requests from individual units for the purchase of ammunition, spare parts, or socks are justified. Before, for example, a unit would request Kc1 million to purchase shovels, but no one knew that another Army unit, which had a surplus of shovels, could supply them.

The annual Army budget has been approximately Kc30 billion for several years now. An increase has been asked particularly with regard to the expected entry into the North Atlantic alliance.

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Slovakia: Opposition Parties To Avert Country's Isolation

LD1008182396 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1600 GMT 10 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The National Executive Committee of the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] has once again demanded that basic democratization changes, which will give opposition parties the right to proportional representation in the work of parliamentary bodies, including the parliamentary monitoring agencies, be implemented as early as at the National Council's September session. This was said in the statement adopted at the conclusion of the committee's session. [passage omitted]

Editor Oto Goerner asked the party's chairman, Jozef Migas, what other conclusion had been made at the session.

[Begin recording] [Passage omitted] [Goerner] How did the session assess prime minister's written statement—or his pledge that privatization will not continue—and how did the session asses his representatives' comments about the prime minister's pledge?

[Migas] The SDL National Executive Committee regards the breach of the written statement by the chairman of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] as yet another piece of evidence that, for the sake of privatization, the HZDS leadership is capable of totally discarding even the honor of its own chairman. [passage omitted]

[Goerner] What action will the SDL take vis-a-vis the HZDS and the other political parties?

[Migas] The SDL is ready to open talks with parliamentary political parties immediately, even before the National Council session. The SDL is ready to discuss above all improvements in the social situation of the working people, the solving of the mounting problems in the national economy, and the easing of the negative effects of the current privatization policies. [passage omitted]

The other subject we will also discuss with political parties will be ending Slovakia's political isolation. The interests of individual parties should take second place in this respect. [words indistinct] What we need is that all coalition and opposition parties work toward preventing this isolation. This is in the interest of Slovakia and in the interest of our citizens. [end recording]

Slovakia: Commentary on 'Regional Dimensions' of Foreign Policy

AU0908141096 Bratislava SME in Slovak 9 Aug 96 p 4

[Commentary by Ondrej Dostal: "Slovakia Without Allies"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The uncertain geopolitical position of Slovakia, caused by doubts about the actual orientation of the ruling team in Bratislava, is not the only flaw in its position on the international scene. That is, Slovak foreign policy also needs to be practiced more conceptually within regional dimensions. (As long as we do not consider confrontation with our southern neighbor to be part of this.) In other words: Meciarite Slovakia is not a problem element only in relation to the enlarging West, but also within the framework of the reawakening Central European region.

Following the factual demise of the Visegrad Four, the Slovak Republic has not managed to find a closer partner among the surrounding countries, to say nothing of an ally. The Czech Republic, after its initial postfederal individualism, has begun to turn toward coordinating its integrative activities with Poland. Hungary, in turn, is dealing with its geographic handicap (the so far neutral Austria lies between it and the NATO countries and, in the future, the yet unaccepted Slovakia will, evidently, also do the same) by making a southern move through Slovenia. The addition of this country by the U.S. Congress to the troika of most promising applicants for NATO membership comes as no surprise; it is the result of longer-term considerations. Just as an illustration: Slovene and Hungarian Defense Ministers Jelko Kacin and Gyorgy Keleti signed an agreement less than a month ago on cooperation between the two countries' armies in military flights and air defense, which they both described as the first step toward Slovenia and Hungary joining NATO simultaneously.

Slovakia lacks any type of comparable alternative to the Polish-Czech or Hungarian-Slovene alliances that are being formed. It is possible that Slovak diplomacy is not thinking at all within these dimensions. It is undertaking no more discernible activity in this regard. Therefore (although, the essence of the problem certainly does not lie in this), its chances to fulfill its Western aspirations are declining further.

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Hungary: Kovacs Ready for Urgent Treaty Talks With Romania

LD0908122296 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1000 GMT 9 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The foreign minister [Laszlo Kovacs] told this program that Hungary is ready to resume basic treaty talks 'n a few days' time.

[Begin Kovacs recording] I recently received a letter from Romanian Foreign Minister [Teodor] Melescanu in which he indicated that Romania is ready to adopt a joint interpretation statement regarding Council of Europe recommendation 1201, which I proposed earlier. This would resolve this pending issue. [end recording]

Laszlo Kovacs said he told his Romanian counterpart earlier that the Hungarian side is ready to continue talks in the first half of September. However, if Romania considers the matter more urgent, another round of coordination talks could be held between experts even in August.

According to the Hungarian foreign minister, Romania's urgency about further talks is unlikely to be a campaign trick before the upcoming parliamentary elections:

[Begin Kovacs recording] Usually an election campaign is not the best time for reaching compromises. That is why we thought the treaty was less likely to be signed before the elections. It might be a message to the West. If it is a genuine message, then it is a good one. As far as we are concerned, we are ready to participate in a further round of expert talks within days. [end recording]

Hungary: Hungarians Protest Nationalist Campaign in Ukraine

AU0908153396 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 9 Aug 96 pp 1, 9

[Correspondent's report: "Hungarian Letter to Kuchma"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The national organization of ethnic Hungarians in Ukraine, the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Ukraine [UMDSZ], sent an open letter to Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma this week in which they asked the president to use his constitutional rights and take the necessary steps to halt the anti-Hungarian campaign in Ukraine, a campaign that violates the law.

The open letter, signed by Mihaly Toth, the Hungarian representative in the Ukrainian Parliament and UMDSZ chairman, informed Leonid Kuchma that a deliberate anti-Hungarian campaign has been going on for weeks in both the Subcarpathian and the central Ukrainian press, in connection with the celebration of the Hungarian milecentennial in Ukraine.

The UMDSZ is deeply alarmed by articles that "question the right of the Hungarian community to celebrate the major anniversary of its history." According to the letter, by falsifying history, these publications present the Hungarians as the arch enemy of the Ukrainian people. The letter rejects the accusations that call the Hungarians adventurers and revanchists and that Ukrainians should fear for their territorial integrity. Both local and national newspaper published articles that, by affecting the public falsely, denied "the 1,000 years of peaceful coexistence of various ethnic groups in Subcarpathia, as well as the positive role played by the Hungarian community both in the creation of an independent Ukraine and its democratization process."

According to the UMDSZ, the aforementioned mood-inciting outbursts are violating the constitutional rights of the deep-rooted Hungarian national minority in Ukraine and are threatening the peaceful coexistence of national minorities.

The UMDSZ asks Kuchma to order the Information Ministry and the Attorney General to call to account the persons guilty of inciting the confrontation. In conclusion, the UMDSZ calls for the setting up of a joint committee made up of Ukrainian and Hungarian historians to clarify the controversial issues in the common history of the two nations.

The Cultural Association of Hungarians in Subcarpathia [KMKSZ] refuses to discuss the issue of the Verecke memorial with the Ukrainian nationalist organizations in Subcarpathia, because the KMKSZ does not regard these organizations as partners—KMKSZ Chairman Miklos Kovacs declared. According to Miklos Kovacs, the state is their partner. The KMKSZ observes the valid Ukrainian laws and therefore has the right to celebrate the anniversaries of its national history.

At a news conference, Janos Homoki, parliamentary deputy of the Independent Smallholders Party [FKGP], expressed the opinion of his party about the events in Subcarpathia. Janos Homoki pointed out that the Smallholders' warnings regarding the Hungarian-Ukrainian basic treaty have proved to be justified. Since the signing of the treaty, the situation of the ethnic Hungarians in Subcarpathia has further deteriorated rather than improved. It was announced at the aforementioned news conference that despite the events in Subcarpathia, FKGP Chairman Jozsef Torgyan will cross the Ukrainian border and pay his respects at the Verecke Pass on 14 August.

Hungary: Kovacs: Anti-Hungarian Campaign in Ukraine 'Regrettable'

LD1008191796 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1730 GMT 10 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs has confirmed that the meeting of the Hungarian and Slovak prime ministers will be held in Hungary on 13 August. [passage omitted]

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According to the foreign minister, there is still a chance to celebrate the 1100th anniversary of the Hungarian conquest at the Verecke strait.

[Begin Kovacs recording] I consider the campaign against the anniversary celebrations and against the Hungarian minority that has developed in Subcarpathia, in Ukraine, regrettable. This is contrary to the spirit of the Hungarian-Ukrainian Basic Treaty. I hope that the Ukrainian authorities will put an end to this development. [end recording]

The foreign minister also said that he had asked his Ukrainian counterpart in a letter to support the anniversary celebrations.

Hungary: Prime Minister Horn Interviewed

LD1108230196 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 11 Aug 96

[Interview with Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn by an unidentified correspondent on the "This Week" program—live or recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Correspondent] Good evening Mr. Prime Minister.

I am going to list some events, starting with the world meeting of Hungarian Reformed Churches held in Transylvania, the meeting of the World Federation of Hungarians, the meeting of successful Hungarians, Hungary in 2000, the Budapest meeting of Hungarian scientists—all of them were held this year. Is there any tangible, concrete result from all this, or is it only a spectacular demonstration, the 1100-year-old dream?

[Horn] Naturally, both aspects are important. One the one hand, it is important to demonstrate that all Hungarians living in different parts of the world are trying to hold together. On the other hand, this is naturally linked to the 1100th anniversary. We are determined to make use of the opportunities provided by Hungarians living in the West to strengthen the country's good reputation and lobby in the interest of their mother country, and many other things. At the same time, I would also like to stress that all this is in line with the country's, the government's foreign policy efforts.

[Correspondent] The climax, so to speak, of these Hungarian-Hungarian meetings was a meeting held at the beginning of July, when the Hungarian Government, the Foreign Ministry, the Office for Hungarians Beyond the Borders, Hungarian parliamentary parties and representatives of Hungarian organizations and associations beyond the border signed a joint statement.

This Hungarian-Hungarian joint statement has caused a large scale uproar in Slovakia, and Bucharest also asked for an explanation. What, in your view, is the reason for this?

[Horn] First of all, the statement signed on 5 July does not include anything that would insult our neighbors, on the one hand. On the other hand, it does not include anything that would be different from the country's, the government's present foreign policy. It takes a position regarding matters which are in line with the government program, on the one hand, and with European standards and practice, on the other hand. However, I also feel that we have to make our neighbors understand, that... [pauses] It is obvious that when Hungarians beyond the borders perceive Hungary's integration efforts as a step which helps the mother country's—the Hungarians'—prosperity, it is also natural that their prosperity can be guaranteed in their native land, in the country where they live, in accordance with the legal system of that country and by making use of the opportunities there. This is a very important element.

At the same time, this does not contradict the fact that we have continuously been building our ties with our neighbors, with all of them. The main point and aim of this is that Hungary and its neighbors have a lot of common interests which have to be strengthened.

[Correspondent] I am holding the joint statement in my hands. Let me quote the point which is the most debated from this aspect. Quote: the fundamental condition of the preservation of the identity of Hungarians living beyond the borders is the creation of self-government, autonomy in accordance with current European practice and in the spirit of international standards, endquote. The way you have mentioned this is obviously one of the possible interpretations. But what about the interpretation in Bratislava and Bucharest, according to which Hungary violated the Slovak-Hungarian basic treaty?

[Horn, interrupting] I very much regret it, if (?objections) have been published in connection with this, because the text quoted by you does not mention the assertion of collective rights or territorial autonomy based on ethnic criteria. It only includes the exercising of rights—in culture, the use of the mother tongue and education—which are usually exercised in communities. It is obvious that man is a social animal and these rights can be exercised only in communities. On the other hand, the Hungarian-Slovak basic treaty—or the Romanian-Hungarian basic treaty under preparation—also includes the principle of the inviolability of borders. That is to say, there is no room for any kind of separatism or separatist efforts here, and nobody is considering plans of this kind.

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This is why I consider it very important to interpret unambiguously everything which is included in this statement, and to make progress in developing our relations.

[Correspondent] Do you not think that by signing this statement Hungarian foreign policy has given Romanian or Slovak diplomacy a winning card and provided breeding ground for nationalist forces which sometimes determine the propaganda in Bratislava and Bucharest?

[Horn] I am convinced that, from time to time, there will be problems in our relations. This is one of them. However, we also have to take the fact into consideration that political relations—as well as economic, cultural and cross-border cooperation—have developed with both Slovakia and Romania. There is very significant progress in these fields.

On the other hand, we have to start with the point that they also have a vested interest in preserving the stability of the region and, within this, their country. They have also declared their intention to join the EU and NATO. The difficulties of this transition are also putting great pressure on them as well as on us. These are much greater merits, than the tension which occasionally occurs. I would also like to stress that if there is some tension, dispute or misunderstanding, we have to sit down to hold talks.

This week, when I started my work and looked at what happened and what did not happen, for example in Hungarian-Slovak relations, I phoned Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, in accordance with our earlier agreement, and proposed that we should sit down for informal talks in Hungary. This will take place on Tuesday.

It is certain that very serious questions will be discussed then.

[Correspondent] What kind of questions?

[Horn] Privatization, the issue of Gabcikovo dam on the River Danube....

[Correspondent, interrupting] Excuse me for interrupting you, I am not aware of the possibilities of privatization....

[Horn, interrepting] We earlier agreed that we would participate in privatization in Slovakia and we would cooperate in privatization, and this is closely related to our economic cooperation program.

[Correspondent] Let me ask in connection with this: Does this mean that, perhaps, Hungarian compensation coupons might be used....

[Horn, interrupting] I am not going into details. Experts will have to discuss this. I only want to boost these ties, and naturally the coordination of our integration efforts is also very important.

I also consider it very important that we are almost on the verge of an agreement on the Hungarian-Romanian basic treaty. I have asked our foreign affairs state secretary to travel to Bucharest next week and to discuss questions which are still open. The Romanian foreign minister's response to us regarding the [Council of Europe's] Recommendation 1201 [on minority rights] is acceptable for us. With this, probably, the last obstacle to concluding the basic treaty can also be removed. I can say that if we come to an agreement, I am ready to sign the basic treaty either in Budapest, or Bucharest, or even at a third venue. This is extremely important in our bilateral ties and also for our international partners. We have to set aside prestige or other points of view. Only one thing can be decisive, the interests of our country, our countries.

[Correspondent] If Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu is withdrawn from Romanian foreign politics, if the campaign manager of [Romanian] President Iliescu does not....

[Horn, interrupting] I do not know think that it will happen. I am not thinking of whether or not this will happen. Melescanu's letter must have been approved by the Romanian Government and the president.

[Correspondent] Has the venue of your meeting with Meciar been chosen?

[Horn] Yes, it will be in Hungary, somewhere near the border.

[Correspondent] Will the Slovak Language Law be raised at your talks with Meciar? The law raised the possibility of passing another law on the use of minority languages, which would settle Hungarian language issues.

[Horn] I have not had a meeting with Meciar since autumn 1994, when the assertion of minority rights was not raised. There were occasions when we could come to an agreement and there were occasions when we could make a significant step forward. However, the style and the content of the presentation of these problems are not at all indifferent.

What is important for me is that mutuality should be maintained in this process. For example, we consider Slovakia's support for Slovaks living in Hungary as important as our support for Hungarians living in Slovakia, which is our principal obligation as proved in practice. These questions will be raised at our talks next week.

However, I think that many of these questions, including the ones raised by you, are questions of the kind which can be negotiated with my counterpart.

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Hungary: Opinion Poll Shows MSZP Leading in Popularity

AU0908161396 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 9 Aug 96 pp 1, 4

[Unattributed report on an opinion poll on the popularity of the political parties in Hungary carried out by Szonda Ipsos between 20 and 30 July 1996]

[FBIS Translated Text] Every parliamentary party's camp of supporters changed in July 1996, and even if the 1-2 percent changes are not considerable, they increased the distance between the first and last places on the list. Leading the list of popularity is the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], enjoying the support of 19 percent of the population; closing the list is the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] with the support of 3 percent of the population. These are the most interesting results of the latest national political survey carried out by Szonda Ipsos in July 1996.

The number of MSZP and Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] supporters increased by 1 percent each between June and July, while the number of Independent Smallholders' Party [FKGP] and Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] supporters decreased by the same percentage. Bigger changes affected the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ] (2 percent increase) and the MDF (2 percent decrease), but these results cannot be called statistically relevant. The leading group stabilized in the past three months, and the present order got finalized in the wake of the change following the Torgyan-speech: MSZP is first, followed by the FKGP, which is lagging behind the MSZP by considerable points, but the other parties do not quite threaten the FKGP's second place. The closing group on the popularity list is also characterized by stability: The MDF has had a rented place there for the past six months.

Nor did antipathies change much in July: Most people—22 percent—said they would not vote in favor of the FKGP in any case; the next in the line of antipathy is the MSZP. We can find the Hungarian Justice and Life Party [MIEP] occupying third place on the negative list: 8 percent of those surveyed expressed their antipathy toward this party. Some 5 percent of the people oppose the MDF, 3 percent oppose the KDNP, 2 percent are against FIDESZ, and 1 percent are against the SZDSZ. We can see the parties' strength and the overall evaluation of the voters if we compare the percentage of those who sympathize with the percentage of those who feel antipathy toward these parties. Two parties, namely the MSZP and the FKGP, divide the voters very much; in other words both the camp of their supporters and the camp of their opponents are very strong. More than one-third of the people surveyed relate to the parties in a specific way; however, while the percentage of MSZP supporters is equal with the percentage of MSZP opponents, the difference is substantial in the case of the FKGP, as the opponents are almost twice as many as the supporters. The balanced evaluation of the MSZP is true of the society as a whole, but it is not true of individual groups: The MSZP can be called mostly popular among certain strata of our society, and unpopular among other strata. The MSZP indicator is slightly negative among young people, skilled workers, and people working as skilled workers, and people who are currently unemployed: The number of people who feel antipathy toward the MSZP is bigger than the number of people who feel sympathy toward this party by 5-7 percent. However, the overall MSZP image is positive among people over 50, people will less than 8 years of schooling, university graduates, and people in leading positions: The surplus here is 5-7 percent in favor of MSZP supporters. There are no such strata-specific phenomena in the evaluation of the FKGP, because antipathy, rather than sympathy, is the dominant feeling in all strata of the Hungarian society. There are big discrepancies between people who would not vote in favor of the FKGP in any way and people who would vote in favor of the FKGP in Budapest (25 percent, 8 percent respectively); in villages, this discrepancy is much smaller (22 percent, 15 percent respectively). This party has the worst position among university graduates (36 percent, 4 percent respectively), and the best position among people with basic education (17 percent, 15 percent respectively). In the case of the KDNP, its supporters are in majority in almost every group; young people make the only exception where supporters make up 2 percent and opponents make up 4 percent.

The potential of the FIDESZ is even more positive; even among older people, there are slightly more FIDESZ supporters and opponents (3 percent, 2 percent respectively). The MDF has been quite weightless in the eyes of the public lately; it has few supporters, but there are also few people with a negative approach toward this party. This is a different balance than the one found with the MSZP, because we cannot find here definite MDF-supporter groups or definite MDF opponent groups.

Which party would you choose if elections were held this Sunday?

	Among People in Survey	Among People Selecting Any Party
	Percent	
MSZP	19	30
SZDSZ	9	14
MDF	3	5
FKGP	12	18
KDNP	4	7

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Which party would you choose if elections were held this Sunday?		
FIDESZ	10	15
Workers Party	2	4

Which party would you choose if elections were held this Sunday?		
Other party	5	7
Uncertain voters, people who would not vote	37	

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B-H: NATO Urges NGO's, Civilians To Leave Serb Territories

AU1208140396 Paris AFP in English 1350 GMT 12 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Aug 12 (AFP)—The commander of NATO ground forces in Bosnia on Monday urged non-governmental organisations and other civilian organisations to withdraw foreign staff from Serb-held territory. Lieutenant-General Sir Michael Walker "is recommending that all NGO's [nongovernmental observers] and other international civilian organisations withdraw their foreign staff from the Republika Srpska as soon as possible," NATO said in a statement here.

At 14:00 p.m. (1300 GMT) Walker activated Operation Fear Naught, a "comprehensive security plan" for troops of the NATO-led peace implementation force (IFOR) across Bosnia, the statement said. "As part of the plan, small, isolated detachments of IFOR troops stationed in the RS (the Bosnian Serb entity) will redeploy to larger, more secure areas and bases," the statement continued. "The redeployment is effective until further notice," it added.

The statement was issued at around the same time as a NATO political adviser in Pale, the Bosnian Serb stronghold, announced that the Serb leadership had agreed to settle a dispute with IFOR and allow IFOR troops to inspect a contentious weapons storage site. It was not immediately clear whether this would lead to IFOR withdrawing the recommendation to pull out of Serb-held areas.

B-H: Serb Sources on New Crisis in Relations With IFOR

LD1108201696 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1933 GMT 11 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 11 August (SRNA)—After last night's incident near Han Pijesak when IFOR [Implementation Force] troops tried to inspect a warehouse of the Army of the Serb Republic, which in this case was contrary to the Dayton Agreement, liaison officers of the international forces left their office in Pale today. Only interpreters remained in IFOR's office in Pale.

SRNA has learned from well-informed sources in Pale that this move of IFOR "has nothing to do with armaments control and other commitments the Serb Republic has assumed in keeping with the military annex to the Dayton Agreement."

"The question is whether this is a new course of action taken by IFOR commander, Rear Admiral Joseph Lopez, or it is an attempt to draw attention away from problems in the Muslim-Croat federation so that the blame for failing to implement the Dayton Agreement can be apportioned to all sides," the sources say.

Adding that the Serb Republic was indeed against the arrival of forces which bombed its people, SRNA's sources in Pale recall that the Serb side has done its utmost to establish good relations and cooperation with IFOR.

"We are sorry to say that someone wants to strain these relations now," the sources say.

"We are concerned that the new direction IFOR has taken might lead to unwanted consequences," SRNA's sources in Pale say.

B-H: Serb Republic Submits War Crime Charges to Hague

AU1108131496 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 9 Aug 96 p 5

["Excerpts" of a report by Boro Maric: "Crime in Five Chapters"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Internal Affairs Ministry of the Serb Republic has accused part of the leadership of Bosnia-Herzegovina, headed by president Alija Izetbegovic, of "facilitating, through their actions and negligence, the annihilation and exile of Serbs from 1992 to 1995."

On 17 May 1996, the Internal Affairs Ministry of the Serb Republic submitted a five-chapter indictment to the International War Crimes Tribunal at The Hague.

In addition to Izetbegovic, charges were filed against Ejup Ganic, vice president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina; Rasim Delic, general of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina; his predecessor General Sefer Halilovic; and Jerko Doko, former defense minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The list also includes Hasan Efendic, former commander of the Territorial Defense of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Delimustafic, former internal affairs minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and his successor, Jusuf Pusina.

All of the aforementioned individuals are believed to have "facilitated the annihilation and exile of Serbs from 1992 to 1995, through their actions and negligence as well as in agreement with others, on the basis of the Constitution and other legal acts of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

The above persons are believed to be responsible for the killing, exile, and unlawful transfer of the civilian population and for the destruction of religious and

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sacred shrines "with the aim of annihilating or partially annihilating Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina."

The formal accusation, divided into five chapters, names camps where Serbs were imprisoned, tortured, and murdered and cites examples of ethnic cleansing as well as of artillery attacks "against civilian targets, groups of civilians, and industrial facilities."

Other crimes include destroying churches. The final chapter deals with "killing and wounding civilians by sniper fire."

The first chapter of the indictment, devoted to prison camps, says that in Sarajevo alone there were 31 camps and prisons holding Serbs. Also included is the prisoner camp in Celebic, near Konjic, which Alija Izetbegovic himself visited.

The indictment says the prison camps were "one of the most significant methods of destroying Serbs."

The indictment also gives numerous examples of Serbs civilians being killed or tortured and of churches and other sacred buildings being destroyed.

The indictment against Izetbegovic, Ganic, Delic, and others, submitted to the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague also gives complete information about 53 victims (including 23 women) being killed by sharpshooters of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina in parts of the former Serb Sarajevo.

This indictment "does not include everyone who has been accused of war crimes against the Serb population in Bosnia-Herzegovina on the basis of evidence held by the Serb Republic authorities." Charges against them "will also be submitted to the International Tribunal in The Hague for War Crimes Committed on the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia."

B-H: Ganic on Tudjman Meeting, Federation Prospects

AU1108170696 Zagreb NACIONAL in Serbo-Croatian 9 Aug 96 pp 5-6

[Interview with Dr. Ejup Ganic, vice president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and member of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Ivica Rados in Sarajevo; date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ejup Ganic, vice president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and member of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, is among the most confident of Alija Izetbegovic's people. During Alija Izetbegovic's absences, most often caused by his illness, Ejup Ganic takes on the role of the first man of the Bosniak state. He has also taken on the leading role in Bosniak diplomacy, although officially he does not discharge any duties that belong to the foreign affairs minister. Ejup Ganic has recently begun to take over the role of creator of the Bosniak policy toward Croatia, too.

The ultimatum to dissolve Herzeg-Bosnia he recently gave President Tudjman has clearly shown that the Bosniak leadership intends to use the momentary pressure of the international community, primarily of the European Union [EU], on Croatia. We spoke with Ejup Ganic in his office in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency building on the day the agreement on Mostar was signed. An agreement was reached thanks to the immense pressure of the international community and the United States on Croatia, although it is opposite to the primary requests of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats.

[Rados] You recently met with President Tudjman in Zagreb and explicitly asked for dissolution of Herzeg-Bosnia. Moreover, Sarajevo media reproached the Croatian state leadership for not receiving you as a statesman?

[Ganic] I do not know what to tell you. I came to Zagreb on business. Our ambassador to Zagreb, Kasim Trnka, was waiting for me at the airport, and arranged transportation and security, although I had my own security. Frankly, it did not occur to me that someone should have been waiting for me. I was simply so occupied with the job I was to do in Zagreb that I was not paying any attention to secondary questions. Besides, I often travel to Zagreb and am used to having no welcoming committee.

[Rados] What did you discuss with President Tudjman?

[Ganic] I told the president: "Mr. President, relations between the Bosniak and Croat nation are good, very good. We have very good relations with Dalmatians, Istrians, citizens of Zagreb, Slavonians..." I said our strategy is to further promote our relations with Croatia, but the lack of understanding of one small group is bringing our good relations into question. We like to cooperate with the Croatian people, and we feel the "chemistry" works on both sides. We have to the same Western concept of building a society. I asked President Tudjman if together we could solve the accumulated problems that are impeding our cooperation.

[Rados] What was President Tudjman's answer?

[Ganic] I said specifically that we were asking for the dissolution of Herzeg-Bosnia. I said: "Mr. President, it cannot be done without you. You can take care of it..." I feel a bit awkward talking about it because they were diplomatic discussions, to some extent closed, and I would not want to tell you exactly what I told him and what he answered. It was an open dialogue. I said, among other things: "Mr. President, I advocate

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the development of relations that will live on when the politicians are no longer alive. Relations between two nations are something more permanent and longer than our careers."

One-Fourth of Power to the Croats

[Rados] In return for the dissolution of Herzeg-Bosnia, the Croatian side allegedly asked for the consolidation of borders toward the Serb Republic?

[Ganic] I was not told that. That would mean the division of Bosnia. For the first time in history, the Catholic Church has no influence on the Drina River. Maintaining such a situation would be the defeat of the West, not just of the Croats and Bosnia. We were also talking about the weakening of authorities of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I said the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina will have neither more nor less authorities than those envisaged in the Dayton agreement. Therefore, at the moment, there are six ministries on the level of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Rados] After your meeting with President Tudjman in Zagreb, the VONS [Council for Defense and National Security] held a session and concluded, judging by the communication, that the Republic of Croatia did not accept the policy of pressure. Does that refer to the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina or to the EU?

[Ganic] Well, I was accompanied by the U.S. ambassador. I do not know precisely what the subject of that Council meeting was, but whoever disputes the Federation will be put under terrifying pressure. The international community wants Herzeg-Bosnia eliminated because Herzeg-Bosnia blocks implementation of the Federation and in so doing blocks Dayton, too. A stable Federation is a precondition for implementation of the Dayton agreement.

[Rados] How do you comment on Kresimir Zubak's statement that even President Tudjman himself is not entitled to speak in the name of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats?

[Ganic] It is an academic statement that works in theory, but we all know what President Tudjman's real influence is. His political party is the strongest party here, because the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] is one political party, one structure.

[Rados] However, of the Croatian arguments are indisputable. There were many irregularities in the Mostar elections, were there not?

[Ganic] There are small omissions in every elections. It is like car accidents: Even though there are traffic laws, there are several accidents every day. It is similar in the elections: Somebody misses the box, someone votes twice, there is always one in a thousand who will make a mistake. It happens in all elections. The ombudsman analyzed all of it and concluded that those disputed 26 votes could not have influenced the election results in any way. Whoever got the votes, Croats or Bosniaks, it would not have influenced the election results.

However, when we look at the election defeat of the HDZ in Mostar, I can say the HDZ fared well there, because in the long term only the policy of an integrated Bosnia can survive. An integrated Bosnia guards 80 percent of the Croatian border and thus significantly reduces the military budget. The Bosniaks guard Croatia's belly and covers 80 percent of its border toward the Serbs. So Croatia has to guard only a small part of the border on Prevlaka and toward Vojvodina.

An integrated Bosnia is the best solution for the Croats. The Croats have two states: their own Croatia and Bosnia, which they share with the others and in which they have one-third of the authority. Bosnia is Croatian as much as it is ours. What more do the Croats want?

[Rados] That claim is not very convincing. We know the Serbs have half of Bosnia while the Croats share the other half with the Bosniaks. So the Croats have only one-fourth of the authority, and that is only in theory...

[Ganic] No. The Serbs have, at the moment, won 49 percent of the territory, but they do not have so much authority... The Croats and Bosniaks are strong enough to maintain Bosnia. The Federation concept is the basis of an integrated Bosnia. It envisages that the Serbs from the Serb Republic transfer to the territory of the Federation later on, like the Germans from East Germany to West Germany.

It is no science to divide Bosnia, but we want a Federation that is strong and that will make Bosnia viable. That idea is supported by the Catholic Church, Franciscans. Their structure, developed throughout the centuries, has been swept away by Herzeg-Bosnia. After all, which solution is better for the Croats?

Mayor—A Croat

[Rados] Have you not forgotten the Serbs in this whole story?

[Ganic] As far as the Serb Republic is concerned, I know that they are planning the worst; they are planning a referendum for secession. But they have already missed the train based upon both Dayton and the balance of power.

[Rados] According to the agreement signed in Mostar, the Bosniaks have got an united town—that is, what they wanted—and the Croats have got the mayor?

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[Ganic] Why shouldn't a Croat be mayor of Mostar? We made an agreement earlier that if a Bosniak was the head of the canton, the mayor of Mostar would be a Croat, and vice versa. We do not ask such questions. We feel comfortable if the first mayor of Mostar is a Croat.

[Rados] The Mostar situation became red-hot and almost ended in a conflict. Didn't Alija Izetbegovic contribute to that atmosphere with his speech to the invalids of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army?

[Ganic] I do not believe such a thing, and I did not listen to that speech. Our strategy is to build as good relations as possible with the Croats, and we consider the conflicts from 1993 to be an unfortunate "car accident." That was not a war between two nations but a conflict with one interest group within the Croatian nation in Bosnia. We have not made war against the Croats in Posavina or in the Tuzla basin. In principle, we have had no serious conflicts with the Croats in central Bosnia.

That was a conflict of a part of the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] with the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. The conflict between the Croats and Bosniaks is illogical. Why should Croats fight for something they already have? They are their own masters on their own land in Bosnia, and Bosnia belongs to them as much as it belongs to us. It is a common property and cannot be divided.

It is precisely what the Serbs want: To divide Bosnia with the help of the Croats. Of course, we oppose that. Bosnia cannot be divided because the whole region would fall into a war and an economic crisis. Then it would occurs to someone in Europe, and he would say: Put them all together in a Balkan wastebasket.

[Rados] In general, judging by the elections in Mostar, can one predict peace in Bosnia?

[Ganic] I do not know what to tell you, but certainly the fall elections will bring 50 percent of new, very moderate people. I hope the elections will contribute to the stabilization and strengthening of the Federation.

In their history, the Croats have never taken other people's things, but now we have cases of Croats moving into some Bosniak houses in Stolac and Capljina. Of course the Bosniaks have also moved into some Croatian houses in the north, but we want to change that. We want everyone to return to their own property.

The Program for the Federation

[Rados] What do you think, for instance, of Bugojno? The radical faction of the SDA [Party of Democratic Action], headed by Mlaco, is in power there. Mlaco is very severe and intolerant toward everything of Croatian and Catholic origin.

[Ganic] If the Croats want to return to Bugojno, I will get them back. No local clerk can stop me. Every chunk of Croatian land and every Croatian house will belong to the Croats, and I can do that.

[Rados] The U.S. Administration has on several occasions given you an ultimatum to send the mujahidin back to their countries, back to where they came from. However, one still runs into them, particularly in central Bosnia.

[Ganic] When you have had 250,000 soldiers, 50, 500, or 1,000 mujahidin really mean nothing. We have had problems with the lack of weapons, we needed weapons, not 500 fighters. Viewed against that situation, the problem has been invented. I admit they are attractive. When the CNN reporters meet five or six of those "characters" with scarves around their heads, they take their pictures. On the other hand, they find 200,000 of our beardless fighters uninteresting because they look like Europeans.

The story about mujahidin is an imputation; namely, that we have not controlled the border. Then how could they cross the border?

Once I was told there were some mujahidin in Zenica. I asked: How many are there? They said 30. I told them to give them my message that I would lead them when there were 300,000 of them and I would be able to chase the Serbs to the Drina River. I also said that those 30 should pack their things and go back where they came from because they only cause problems for me. A religious war, something which the foreign press often writes about, is a pure imputation.

[Rados] It will, however, be a bit difficult to go to the Drina River.

[Ganic] Serbia is not as strong as it used to be. The Serbs are not economically strong enough to dictate the rules in this area. They have had an advantage because they have taken everything from the army which we had been creating for 50 years.

We will now arm ourselves within the program for the Federation. The Americans are in charge of that program, and we have also been assisted by the Islamic countries. That changes relations significantly. We have fought with several rifles, and if we were able to fight them then, how could we not be able to fight them now?

[Rados] But the creation of the Federal Army has proved to be a big problem. Do you think the people who shot at each other only yesterday will serve in the same army?

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[Ganic] That conflict is caused by the aggression of Serbia and Montenegro. We will find a cure for our common federal army, too. One Herzegovinian cannot say he will not join the same army as the Muslims because there are all Muslims around him. Herzegovina cannot exist without trade in Sarajevo. When this commences, and it has already commenced, people will start dealing with other, everyday problems.

B-H: Mujahidin Accused of Attacks on Catholic Monastery

LD0908190496 Mostar Croatian Radio Herceg-Bosna in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 9 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] In response to the statements by Bosnian Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic and Ejup Ganic, the vice president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation and member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, on yesterday's session of the federation forum, the office of Kresimir Zubak, the president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation, issued a statement. [passage omitted]

At yesterday's session of the federation forum, President Zubak informed the participants on the latest attacks against the Croats and their religious buildings committed by the remaining groups of Mujahidin, the statement adds. On 28 July, a group of five or six armed Mujahidin broke into the Franciscan monastery of Guca Gora, looking for Mijo Matakovic. The follwing day, on 29 July, an IFOR [Implementation Force] patrol evacuated him from this monastery to the area controlled by the Croatian Defense Council, as, according to the available information, the Mujahedin wanted to kill him.

On 4 August, Mujahedin again broke into the monastery scattering all the treasures around the sacristy, the statement concludes.

B-H: Explosions Rock Croat Barracks in North

LD1108084596 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 0800 GMT 11 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Early this morning, at 0410 and 0415, two powerful explosions echoed across the valley of the River Usora [northern Bosnia]. According to the 110th Usora Homeguard Regiment of the Croat Defence Council [HVO, Bosnian Croat forces] an explosive device was planted near the barracks in the village of Rosulje. None of the soldiers were injured. One coach and one car parked right next to the barracks were destroyed and windows in nearby houses and in the barracks were smashed.

This is yet another terrorist act and the culprits, like many times before, will most likely not be found. The fact is, the 110th Regiment says, that Usora Croats and their property are being destroyed.

The Vitez HVO and the Danish battalion [IFOR] within, deployed in the Krasevo base two km south of Doboj, were informed about the attack.

B-H: Commentary Predicts Increasing Ethnic Division

AU1108154196 Zagreb NACIONAL in Serbo-Croatian 9 Aug 96 p 12

[Commentary by Janusz Bugajski]

[FBIS Translated Text] While the international community prepares itself for elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, its division into three ethnically homogeneous entities continues at an accelerated pace since the signing of the Dayton agreement. Nationalistic parties of all three sides want to create separate ethnic territories in which they can monopolize political life. While Milosevic and Tudjman are convincing Washington that they want an integrated Bosnia on the ground, from the highest political level, they are carrying out ethnic separation.

According to estimates by opposition politicians in Sarajevo, in all territories under the control of the HVO [Croatian Defense Council], 96 percent of the population is Croat. Before the war, Croats made up about half the population. In the Serb entity, Croats and Muslims are less than 8 percent of the population. Areas under the control of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army are now 80 percent Muslim as opposed to 55 percent before the conflict.

The war has proved to be useful in the division and separation of communities. New methods have recently been developed to continue the process of apartheid. The bases of the nationalistic policy are fear and manipulation. Incidents occur in the towns and villages of all three entities, where churches are blown up, mosques and graveyards damaged, and there is shooting, threats, and intimidation.

Regarding NATO

Smaller communities live under pressure, and their citizens never know when the next attack will come. Suspicion and fear within communities is promoted, although the nationalists pretend to be defenders of their own ethnic groups. Either under pressure or by their own will, common people gather around their ethnic leaders and thus consolidate the process of territorial homogenization. Some people from the opposition believe that the Catholics themselves set fire to the church in Bugojno and that the Muslims themselves shelled the mosque in Stolac as part of

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the coordinated plan of ethnic segregation. Nationalistic leaders terrorize their own populations in order to make them more ready to move into the territories of Herzeg-Bosnia, the Serb Republic, or Muslim Bosnia.

The more IFOR retreats, the more courageous the nationalists will be. In the Serb entity, Muslim families are regularly banished from Banja Luka and the surrounding cities. In the Croatian semicommunity, the houses to which Muslim refugees were supposed to return have been destroyed in Stolac, while the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] officials are busy convincing Croats in several small enclaves surrounded by Muslims in central Bosnia that they must move into ethnically clean areas in western Herzegovina.

The Bosnian Government, too, has been joining the process of separation more and more, particularly since the Serbs left the Sarajevo suburbs early this year. As the spokesman for the IPTF [International Police Task Force] of the United Nations says, violence and attacks on Serbs are becoming more frequent, while the authorities stand aside and pretended to advocate multiethnicity.

Some people from the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] leadership are accused of settling Muslim refugees from eastern Bosnia and other areas occupied by the Serbs in Sarajevo suburbs.

Potential Wars

The SDS [Serb Democratic Party] from Pale has settled tens of thousands of Serbs from Croatia and Bosnia into Brcko and the Posavina corridor, territory that was 80 percent Muslim before the war. A small number of non-Serbs remain now in these strategic areas, and they will certainly be exposed to animosities again.

The purpose of ethnic homogenization is perfectly clear. It promotes political homogenization and a monopoly by individual parties: a hybrid between communism and ethnic nationalism. Of course, democracy will be squeezed out of the monoethnic communities, and free and civic opposition will be marginalized. Many people believe the SDS, SDA, and HDZ are on their best behavior under the vigilant eye of the international community. Their control over the media and refugees and their creation of a war psychosis will ensure their success in the elections. When the polling stations close and the international observers leave, the attack on the media and other independent institutions will begin and the nationalists will strengthen their monopoly on power.

Some Western leaders have probably calculated that only ethnic division with a certain measure of authority will preserve peace in Bosnia. Perhaps in the short term they are right, but in the long run it can bring neither stability nor democracy. Apart from ethnic fascism, which is developing in Mostar, Pale, and even Sarajevo, there will also be resistance. The opposition leaders predict potential civil war within the three entities, which will be manifested in terrorism, murder, and conspiracy.

The Bosnian authorities, regardless of the momentary calculations, are not reconciled to the permanent loss of territories that were populated primarily by Muslims before the war. They will not refrain from asking some more radical Islamic countries for help.

Zagreb and Belgrade are still for the division and conquest of the Bosnian territory. They believe time is on their side and that NATO has no power to unite Bosnia. Without full democratization in Serbia and Croatia, there will be no resistance to such expansionist plans.

Ethnic Cleansing

Really, it will probably not be possible to prevent the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Dayton agreements have sealed that process under NATO's control: If there is no new NATO mission with a wider mandate to protect the country's external borders, eliminate criminal elements, provide for freedom of movement, and assist in the creation of a state based on laws, Bosnia will be divided.

However, if Serbia and Croatia succeed in spreading their borders and homogenizing their population, ethnically and politically, then the other states with such ambitions will conclude that ethnic cleansing pays off. In that case, why should there be no Greater Albania and Greater Hungary?

B-H: Commentary Views Milosevic Role in Election

AU0808190996 Sarajevo JAVNOST (Bosnian Serb) in Serbo-Croatian 3 Aug 96 p 9

[Commentary by Slobodan Nagradic: "JUL in September"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The coming elections in the Serb Republic and in the other entity, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, are an important test that serves to "get an idea" about the attitude of the regime in Serbia toward the crisis in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina and the manner and dynamics of its resolution and the definite normalization of the situation in this part of the wider region.

At this moment, Belgrade cannot disassociate itself from the events and relations in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly the Serb Republic, even if it

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wanted to, and it does not, because the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, personified in Slobodan Milosevic, president of Serbia, is a signatory to the Dayton agreement and a guarantee that this agreement will be consistently observed and implemented.

Therefore, there is no getting out of it for Serbia! It is "up to its neck" in the Bosnian crisis and its retreat is cut off by the fruit of its political mind—the Serb Republic, an entity with a significant degree of statehood: an army, a police force, courts, media, education, a part of the economic and monetary policy, "special connections" with other states, etc.

Goals

Therefore, Serbia is forced to remain for a while longer in the area of the central former Yugoslav republic, to define its interests and goals in the elections, to set its priorities, find its own suitable candidate—and that is its least problem, because Serbs can be willing servants to foreign masters, not to mention the most beloved Serb, and—the election campaign can [passage missing in original article] Serb Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina? There are several goals, but two are most important. The first goal is to make sure that after September, such forces come to power in the Serb Republic, at all levels of authority, from the legislative to the executive, that will not jeopardize the right of Belgrade to decide on all important issues that the Serb Republic would carry out unconditionally.

The second goal, which requires more time to carry out and presumes the successful outcome of the first goal, is to definitely get the Serb Republic off the back of the regime in Serbia and leave it to its own fate within Bosnia-Herzegovina, as the bastard of two state entities, without any attributes: union, alliance, confederation, federation, etc.

What is being done and what has been done in achieving the first goal? First, the political forces have been defined. According to Dr. Mladen Ivanic, chairman of the Serb Intellectual Forum, today one of the leaders of the Democratic Patriotic Bloc of the Serb Republic, this was done by Milosevic himself when he said that he felt that "democratic parties and parties of the left had to win the elections in the Serb Republic, because otherwise, there was a very bleak and dark future for the Serb Republic."

Milosevic said these words in front of a large number of Serb politicians, businessmen and intellectuals from Banja Luka and the Krajina in the autumn of 1995, which indicates that these blocs, coalitions, and individual parties were planned and designed a long time ago in Dedinje [area of Belgrade where Milosevic lives], that it has taken longer to form them, give them a certain profile, and present them to the general public, than one would imagine.

Therefore, Belgrade is attempting to carry out its goals through two coalitions that have been formed and submitted its candidates for the September elections in the Serb Republic as well as the joint house of representatives of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The first coalition, considerably stronger and much more to Milosevic's taste, is the Alliance for Peace and Progress, and comprises five parties and "associations": The Socialist Party of the Serb Republic [SPRS], the Party of Independent Social Democrats of the Serb Republic, the Social Liberal Party of the Serb Republic, The Yugoslav Left for the Serb Republic, and the New Workers Party of the Serb Republic.

Parties

By far the strongest and best known of these parties is the SPRS, whose program, ideology, method of work, relationship toward the charisma of Milosevic, etc., is merely an extended arm of the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] from Serbia, regardless of the vows made by the local socialist leaders, albeit without their hands on the Bible, that it is authentic, independent, formally and legally self-reliant, and accountable to the people of the Serb Republic. Perhaps the socialists of the Serb Republic did manage to organize themselves in 1993, perhaps they did emerge as an indigenous political force, but it is more than apparent that today they do not make even the most harmless move without consulting "Comrade Sloba."

The leader of the "independent" social democrats is Milorad Dodik, a former member of the reform movement and a delegate in the Serb Republic assembly, who said publicly in 1994 that he was closer to Milosevic than to Karadzic, and so, although he is one of the wealthiest men in the Serb Republic, he immediately went over to the left wing. Belgrade did not mind his wealth and his business; on the contrary. Everything is acceptable, only if its aim is to bring Karadzic down.

This also explains why Milosevic "swallowed" a bitter pill called Miodrag Zivanovic, the leader of the small liberal party, the only unwaveringly civic and antiwar party in the Serb Republic. Zivanovic is the Banja Luka version of Vesna Pesic. During the entire war, he equally condemned Pale and Belgrade for inflaming the war and spreading interethnic hatred and ostracism.

Obviously, in Machiavellian fashion, Milosevic does not regard the enemy of his enemy (Karadzic) as his own enemy, at least not for the time being. That is why he allowed Zivanovic to join the coalition

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with his socialists, and also his socialdemocrats (no normal person doubts any more that the communists from the SK-PJ [League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia] or the JUL [Yugoslav Left] are also his). Besides, Zivanovic's image and his connections in the West are not to be underestimated.

Carevic and his insignificant partners and members from the JUL are not an issue and they could come in handy for the future liaison with the Federation, because Milosevic hopes that there are communists there too. What Carevic is not able to accomplish with his political connections, Zivanovic and the adherents of his civic and multicultural society option will.

"Democrats"

However, Milosevic is not uninformed as to the atmosphere among the people in the Serb Republic. He knows very well that the voters are full of misgiving toward his pet candidates, so he decided to form a second coalition, giving it an agreeable, and to many people acceptable, name: the Democratic Patriotic Bloc. His intention is to attract all those who feel that the SPRS or the Party of Independent Social Democrats is to far to the left, and those who feel that the SDS [Serb Democratic Party], the Serbian Radicals, and others like them, are too far to the right.

In other words, the primary intention with this bloc is to break up the constituency of the nationally oriented parties, such as the SDS, the Serbian Radical Party, the People's Party, the Serb Patriotic Party (SPAS), the Serb Party of the Krajina and Posavina, etc.

According to the "political brain trust" from Dedinje, these two factions should secure an absolute victory in the elections in the Serb Republic and in that way create a "stable government" that would legally and legitimately remove the disobedient government in Pale, embodied in the stubborn and verbally sleazy Karadzic and orientally crafty Krajisnik.

Every other way of removing the current leaders of the Serb Republic from power would create needless difficulties for Milosevic at home, in Serbia, and a further drop in his ratings prio. to the Federal Assembly elections in the autumn and Milosevic is still not prepared to relinquish his power or even share it with someone else.

Dissidents

But what if even these two coalitions are not enough to secure a victory? What if the SDS wins in the September elections, which is absolutely possible? As an experienced politician, Milosevic has thought about that, too. He is already searching for "moles" in the ranks of the SDS and the Serbian Radicals. Proof of that is the "case" of former Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic, Milosevic's constant "coquetry" with Koljevic, the winning over to his side of a number of SDS delegates, for example Andjelko Grahovac, then there are the constant attempts to manipulate the municipal party organizations of the Serbian Radical Party in Doboj, Derventa, Srpac, Prijedor, etc., whose members then cross over to other parties, as well as many other examples. Then there are also Milosevic's invariably trusty proponents from Serbia that have their party affiliates in the Serb Republic: The Party of Serb Unity and the Radical Party "Nikola Pasic," which will additionally "tear away" votes from the SDS and the Radicals.

The second goal that is strongly pushing Serbia into the mayhem of the Bosnian elections is its hope ultimately to get the Serb Republic off its back once the elections are over, to untie the millstone of its trans-Drina "brethren" from around its neck that is pulling it down, delaying its integration with Europe and the world, and disabling the development of democratic relations and institutions in Serbia itself, as the representatives of the establishment in Serbia often say, bolstered by the brains and interests of the JUL [United Left].

That is why Milosevic wants the left and democratic forces to win, forces that he will control and directly "advise" not to sidestep all the consequences of the Dayton agreement, particularly those regarding the return of refugees, establishing economic ties, and finally embracing political togetherness in some form within the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Of course, Milosevic would be glad to see the political scene of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation without Izetbegovic and his loyal extremists from the SDA [Party of Democratic Action]. He would rather see more moderate politicians such as Sejfudin Tokic, Beslagic, and even Haris Silajdzic, Durakovic, etc. convinced that it would be easier for him to establish a dialogue with them to facilitate a more rapid reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Understandably, the bridge to Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot be made of politicians like Karadzic, Krajisnik, and Plavsic, but of politicians like Dodik, Radic, Zivanovic, Ilic, and Radisic on the Serb side, and Tokic, Beslagic, Sliskovic, Filipovic, and Zulfikarpasic on the Muslim side.

It is not entirely impossible that Belgrade's above-defined "election goals" in the Serb Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina are motivated by the never forsaken dream and ambition of Milosevic and his wife Mira Markovic to put together a new Yugoslavia.

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B-H: Plavsic Discusses Elections, Karadzic

AU1008193796 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 5 Aug 96 p 7

[Interview with Biljana Plavsic, acting president of the Serb Republic, by Predrag Savic; place and date not given: "Dayton Is Sacred"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Savic] Radical personnel changes have been made at the helm of the Serb Republic following persistent efforts to allow Dr. Radovan Karadzic to retain his political and state functions. Considering the fact that the Dayton agreement explicitly required changes in the leadership of the country and the SDS [Serb Democratic Party], why was Dr. Karadzic's departure delayed for so long? Could the transformation have been more rapid and less painful, and what are the political consequences of such a delay?

[Plavsic] There are certain passages in the Dayton agreement that talk about withdrawal. I think the withdrawal is a lesson we have learned and on the basis of which we can oblige those who signed the Dayton agreement to strictly adhere to their part of it. It was expected that they would insist upon Karadzic's withdrawal, and as I said, we have learned that what has to be done today must not be left for tomorrow.

It was not easy for us to do that. As early as February, the people began spontaneously to express their support for Karadzic and Mladic. The international factors should not have threatened so much with the Hague Tribunal. Those stories and threats in the media were so strong that they caused a reaction among the people of the Serb Republic. We in the state leadership suddenly found ourselves in a situation where it was not possible to make any quick changes. That is why we were not able to carry out the changes in time, even though we knew the changes had to be made.

Equal Treatment

[Savic] How do you evaluate the results of the implementation of the Dayton agreement so far?

[Plavsic] I would say they are satisfactory. Of course, the civilian part is more complex, and certain delays and difficulties were expected. The Dayton agreement was written by people who live far from this territory, people who did not attempt to find out more about the history of the people in this part of the world. They say that is a waste of time, but if they had only made an additional effort, many problems in the implementation of the Dayton agreement would have been avoided.

The military part is being implemented relatively well, primarily because it is conducted by a military organization, a structure that is well disciplined. On the other hand, when we get into civilian life, it appears to be much more complex, particularly after a war like this one, charged with horrible negative energy from all sides. Things were supposed to happen in a very short time that would normally take entire generations.

Since we have really made maximum efforts as far as the changes in the state and party leadership are concerned, we now insist that the Dayton agreement really be sacred. Therefore, no one can demand anything more from us than what is specified in the Dayton agreement. And it is obvious that they are demanding more. Every representative of the international community responsible for different areas wants to prove himself to someone else and does that by demanding more than the Dayton agreement calls for.

[Savic] How are the commissions for dividing the two entities making out?

[Plavsic] As far as these commissions are concerned, they have been working since the very beginning, but it is very difficult. Very difficult. I do not know all the details exactly. I have spoken with Mr. Ostojic, who heads the commission, and I will tell you what he said. Our commission has the following approach: If a given territory is not essential to us and does not mean very much to us, and if its physical boundary does not divide an entire unit, we are prepared to cede it to the other side along this principle. In return we would expect the other side to give us a piece of their territory in another area.

I think that this is a good principle. Such exchanges can improve the life of the inhabitants. This principle, which would create a much more favorable situation for the people living there, is not respected, particularly by the Muslims, whose only guiding principle is to make life miserable for the Serbs. For example, the boundary goes through a village and the village graveyard remains on the other side of the border. As far as we are concerned, there is no difficulty in making an exchange here that would be compensated for in some other place.

There Is No Extradition

[Savic] What do you expect to happen in Brcko?

[Plavsic] I do not know why there is so much commotion over Brcko. The commission had to be formed. I do not understand why the Brcko is an issue in the first place when in the Dayton agreement, whose strict implementation we fully support and insist upon, the town of Brcko is not an issue at all. What is an issue is the interethnic border in the area of the municipality of Brcko. In other words, the problem remains only whether

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the factual situation, that is, the 6-km corridor, will remain the same.

According to the Dayton agreement, Gorazde, a single enclave, got a normal corridor 20 km wide. It is completely in order that two parts of one single country, a single entity, are connected by a corridor at least as wide as the corridor of an enclave.

[Savic] How do you evaluate the work of the Hague Tribunal? What are the relations between the Serb Republic and the Tribunal? What is the goal of justice minister Arsovic's visit to the Hague?

[Plavsic] Minister Arsovic went there as a legal expert and as justice minister to see what kind of a court it is. I think that our experts should have gone there earlier and to see what was going on, for example during the trial of Tadic. Tadic is one of our people, he was wrongly accused. We are saying everywhere that we will defend every Serb, and in the Tadic's case, our republic showed only a slight active interest. In that particular case, the whole republic should have stood behind the man, with all its instruments of law. I will ask Mr. Arsovic to contact Tadic's lawyer. In the future, our courts should provide help and assistance to every citizen accused of a crime.

Those who formed the Hague Tribunal know well that the tribunal is a political court, a means to pressure the Serbs, a way to more easily implement their desires and ideas in the field. We are obliged by our Constitution, and we have no right to extradite one single indicted person to a foreign court.

We all know that the Constitution is the supreme legal document that must be obeyed. It is difficult to understand at the end of the 20th century how legal and judiciary practice could stoop so low in such an ugly way. I think that in the case of the Hague Tribunal, all bar associations in the world should stand up to defend the ethics of their profession.

National Reconciliation

[Savic] How realistic are foreign threats that Dr. Karadzic and General Mladic will be arrested and turned over to the Hague Tribunal?

[Plavsic] Let them try. If they want it so badly, let them try. It is such a terrible injustice. If they had accused as many Croats and Muslims as they have Serbs, that would have been a different situation. If they tried Tudjman and Alija Izetbegovic, then Karadzic would probably also go so the knot could finally be untied.

[Savic] According to information published in the media in the Serb Republic, there are many places where monuments to partisans have been demolished. How does your state feel about the legacy of the National Liberation War], and how does it feel about the Chetnik movement?

[Plavsic] We have done much to facilitate a national reconciliation. Communism is an international movement, just like fundamentalism, the Vatican, and the new world order. The goal of internationalism is to divide the Serb nation. In this war we managed to erase the divisions that people had dating back to the earlier period. Our people are very much aware that it was these divisions created in the former war that caused all these events and the latest war. It was not the king that divided the Serb people in World War II, nor was it Draza Mihailovic, it was Josip Broz.

[Savic] How are preparations coming along for the September elections? What does your party, the party in power, expect from them?

[Plavsic] Preparations are going relatively well. We had planned to conduct multiparty elections even before the Dayton agreement, which is why we are ready for these elections in September. As far as the party is concerned, we expect a victory, a landslide victory.

There Are No Silver Spoons

[Savic] In your opinion, how justified are the claims of the opposition parties that the government in the Serb Republic is repressive toward them and will not give them access to the media?

[Plavsic] This war has shown that it pays to be a "victim." Izetbegovic systematically made a victim out of Sarajevo. He also made a victim out of the entire Muslim population. Communists know very well how much it pays to make yourself a victim. There is nothing the communists would not do just to grab power. That is why they are accusing us of repressing political freedom and not giving them access to the media. You have seen that there are far more opposition than government newspapers here.

The opposition also has its own radio stations. They can freely organize their rallies, and they can work unhindered. They said people threw stones at them; well, we are certainly not to blame for that. The people know there is no surviving on this territory without a Serb state, and that is why the people fought to create it. Then came certain political parties that created loathing among the people because they wanted to immerse us in Alija's state again. It prompted spontaneous reactions by the people. Then such parties and individuals blame the regime because the people do not want them.

In such a situation, they will not hesitate to use lies and say that we have cut their electricity. The only

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thing they can still do is use Alija's principle and the principle of communism and make themselves look like victims in order to profit from later. But that no longer works, because in this war, the Serbs showed that they are exceptionally well educated politically. That is one of the basic qualities of our people in this area. All of these qualities are just negative points for such parties. Everyone knows that during the war, and after the war (except for Srebrov), we did not have a single political prisoner. Even that wretched Srebrov had declared himself a hunter for Serb heads during the war. As an extended arm of Alija's policy, he was on the side of criminals such as Juka Prazina.

[Savic] What is the Serb Republic doing to revive the war-torn economy, and when can the people expect better days?

[Plavsic] Our people have a lot of understanding for the Serb Republic's very difficult material situation. Our government is doing the best it can. It is common knowledge that we cannot expect to receive any help from the world and the international community, because with every form of help they would require various political concessions which we cannot make. I cannot promise the people milk and honey, as some left-oriented parties have promised. Promises that everyone will eat with silver spoons are not realistic. The people know the state is depleted.

Candidates

On September 14, the voters of the Serb Republic will elect their president from among seven candidates: Dr. Biljana Plavsic, representing the ruling SDS [Serb Democratic Party]; Zivko Radisic (Alliance for Peace and Prosperity); Predrag Radic (Democratic Patriotic Bloc); Slavko Lisica, retired general of the Army of the Serb Republic (Serb Patriotic Party); Dr. Dragan Djokanovic (Democratic Party of Federalists); Ljilja Peric (Party of Serb Unity); and Abid Cosic (Party of Democratic Action). As of today, we will inform the readers of VECERNJE NOVOSTI about the views and opinions of the main candidates for president of the Serb Republic.

B-H: Klickovic on Army Reorganization, Economic Recovery

LD1008194896 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 10 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Our army is the only guarantee for the survival of the Serb Republic, it is only the army that the Serb people can depend on. That is why the first task of the state leadership of the Serb Republic is to equip the army and to provide it with a material basis, Serb Prime Minister Gojko Klickovic said in talks held today with General Momir Talic, the commander of the 1st Krajina Corps of the Serb Republic Army.

Klickovic, along with aides and businessmen of the Banja Luka region, agreed today in Banja Luka on concrete steps for financing programs of reorganization and creating a professional Serb Republic Army, for the autumn harvest, and for the implementation of measures of social policy.

[Unidentified correspondent] What is to be done for the economy of Banja Luka and the Serb Republic to embark on the road of more accumulative streams [as heard] are the basic questions to which the businessmen of the region, in which almost two-thirds of the economic potential of the Serb Republic is concentrated, tried to find the answer. [passage omitted]

In addition to this, he said, significant agreements have been reached in the area of defense of the Serb Republic, especially in investment for the plan of the reorganization and creation of a professional Serb Republic Army.

The current situation and the problems in the army, together with the efforts to solve them, were the subject of talks Prime Minister Klickovic had with Lieutenant-General Momir Talic, the commander of the 1st Krajina Corps of the Serb Republic Army.

B-H: Serb TV, Radio Continue Debate on 'National Issue'

AU1208080096

[FBIS Report] Banja Luka Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian at 1840 GMT on 8 August carries an approximately 90-minute roundtable discussion, part of the "Elections '96" program, continuing the "radio and television debate on the Serb Republic and the national issue."

Drago Vukovic, host in the Banja Luka studio, welcomes 10 representatives of parties from the Serb Republic to the second part of the debate initiated on 6 August in the Pale television studio featuring representatives of five parties from the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and four from the Serb Republic.

Cohost Milivoj Tutnjevic greets the audience of Serb Radio and Television and proceeds to introduce: Predrag Lazarevic of the Serb Party of Krajina; Dragan Djokanovic of the Democratic Party of Federalists; Branko Dokic of the Party of Independent Social Democrats; Vojo Kupresanin of the Party of Serbian Unity; Gordana Vidovic of the Serb Republic Serb Peasants' Party; Bozidar Bojanic of the Radical Fatherland Front Nikola Pasic; Mico Carevic of the Yugoslav

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United Left of the Serb Republic; Slavko Zupljanin of the Serb Patriotic Party; Slobodan Bijelic of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS); and Radoslav Brdjanin of the Serb Republic National Party.

Tutnjevic reminds the viewers that representatives of the Croatian Pure Party of Right and the Muslim Bosniak Organization failed to arrive although they were invited.

Vukovic recapitulates Tuesday's discussion, saying that the party representatives debated "a nation's right to national identity and self-determination" and "a very perfidious and arrogant" insistence on Bosnia's integrity, "as though no nation has a right to survive outside it." He also expresses regret that some Serbs from the federation were "used in the attempt convince the Serbs that they do not need their own nation."

Predrag Lazarevic starts off with a historical overview of the Serb national issue, arguing that "the Serbs are one of the oldest nations in Europe" and that, in recent history, "had the misfortune not to have a true national state." He claims that "Western countries are perfidiously preventing the Serb national unification," because it stands in the way of their interests in the region. Lazarevic says the Serbs were "tricked into Yugoslavia" to prevent the forming of "a large bloc of Orthodox countries."

Radoslav Brdjanin, representative of the Serb Republic National Party, says that "every Serb must advocate a national state" and proceeds to outline a profile of people who can create such a national state. He urges all parties to sign a consensus agreement on their minimal interests, specifying that "the national issue is nonnegotiable, we can only talk about economic issues."

Dragan Djokanovic says that "this generation of Serbs inherited a country called Yugoslavia from their fathers, and the least they can do is to defend it." He says that "the preservation of the FRY as a federation of Serbia, Montenegro, and the Serb Republic" is the first and foremost task of all Serbs. Djokanovic goes on to say that Serb Republic parties must "strengthen the Serb Republic as a democratic, law-ordered state" and calls for "internationally recognized federal, not special, ties with Serbia and Montenegro."

Speaking on behalf of the SDS, Slobodan Bijelic warns against the "dispersion of the Serb national body" in the wake of the Dayton Accord. He says the SDS has "a historic responsibility" for the realization and protection of the Serb national issue in the past five or six years and adds that the party was formed "in reaction to the secessionist policies of Slovenia and Croatia, as well as Bosnia-Herzegovina." He says that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the unification of Germany had much to do with the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Bijelic reminds that the Serb nation has "a genetic fear of neighbors based on negative historical experience" because, for the third time in the past 80 years, the Serbs have been "attacked by the neighbor's offspring." He believes that "it is fortunate that Franjo Tudjman is paranoid about Euroslavia, or any other type of coexistence in the region" and says that the SDS is fighting for the right to self-determination and unification with Serbia.

Branko Dokic insists that the Dayton Accord recognized the Serb Republic as a state and adds that it will survive as a national state "only if it is democratic, law-ordered, and compliant with world standards regulating basic human rights." He warns against "headlong unification with Serbia, i.e. FRY" and argues that "we must wait for the right moment and do it the way the two Germanies united."

Slavko Zupljanin speaks on behalf of "the party of Serb soldiers" and says that "freedom is of paramount importance; there is no freedom without a state; there is no state without national awareness; there is no national awareness without patriotism." He says that "the Serb national issue cannot be solved now considering the constitution of Serbia, i.e. Yugoslavia," but says that the Serb Republic, as "an ethnic entity of the Serb nation" is the solution to the national issue of the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Vojo Kupresanin explains the position of the Party of Serbian Unity on the Serb national issue, saying the Serbs "cannot coexist" with the Croats and the Muslims and that "Bosnia-Herzegovina as a country, does not have the cohesive force to preserve it as a state." He says the "unprepared, communist Serb intelligentsia" who did not care enough about the Serbs are responsible for the present situation and that the Serb national issue will not be solved until "Serb nationalists whose primary goal is the Serb state and the Serb nation take matters into their own hands."

Mico Carevic takes over to say that "to solve the national issue, the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina must be connected with their mother nation, i.e. Serbia," but that they must also be connected to their other neighbors. He calls for a national state that will also be "multiethnic to an extent."

Representing the views of the Serb Republic Peasants' Party, Gordana Vidovic says that "national interests should prevail over personal and party interests" and calls for "unification with all Serb lands," as the Serb Republic cannot stand alone.

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Bozidar Bojanic says that the Serb national awareness developed in the 19th century around the territory, language, and spirituality of the Serb nation. He blames many present problems on the fact that "the Serbs let others exploit them." He calls for the preservation of "present division into entities," as envisaged by the Dayton Accord, because "that will preserve the Serb national being."

Milivoj Tutnjevic wraps up the discussion saying that, while some party representatives call for absolute sovereignty, some call for closer ties with Yugoslavia, and others call for a Serb entity, they all seem to be "for the Serb Republic."

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Croatia: Tudjman Holds Talks With U.S. Envoy Kornblum

LD1008121296 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 10 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Croatian President Franjo Tudjman has received John Kornblum, U.S. assistant secretary of state. Kornblum briefed the president on his talks with Milosevic at the forum of the Federation in Sarajevo and in Belgrade.

Kornblum regrets that, because of objections by the Bosniak side, the documents on the transfer of authority to federal were not signed. He positively assessed the stand of the Croatian side to the effect that the transfer of authority from Herceg-Bosna and from Bosnia-Herzegovina to federal bodies be carried out concurrently.

It is important that the documents are prepared by 14 August, the date of the Geneva meeting of the Contact Group. The aim of this meeting is to reaffirm the resolve of the United States in the successful implementation of the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the establishment of authorities after the elections, Kornblum said.

President Tudjman said that the Republic of Croatia fully supports the implementation of the Dayton and Washington agreements, in particular the part relating to the Federation, in order to ensure the equality of federal partners, the Croats and the Bosniaks.

As for relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the president said that the Republic of Croatia is ready for normalization, as this is a condition for creating a new world order. Croatia is prepared to do everything in its power to secure stability in the Balkans, although it does not belong to the Balkans by its geography, history, or civilization.

There can be no relinquishing of Prevlaka and no exchange of territories, because Prevlaka is sovereign Croatian territory and an exchange cannot be carried out at the expense of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the president said, dispelling speculations that Bosnia-Herzegovina was discussed at his meeting with Milosevic.

The president expressed satisfaction with the activitites of transitional administrator Klein, regarding the processs of peaceful reintegration, reiterating Croatia's firm stand that the UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia] mandate must end within the year, because of 80,000 refugees, and the fact that Croatia is financing the work of the transitional administration. [passage omitted]

Croatia: Parties View Milosevic-Tudjman Meeting

AU1208084496 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 9 Aug 96 p 5

[Article by Branko Podgornik, Mladen Balen, and Marinko Bobanovic: "Parties Have Mixed Feelings About Tudjman-Milosevic Meeting"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Croatian political parties expressed mixed feelings about President Tudjman's meeting with President Milosevic, as well as about the announced agreement on the normalization of relations between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY]. Both the party in power and the opposition parties thought it was important to normalize relations with the neighboring state, but the opposition stressed that certain important issues remained unsolved.

Drago Krpina, deputy general secretary of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union], tolk VJESNIK that the Athens meeting and the arrangements for the mutual recognition of the two states were extremely important. In Krpina's opinion, Milosevic's agreement to recognize Croatia's internationally recognized borders can also be viewed as his official political and military capitulation, especially if we consider the goals we had when he began the aggression against Croatia.

The goal of Croatian politics is to establish proper relations with all neighboring states, including the FRY, in order to create a stable background for the promotion of our international position and to ensure rapid economic development. Croatia's and the FRY's mutual recognition will add to the establishment of the new international order in these regions, something that is also in the interests of the international community. Of course, it will also help the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Krpina said.

Krpina: The Fall of Greater Serbia

HDZ's deputy general secretary also pointed out that Milosevic's willingness to recognize Croatia is a clear message to Serbs in the Croatian Danube Valley who are still trying to fight peaceful reintegration. That means the Athens meeting is likely to have a positive impact on the process of peaceful reintegration of the Croatian Danube Valley and the return of displaced Croatians to that region. Krpina said the arrangement for the instant exchange of all information on missing and imprisoned persons as well as on those who were taken away by force deserved special attention.

The Athens meeting ended the cycle of the century of political and historical confrontations that were reflected in the idea of "Greater Serbia," but also in the idea of the sovereign and independent Croatian state. Milosevic

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wanted to create Greater Serbia by taking a part of the Croatian territory. On Thursday in Athens he officially admitted the fall of his main political and military goal. As for the recognition of Croatia, Milosevic faced a fait accompli and just could not go on resisting. As to the concrete establishment of relations with the FRY, Krpina concluded, we must believe that the Croatian authorities will know how to protect primary Croatian interests, especially as they knew—with the support of the entire Croatian nation—how to defeat the Greater Serbia project in the political and military sense.

Bozo Kovacevic, HSLS [Croatian Social Liberal Party] representative and a member of the Assembly's Foreign Policy Board, said normalizing relations with the FRY has always been a guideline of Croatian politics and that the meeting in Athens was not a surprise. The timing of the meeting—which came shortly after President Tudjman's sudden trip to Washington—showed, in Kovacevic's words, that there was a connection between the two meetings.

Bozo Kovacevic claimed that the joint communique from Athens contained a number of details that President Tudjman failed to stress in his statement on Croatian television. The president maintained that Prevlaka was not a problem, but the joint communique said that parties would obey the UN security organization until an arrangement on Prevlaka is made.

Kovacevic: Prevlaka Is a Problem

"According to that, Prevlaka is a problem and it was discussed," Kovacevic stated. The communique also mentioned the general amnesty as a prerequisite for peaceful return. "I believe this regulation is more likely to be a result of President Tudjman's meeting with President Clinton than with President Milosevic," the HSLS representative said.

Kovacevic stressed that Tudjman's speech to the Assembly of HDZ youth criticized the alleged attempts by international circles to force Croatia to accept the principles of free circulation of goods, capital, and people. However, the communique said Milosevic and Tudjman agreed on those principles. "I assume it is another consequence of Tudjman's meeting with Clinton," Kovacevic said.

The topics of conversation between Tudjman and Milosevic were actually a list of problems that should have been solved a long time ago. "I hope this time Croatian politics will not imitate Milosevic's persistent evasion of his duties. If we had taken our proper political actions before, we would have achieved this normalization agreement without being forced to go to Washington first," Kovacevic said. He added: "Of course, we must welcome the efforts on the normalization of relations between Croatia and the FRY."

"The announced establishment of diplomatic relations will be a great success for Croatia because it will entail Serbian recognition of our internationally recognized borders. I hope this process will be quickly followed by a normalization of relations on Croatia's internal political scene," Kovacevic said.

According to Tonino Picula, a member of the Executive Board of the SDP [Social Democratic Party], the SDP has again spotted a huge number of paradoxes —which is usual in official Croatian politics—during the latest meeting of the two presidents. "It is quite telling that it seemes so easy for the Croatian president to talk to his enemy of yesterday. Milosevic has caused so many tragedies both within and outside Croatia. At the same time, Tudjman either ignores or obstructs his political rivals in the country."

Picula: Without Secret Annexes?

The SDP appreciates the good services of the host of the meeting, Greek Prime Minister Simitis. However, the party wondered why President Tudjman agreed to initial the final normalization of relations with Yugoslavia in the capital of a Balkan state, as the Balkans have a very derogatory connotation in his political vocabulary.

The SDP official added that it is quite difficult to dispute the contents of the communique issued after the meeting because Croatia and Yugoslavia are geographic necessities to each other, which is bound to dictate their relations. "We would like to believe that the communique covered all topics of the meeting and that there are no hidden annexes that might someday complicate relations in the territory of the former SFRY. Interestingly, the communique did not mention the recognition of the internationally recognized borders of the signatory states," Picula concluded.

In the opinion of the HNS [Croatian National Party], "the alleged normalization of relations between Croatia and the FRY might have been the excuse, but the real reason for the meeting must have been the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the solution of the Mostar crisis, which was undoubtedly disliked by those who want to divide that internationally recognized country." There are indications that they are trying to complete the dissolution of Bosnia-Herzegovina through electoral manipulation, political pressure, and preservation of illegal parastate institutions in Bosnian territory, the HNS stated.

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The HNS: We Reject the "Spirit of Athens"

The HNS rejected the "spirit of Athens" and the principles of the alleged normalization of relations with the FRY, as those failed to specify who was the victim and who the aggressor. The HNS was particularly irritated by the fact that—in the exultation of forgetting the causes and consequences of the Yugoslav crisis—the issue of Previaka was reopened. That showed that Tudjman had not forgotten the promises he had made to Milosevic on the occasion of the notorious meeting in Karadjordjevo. Moreover, it showed that the president questioned the decision of the Badinter Commission, contrary to the Assembly and the public opinion, which might entail the question of sovereignty of the borders of all states that were created after the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia.

Accepting all the reasons for the establishment of relations with the FRY when the time comes, the HNS refused to accept the humiliation of recognizing the FRY before Croatia's sovereignty over Baranja, Eastern Slavonia, and Western Srijem is reestablished and before the succession proces of the FRY is completed.

In the opinion of the HKDU [Croatian Christian Democratic Union], President Tudjman should have resisted the pressure of the international community and not gone to Athens to meet President Milosevic, because that act has created new doubts and dissatisfaction among Croatian citizens, as HKDU Deputy Chairman Josip Silic said at a news conference on Friday. Silic also said that the Athens meeting created distrust in the federal partner and added to the tension between the Croats and the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Croatia should have followed the example of Bosnia-Herzegovina: Insist on the status of victim, demand war reparations from the FRY, and press charges against Milosevic at The Hague.

Degen: Not to the Detriment of the Third Party

ASH [Action of Social Democrats of Croatia] Chairman Silvije Degen spoke on behalf of his party and said that the announcement of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two states was an expected and necessary step in the context of joint efforts to normalize the situation in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. That step expressed the hope that the return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes will become possible, as well as that the problem of the missing and imprisoned will be solved. Degen highlighted that the announced step would not bring the expected results if it did not outgrow the mere agreement between the heads of the two states. Croatia cannot establish or develop its relations with any country to the detriment of the third country, the ASH stated.

The SDU [Social Democratic Union] welcomed the Athens agreement and added that every war ended in peace, and accounts had to be settled in peace. Our borders must be peaceful. "Our fate is to be together," and we will undoubtedly be close quite soon, SDU representatives said at the press conference in Rijeka.

Croatia: Commentary Assesses Tudjman's Meeting With Milosevic

AU1208075196 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 9 Aug 96 p 1

[Commentary by Fran Visnar: "Power and Pragmatism"]

[FBIS Translated Text] President Tudjman's meeting with Slobodan Milosevic in Athens may be a surprise for those who do not think politics is a struggle for the interests of the state, a struggle that includes negotiations with the main opponent in the region. Tudjman must do what he is doing because it is his job and because one must talk to the "bitter enemy" once the war is over.

American veterans who fought in Vietnam still cannot come to terms with their government's decision to establish full diplomatic relations with Vietnam despite the fact that certain important issues have not been solved—for instance, missing persons. Just remember what Yitzak Rabin and Shimon Perez said five years ago: "We will never sit at the same table with Yasir Arafat. Oil will spurt out of the sands of Negev before we accept Arafat as a negotiator." All those statements were forgotten when the same Israeli politicians, for the sake of peace, shook hands with the man who was responsible—directly or indirectly—for the death of hundreds of innocent Israelis and Jews around the world.

Franjo Tudjman did not have to change his attitude so radically, because he has always maintained that he would negotiate with whoever can help stop the war, preserve human lives, keep Croatians out of the trenches, or help with the recognition of the Croatian borders by those who took a long time to accept them. Milosevic, a very pragmatic politician, has realized what Croatia has become after Operation Storm. He sees the advantages of Croatia now. He is hoping to finally establish with Tudjman the relations that a state should have with its neighbors, especially if Tudjman is utterly devoted to his own nation. Tudjman does not have to abandon anything that belongs to Croatia. However, we cannot force Milosevic to give us other important answers (the solution of the problem of missing and imprisoned

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persons, recognition of Croatia's internationally recognized borders, etc.) without establishing full diplomatic relations with Serbia and Montenegro. Diplomacy is just like cooking: To bake a good cake, you must first crack all the walnuts and then pick out the good ones.

Croatia: Commentary Views Prospects for Relations With FRY

AU1208115496 Zagreb NACIONAL in Serbo-Croatian 9 Aug 96 p 14

["Exclusive" commentary by Roman Majetic: "There Will Be No Recognition!"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Judging by the joint statement initialed by the foreign ministers of the Republic of Croatia and SR [Federal Republic] Yugoslavia, Dr. Mate Granic and Milan Milutinovic, in Athens on 7 August, following the 53rd meeting in the last six years between presidents Tudjman and Milosevic, the two states should sign an agreement on the normalization of relations by the end of the month.

According to the presidents' statements, the Athens meeting resulted in significant progress toward the normalization of relations between the two states, and their host, Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis, announced that the agreement, which will be signed by Granic and Milutinovic at the end of this month (the meeting should take place in Belgrade on 23 August), will mean full diplomatic recognition between the two states.

On 7 August, we talked by phone with Dr. Zvonimir Markovic, head of the Office of the Republic of Croatia in Belgrade, who participated in the preparations for this meeting. According to him, contrary to the Greek prime minister's announcement, it is unlikely that SRJ [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] and Croatia will establish full diplomatic ties by the end of the month.

Ready for Normalization

"I do not believe, based on the meeting between Mate Granic and Milan Milutinovic, that mutual recognition will be established by the end of this month. Diplomatic recognition—and it is a solemn act which symbolizes full normalization of relations between two states—must be preceded by concrete solutions to all disputable issues: the problem of the missing, Prevlaka, pensions, economic relations, property relations, frerdom of movement of people and goods....

"Diplomatic recognition itself, in that context, represents the final chapter of negotiations during which issues are resolved with a series of agreements. Mutual diplomatic recognition of two states, before the resolution of all disputable questions, would not necessarily improve bilateral relations.

"Tudjman and Milosevic, in talks lasting several hours, touched on a majority of the contentious issues between the two states. However, concrete solutions to those problems are never agreed upon at the presidential level; they are solved by ministers and expert teams.

"Therefore, the results of the meeting between Dr. Franjo Tudjman and Slobodan Milosevic must be viewed as a political expression of the will for normalization of relations. The problems between the two states—even after diplomatic recognition—would be solved in meetings at the ministerial and working group levels. Most of them will be discussed in Belgrade on 23 August, but it is hard to tell which problems will be solved then.

"During the process of normalization, issues on which we have already reached agreement and have begun implementation, must be addressed again: railroad traffic has not started to function yet, road traffic and telecommunications only partially, and the resumption of the air and river traffic is to follow," finished Dr. Zvonimir Markovic. [passage omitted]

Vague About Results

[Passage omitted] On the other hand, although the joint statement from the Athens meeting reflects the readiness of the leaderships of the two states to normalize relations, the vagueness about the results of the negotiations, in addition to the unresolved issues, indicate that two sides are not near agreement on their individual stands.

Croatia, admittedly, expressed its readiness to yield on the issue of the return of the Serb refugees, having obliged itself to proclaim general amnesty for all the refugees. In return, the Serbs oblige themselves to immediately exchange all existing data on missing persons, which represents a significant step in the negotiations on this issue.

Particular attention was paid to the border issue during the talks. In Athens, Slobodan Milosevic for the first time publicly and unreservedly supported the implementation of the Erdut agreement, and since this agreement means the reintegration of eastern Slavonia and Baranja into Croatia's legal system, it is clear that SRJ has no territorial aspirations toward that part of Croatian territory.

The problem of Prevlaka was given, seemingly, too much importance, since it is indisputably a part of the Croatian territory. "Two sides confirmed their readiness to solve the issue of Prevlaka via negotiations, and in the spirit of the UN Charter and neighborliness," says the statement. This rather vague formulation—if one adds President Tudjman's statement that "the

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issue of Prevlaka will be solved such a way as to provide security to Boka Kotorska, as well security to the Dubrovnik hinterland"—in fact, confirms that the question of the territorial exchange in the far south of Croatia was very much the subject of talks. [passage omitted]

Both presidents can say, without question, that the meeting in Athens was a success, although a concrete agreement was not reached. President Tudjman will try to describe it as a new "big diplomatic victory" and thus try to regain part of his reputation lost with the Croatian electorate, while Slobodan Milosevic, regarding the issue of Prevlaka, will try to persuade the Serbian public that he succeeded in exchanging part of a useless territory of the Dubrovnik hinterland for a strategically important cape. One must not forget that both presidents have elections coming up soon; Milosevic as early as in November, and Tudjman, at the latest, in the spring.

Croatia: Granic Comments on Federation Forum Meeting

LD0908194596 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 9 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] We asked Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic to comment on last night's events in Sarajevo. Dr. Granic is in Brijuni, where he is to meet tomorrow the U.S. peace mediator, John Kornblum. Croatian President Franjo Tudjman will receive the U.S. mediator. Our colleague Zeljko Korpak reports:

[Begin recording] [Korpak] Mr. Minister, the second federation forum was held in Sarajevo last night. The expectations were that the meeting that you attended in the name of the Republic of Croatia would mark a step forward in the process of the transfer of some powers from the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities and the government of Herzeg-Bosnia to the government of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation. Have these expectations been fulfilled?

[Granic] Unfortunately, not yet. I visited Sarajevo at the invitation of the United States, in line with the agreement reached during the visit of President Tudjman to the United States.

In the beginning, the proceedings were held in plenary session. An agreement was reached to adopt a political declaration and second, an annex that will determine precisely the transfer of power from the republic to the federation and the transfer of power from Herzeg-Bosnia to the federation. We reached agreement on this.

Later, we worked in two groups. I worked in the political group, in other words on the political declaration. The U.S. sponsored the declaration. The Croatian side, headed by Federation President Zubak, had only two minor remarks that had been accepted. The Republic of Croatia has firmly supported the U.S.-sponsored declaration, just as Mr. Bildt did, and practically all we discussed for two hours were the remarks made by the Bosniak side.

After two hours we concluded the proceedings and adopted the declaration, which was to be signed by Mr. Zubak and Mr. Ganic [Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation vice president]. Mr. Ganic participated in the work on the declaration in the name of the Bosniak side.

It is then that I left Sarajevo. Unfortunately, I heard that 10 minutes later Mr. Muratovic came and said that the Bosniak side did not agree with the agreement reached.

It is evident that intensive work is necessary if we are to avoid huge damage to the Federation. Especially as these institutions will not be able to function after 15 September, after the elections. The Serb side, the Serb entity will have a significant advantage. The Croat side will do everything for the agreement to be reached. But here, the Croatian side was not an obstacle in any way. In fact, it accepted straight away the proposal put forward by the United States.

[Korpak] There will be a new opportunity for additional work on those proposals tomorrow here, in Brijuni, where John Kornblum will meet Croatian President Tudjman. Mr. Minister, thank you for the interview.

[Granic] You are welcome. [end recording]

Croatia: Commentary Warns of Effects of Trade Sanctions

AU0908181496 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 9 Aug 96 p 4

[Commentary by Deana Knezevic: "A Dangerous Word—'Sanctions'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It would be good if the Mostar compromise permanently hurled the threat of sanctions away from this area and if this threat were not provoked by some new crises, particularly not such crises in which the main actors will say later on that they could have been ended in a "more elegant way" or, indeed, avoided altogether. The mere mention of economic sanctions can produce an effect similar to the actual sanctions. For businessmen, who have no time for political analyses and rely upon media digests of events, news of possible sanctions acts as a warning. It has an effect similar to that caused by news about sharks in the vicinity of a tourist beach. Most often such news is denied, but if you want to be sure, you have to take the risk yourself.

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When the introduction of economic reforms started, the Croatian economy started to move decisively away from the concept of "raw materials, food, and energy," upon which one could develop a closed type of economy and which was absolutely inappropriate for the new political order. Even during the war, the authors of economic policy successfully fought against the tendencies to return to such a closed economy and remained faithful to the open model, which is not afraid of foreign competition on the domestic market and will try to carry it into foreign markets, too. Therefore in Croatia there are no more mines from which ore was dug out at whatever cost, even when the ore was far too poor in quality to be profitable. There is not much heavy industry, but roads and airports are being built, the telecommunications infrastructure is being developed, and there is investment in tourism, in other words, in those activities considered capable of being profitable under conditions of foreign competition.

The application of sanctions on such an economic system would cause economic damage the extent of which one cannot even guess at. Almost every product contains greater or fewer imported components and one does not give this a thought in normal circumstances, but when foreign trade rivers dry up, all of a sudden technical and technological details, otherwise usually neglected, become crucial. Today's teenagers do not remember it, but those a little older probably do still remember the shortages in 1982. Then, there were no sanctions, but there was a debt crisis. But the effect was similar. Foreign trade was reduced because of a drastic fall in foreign currency liquidity. There were no imported goods in the stores, such as detergent and coffee, toilet paper and toothpaste, and there was no domestic milk or oil, either, because there were no imports to produce the packaging materials. Sugar was running out, one needed coupons to get gas, and there was neither electricity nor heating.

It is interesting that many foreign creditors, in the interest of whom all those restrictions were introduced then, have still not collected their outstanding debts, but the debts have been rescheduled and serious economic reforms, which would enable the economy to recover, started only several years later. It was too little and too late and the system collapsed. The efficiency of economic sanctions imposed with pure political motives is also doubtful. A national economy can be brought to its knees, the people can suffer, the damage can spread to neighboring countries, but it still does not mean that the political changes that the initiators of the sanctions had in mind will take place. Or at least not in the short term; but in the long term, as the saying goes, we are all dead. Therefore the world powers do not wade into sanctions just like that, but only when all other methods are already exhausted.

Croatia: Prospects for Return of Krajina Serbs Viewed

AU1008200896 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 3 Aug 96 p 2

[Report on interview with Borislav Mikelic, chairman of the Committee for the Protection of Rights and Interests of Expatriated Persons and Their Return to Their Homeland, by I. Zurovac; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] Borislav Mikelic is used to fighting. Sometimes he loses a battle, but he has never admitted defeat. Even when everyone thought he was left only with the ruined remnants of the Krajina, he found strength, political courage, and a way to bring hope to a difficult situation and to lessen the huge injustice. He rectified what could realistically be rectified. The greatest wish of any man is to be on his own soil, in his home, and that is also the age-old right of the Serb people.

In an effort to resolve the fate of the Serb people from the Krajina and to present arguments to the international community, the Committee for the Protection of the Rights and Interests of Expatriated Persons and Their Return to Their Homeland, headed by Mikelic, was formed.

Dayton in Practice

"The Committee's job is not only to protect the rights and interests of expatriated persons and their right to return to their homeland; it must also resolve the basic issues of the status of those who will remain in Yugoslavia and of those who will go to third countries. Judging by their present mood, a significant number of these people will stay in Yugoslavia, some will go to third countries, and 50 percent of the refugee population is expected to gradually return to the western parts of the Krajina," Mikelic said.

"The Committee's priority is to create political, security, and financial conditions for the people to return to their homeland, because that is why the Committee was formed in the first place. For the Serbs to return to their homes, the Dayton agreement needs to be implemented in practice on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Erdut-Zagreb agreement as well. But it is also necessary for Yugoslavia and Croatia to achieve mutual recognition, when the current obstacles are resolved, of course.

"For various reasons, the Committee has determined that for now it is best to plan to send back only the

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people who are capable of doing agricultural work. In the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, there are 40,000 of these people, and if Croatia passes the amnesty law, there should be no problem with them going back.

"I am certain that if this agricultural population went back to their villages, regardless of how many have been burned down, they would create a realistic basis for the second phase: the return of people from the towns. At this point, they have no work here, and they cannot return to Croatia. We will give all this data to the international organizations, and we will demand that Croatia pass the amnesty law so that those that will fall under the law may return to their homes and not be arrested. We are talking about 50,000, 100,000, or 150,000 people, and the security factor is very important. But there has to be a political arrangement with Europe and the international community," Mikelic said.

Clear Answers

Asked whether the Serb people from the Krajina were now aware of who was to blame for their unprecedented defeat and humiliation, which had been a subject of speculation in local and international newspapers, and in political and quasi-political groups, Mikelic said:

"Our people know exactly that the policy of Pale is the absolute cause of what happened. The leader of the Republic of Serb Krajina, Milan Martic, submitted to the views of Pale and cast off the rational policy of Slobodan Milosevic, a policy that gave us a chance to survive in Croatia and to achieve the best possible status that could be achieved."

Borislav Mikelic rejects the theory that everyone is to blame for this tragedy of the Krajina. "I do not know," Mikelic said, "how everyone can be guilty. We could have chosen to find a way out through negotiations, but if you did not want to talk, if you did not want political solutions, then there is only the option that Martic advocated. We cannot all be guilty. Why should I be guilty if someone brought me down because I was in favor of continuing the negotiations; why should I be to blame if there was not enough military power to defend such an area; and why should I be to blame if I openly said so at the Assembly. It does not make me a betrayer of the Serb people. For me the issue was whether the people would go or stay, and the result was only possible to achieve through negotiations.

"Had they allowed me to conclude the economic agreement with the Croats, today the Serbs would be living in the Krajina with a high degree of autonomy. We would have made Croatia economically dependent on the Krajina. Conversely, we would have strengthened the Krajina economically and achieved a better position from which to negotiate."

Explaining that it was necessary to separate state institutions from various associations formed in the FRY, Mikelic said that he had nothing against any of these associations, nor did they bother the Committee. According to Mikelic, the fact that the Committee bothers some people can be explained by their intention to conduct their own policy of returning the refugees to the Krajina, something that they incapable of doing. Because this is a long-term assignment, it is impossible to complete in several months.

"Such a huge task cannot be completed without the support of a state, and in that sense, Yugoslavia is helping us a lot. Ever since we appeared, there has been much more talk about refugees and exiles. I am sure we will manage to make the international community accept our existence."

Premeditated Propaganda

"The news published by DNEVNI TELEGRAF about the formation of some organization called the KOA (Krajina Liberation Army) that will reportedly use terrorism is very dangerous enemy propaganda for the overall security of this region, particularly for the security of the Serb people in Croatia. Such propaganda can also have psychological effects on the implementation of the agreement in the Slavonia-Baranja region and on the safety of the Serbs living there. It is also directed against the refugees on the territory of Yugoslavia, against the possibility of their returning to their homes and the protection of their property that has remained in Croatia.

"After the terrorist attack in Atlanta, news about the existence of the KOA can only bring us new trouble. This is premeditated propaganda, planted through DNEVNI TELEGRAF by those who want to cause more problems for everyone, particularly for the Serbs from the Krajina."

This is how Borislav Mikelic reacted to the news about the existence of the terrorist organization called the KOA:

"Terrorists and those who support such folly should be stopped in the organizations which they hide behind, and I hope the state institutions of Yugoslavia will soon resolve this. Someone has to answer for the dissemination of enemy propaganda, which is, in fact, what these articles in the press about the so-called KOA are. Those who decided to publish such a pamphlet certainly know who gave it to them and why."

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Program

The Committee prepared a pilot project for the farming population to return to 13 municipalities of northern Dalmatia, Lika, Kordun, and Banija, in which, according to the 1991 census, the Serbs were the majority.

The project pertains to the municipalities of Knin, Benkovac, Obrovac, Donji Lapac, Gracac, Korenica, Vojnic, Vrgin Most, Glina, Petrinja, Kostajnica, and Pakrac.

Croatia: Article Sees KOA Threats as 'Trick' Against Tourism

AU0908072396 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 7 Aug 96 p 7

[Article by Robert Bajrusi: "The Serb Trick Against Tourism"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb—A recent report announced that an organization called the Krajina Liberation Army [KOA] will soon be formed. Is Croatia facing a real danger of becoming a new Israel, or is it just a trick played by a handful of Serb chauvinists who fled to Belgrade last summer? Judging by the announced sabotage and terrorist assaults, the Adriatic coast being a special target, there are reasons to pay attention to the "Serb IRA," as the KOA members call themselves. However, the present information implies that is it a mere case of propaganda aimed at causing panic and fear in Croatia. Evidence of that is seen in the reticent reactions of the Croatian state services and their (mostly anonymous) officials, who have assigned little importance to the threats coming from Belgrade.

A Croatian expert in that field, who insisted on remaining anonymous, said that is was an old trick contrived by a small number of people. He added that media interest would be a success for the so-called KOA, as it would provide publicity. We must pay attention to the fact that the process of the peaceful reintegration of the Croatian Danube River Valley has undermined the few remaining pillars of the idea of Greater Serbia. The Greater Serbians, caught in a checkmate, are trying to draw attention to themselves by announcing terrorism in the regions that they consider to be theirs. They cannot achieve any results by the actions that they have announced, but the substantial media attention is a success of a certain kind.

They have succeeded in one thing: They have intimidated the population and heightened tension in the middle of the tourist season. That implies that it still might not be an idea of a couple of hotheads, but a form of special war planned in an intelligence service abroad, as our source have informed us.

Other intelligence services, the Defense Ministry, and the Foreign Ministry had no comment to make on the announcements that came from Belgrade. That led us to the conclusion that it is a case of psychological propaganda aimed at causing panic both among the Croatian public and among the numerous foreign tourists. Finally, the terrorist action announced for Patriotic Gratitude Day [5 August] turned out to be an empty threat and did not make the "Liberators" seem very dangerous. So, should their other threats be taken seriously, or is it just that losers are always angry?

Croatia: Explosive Device Damages Monument in Zagreb

LD1108122196 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 11 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] In connection with this morning's explosion in Zagreb, in which the base of a monument to Veceslav Holjevac was damaged, Zagreb police held a news conference. Assistant Interior Minister Zdravko Zidovec and Deputy Police Chief Vladimir Faber were there.

According to the information available so far, unknown persons planted an explosive device at the level of the statue thus damaging both the base and the electrical installations.

Fortunately, no-one was injured, but the cost of the damage has not yet been established, Faber said. [passage omitted]

Croatia: Police Say Eastern Slavonia Crime Down

LD0908132296 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1209 GMT 9 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Vukovar, 9 Aug (TANJUG)—Public order and peace in the Serb region of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem can be said to be favorable, the information and analysis department of the Transitional Police Force [PPS] announced in Vukovar today.

The statement, which contains an analysis of crime statistics in the first 30 days of the work of the PPS, says in particular that violations of public order and peace resulting from fire-arms' offenses have declined, and this is attributed to the successful completion of the region's demilitarization. [passage omitted]

The PPS began work on 1 July 1996 as a police force within UNTAES [United Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia], and is under the direct control of General Jacques Klein, the transitional administrator.

The PPS is made up of 1,850 people: almost the entire Serb police contingent of 1,300 people, 400 members of the international police, and 150 members of the Croatian Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Transitional administrator Klein appointed Petar Djukic as head of the PPS. Djukic used to have the same job in the Serb police force.

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FYROM: PDPA, NDP Protest Arrests in Tetovo

AU1108205496 Zurich BOTA SOT in Albanian 10 Aug 96 p 8

[Report by L.K. on news conference by the Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians in Macedonia and the People's Democratic Party in Tetovo on 8 August]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tetovo, 9 August—The Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians in Macedonia [PDPA—PPDSh in Albanian] and the People's Democratic Party [NDP—PDP in Albanian] held a joint news conference in Tetovo yesterday regarding the imprisonment of the Tetovo University leaders and the demonstrations organized on that occasion.

The incarceration manifests the latent repression that has been continuously perpetrated against Albanians from Rankovic's time until now, PDPA spokesman Alajdin Demiri said. The imprisonment of the Tetovo University rector and others demonstrates the continuity of the xenophobic culture of a judicial system in which ideas are condemned, Demiri added. In former times, Albanians were convicted on charges that they were ruining the system of communist values, the fraternity and unity, the democratic centralization, while today they are charged with endangering the idea of the national state. The latest incarceration of activists reveals the tendency of the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Government and its services to radicalize the goal of interethnic relations in order to hide the eventual defeats in the domestic, foreign, social, and economic policies, particularly following the assassination attempt on President Gligorov, which amplified dilemmas and doubts.

Those organizers of massive manifestations who were conscientious assess that the demonstrations and protests, held under the motto "We Seek Protection" in the cities of Macedonia, Geneva, and New York, were very well organized and reveal not only the high prestige that the political subjects enjoy among the people, but also the admirable political culture of Albanians. The latest demonstrations protesting the imprisonment of the Tetovo University's honorable activists are a signal of the distressing fact that the system's institutions are not functioning and that the Crvenkovski Government has lost its legitimacy among a majority of Albanians and the citizens of Macedonia. These demonstrations are finally making it clear to the Albanian political subjects that they should end up with more qualified guidelines. Alajdin Demiri added that the imprisonment of the Tetovo University rector and other activists will exact a dear price from the weak-minded Macedonian establishment.

FYROM: Moves by Albania's Berisha Criticized

AU1008173196 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 8 Aug 96 p 2

[Commentary by Nevenka Mitrevska: "Nation on Altar"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 31 July, the new Albanian parliament adopted a resolution admonishing the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] for a court's action against the "president and the other activists" of the illegal "university" in Mala Recica. This resolution also warned that, because the Albanian minority was being denied the right to education in their native language, bilateral relations would greatly "depend on the development of basic rights of the Albanians" who are living not in their homes (as we had thought), but in "their territories." Finally, the resolution questioned the legality of the Macedonian state.

The Macedonian Foreign Ministry, surprisingly, reacted relatively swiftly (no later than 6 August) with an official note and qualified the statements in the "resolution" as groundless and dangerous, not only for good-neighborly relations between the two countries, but also for stability in the region as a whole. The official note called the statements an open "attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of the Republic of Macedonia."

Uncommon Communications

How much further this incident between Skopje and Tirana goes will depend largely on what the authorities in Tirana do next. It is unlikely that the Albanian Government will adhere strictly to the tasks entrusted to it by parliament in the resolution and file "all demarches" necessary to "resolve the question of the rights to university education" in Macedonia. It is very unlikely, first of all, because if a "demarche" is filed (either to Macedonia or to any international organization or institution), Tirana would have to admit to the real situation regarding education of the minorities that are living in Macedonia and in doing so, would lose all its trump cards at home. The second reason is because the goal of the resolution is not really to improve conditions in university education for the Albanian minority in Macedonia. There is another motive here.

Several factors point to this conclusion. First of all, the method of communication between the two states used in this case is uncommon. Countries that say they are developing good-neighborly relations and cooperation usually communicate through the state bodies that exist for this purpose—foreign ministries. The use of parliaments in these communications—unless it is to pro-

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mote development of interparliamentary cooperation—usually indicates a threat or tension.

The ugly vocabulary used in the resolution and the intentional "disregard" for the indisputable fact that the Albanian minority in Macedonia has the right to education in its native language in the legal institutions of the educational system, prove that at this time Albania does not care about the rights of its minority in Macedonia and that all it wants to do is strain relations with one of its neighboring countries. It is not in its interest to pick on Greece because it is too important as an economic partner, nor should it clash with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, especially on Kosovo, since the West told it not to, particularly now that Belgrade and Pristina are moving toward dialogue. So, it seemed easiest for Tirana to heat things up again with Macedonia. Tense relations between two neighborly Balkan countries, which are in the backyard of recent Bosnian battlefields, is a tested recipe for attracting the attention of the international community.

Revision of Relations

After the dubiously democratic parliamentary elections on 26 May, international attention is what Albania has been missing—sensitive care, support, and particularly a constant influx of money from the recent sponsors, which is nearly dry. It is clear that Washington is revising its relations with Albania after the statement by U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher two days ago in which he said that "United States was disappointed with the Albanian elections," because they were held under conditions that cannot be called just and honest. The European Union, which virtually gave a present to Albania in 1992 with the trade agreement and which had started negotiations on raising it to a higher level, now refuses to negotiate with Albania until it receives assurances that Berisha will fulfill the conditions of the Council of Europe and pass a law on elections and start a dialogue between the ruling Democratic Party and the opposition on new parliamentarian elections within 18 months.

After the elections in Albania had shown a "clear trend toward a new authoritarian regime," as a U.S. congressman recently said, the West began to remember all the other lapses of its Balkan favorite to which—until a few days ago—it used to close its eyes. For instance, five years after the fall of the totalitarian regime, the constitution of that regime is still in effect in Albania. In addition to numerous laws that are on the waiting list, the law on elections has not yet been passed. In spite of assistance from the West, economic reforms in the country are moving at a slow pace, making one think that the assistance is being "redirected" to other targets (European institutions noted—during postelection mayhem on Skenderbey's Square—that policemen in civilian clothes had walkie-talkies and brand new police cars).

There is no mercy or pity in policy, and once the most closed European country was "opened," it quickly availed itself of the care and wishes of the rich to help the suffering Albanian nation. When ships loaded with Albanian refugees started to jeopardize the calm, clean, and ordered West, the care evaporated. Since that moment, the popularity of Albania—that is, the regime of Berisha—has been based on its "moderate conduct" among Balkan nationalistic madness, or in other words, its restraint from openly taking advantage of the large Albanian minorities in neighboring countries. This made Albania an important political player for peace and stability in the southern part of the Balkans.

Drawing Attention to Others

After the Dayton agreement and the suspension of war activities in Bosnia, the importance of the countries that were considered important to the stability and peace of the region decreased. This affected Macedonia as well, but as for Albania, beside being left empty-handed with the Dayton agreement, it was disgraced by the elections. Berisha is very much aware that there are not any electoral machinations that can help him retain power without the support and the money of Western sponsors. That is why he needs to find a new way to gain their interest and approval so he can resume his old, comfortable position in their arms. This is probably the reason for the ugly resolution passed by the Albanian parliament: To draw the attention of Western democrats from the lack of democracy in Albania toward the alleged lack of democracy in Macedonia in which, you see, Tirana is not even aware of the "desire" of the Albanian minority for education, let alone other human rights! Berisha, the great democrat, is obviously not considering the destabilizing consequences that can result from such a constant fostering of hot nationalism among the political leaders of the Albanians here. Or, if he is giving it any thought at all—or if he is doing it intentionally—then he is consciously putting at stake the fate, first of all, of the Albanian minority on this side of the border, and then the fate of the whole Albanian nation. This trick was successfully used by another Balkan "national leader": Pushed into a corner, he sacrificed an entire part of his nation purely for the sake of remaining in the saddle, and he even became an "unavoidable factor" in the international arrangement of peace in Bosnia. Why should Berisha not succeed in this as well?

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FYROM: French Ambassador Urges Bilateral Cooperation

AU0808094196 Skopje Radio Macedonia Network in Macedonian 1330 GMT 7 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] France will continue to strengthen its cooperation with Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] on the political, economic, and cultural plane, and to support our country in its efforts for integration in the European Union, newly appointed ambassador of the Republic of France Jacques (Nuzingher) said at his first news conference after taking over his position. Todor Keramitcievski reports from the news conference.

[(Nuzingher) in French, fading into Macedonian report] France was among the first countries to support the Republic of Macedonia at the beginning of its road to full independence. This trend has continued up to today and I believe that it will be promoted in the future. I would like to repeat something that was said during my meeting with President Gligorov—it is truly necessary to intensify mutual contacts and meetings at all levels. For instance, Mr. Badinter, who is today president of the Macedonian-French Senate, will visit Macedonia in October. French Minister for European Questions Mr. (Banier) will also visit Macedonia in autumn. We will do our best to increase such contacts. In the economic sphere we want to intensify our cooperation, which will greatly facilitate the realization of the recently signed agreement on cooperation between Macedonia and the European Union. France will help Macedonia within the framework of the PHARE Program and the revitalization of the Vardar Valley Project is also of mutual interest. In relation to the cultural cooperation, we can be pleased, he said and he repeated the idea for opening a French High School in which the French language, literature, and culture would be taught and whose diplomas would be accepted in France as well. All this will be more easily accomplished as the political and security situation in the region is promoted, the French ambassador stressed, particularly because Macedonia has established full diplomatic relations with all its neighbors and because it has become a member of all bigger European and world institutions and associations. Finally, Ireland, the EU chairperson, appointed the French ambassador as permanent representative of the European Union in our country.

FYROM: Bank Governor on Ex-Yugoslav Foreign Reserves

LD0908174096 Belgrade FONET in Serbo-Croatian 1529 GMT 9 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Skopje, 9 Aug (FONET)—The foreign reserves of the former Yugoslavia, worth $600 million, will be divided without the agreement from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia if the parliaments and the governments of the four newly formed states agree to the division in the way proposed by the International Monetary Fund, Borko Stanoevski, the governor of the National Bank of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], said today, MAKFAKS has reported.

"If Macedonia, Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina agree on the proposed way of sharing the property, the Bank for International Settlements will activate the case, regardless of the fact that the Yugoslav side does not agree with the division," Stanoevski told NOVA MAKEDONIJA today. [passage omitted]

Dragoslav Avramovic, the former governor of the National Bank of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, had proposed that the $600 million should not be divided, but used to create a Balkan investment fund with five states, successors to the former Yugoslavia, the shareholders. The meeting of the governors to discuss the proposal was not held because Avramovic was replaced in the meantime.

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Poland: Geremek Interviewed on Eastern Policy

WS1208080096 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 8 Aug 96 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Professor Bronislaw Geremek, chairman of the Polish Sejm Foreign Affairs Commission, by Adam Laszyn; place and date not given: "Openness to the East"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Laszyn] There is talk in Russia and Belarus that the Belarusian opposition and the CIA are plotting against President Lukashenka. Members of the the opposition, in turn, claim that it is Lukashenka who is plotting against them. Is Belarus proof that such conspiratorial theories can be accepted as true?

[Geremek] Stories about plots should be dismissed as fairy tales. I believe that those who are formulating such theories in Minsk or Moscow are perfectly aware of the fact that they are taking part in a propaganda campaign whose model was established in the Stalinist system.

It is, however, advisable to watch carefully how the situation in that region develops. Although it is an internal affair of Belarus, we Poles have learned that problems of the relations between those who are in power and those who are governed, problems of respecting human rights, cannot be treated as a country's internal affairs. These are problems at the European and global levels.

[Laszyn] How should Poland respond to the developments in Minsk?

[Geremek] We should primarily hope that policies of democracy and respect for human rights will finally prevail in Belarus. Poland should see the need for the existence of an independent Belarus as part of its national interests, just as it does in the case of independent Ukraine.

We should be concerned when we see that the sovereignty and independence of our neighbors is waning. We have observed such a trend in Belarus over this year. However, Poland's foreign policy should be sensible, open to Belarus.

[Laszyn] Watching current developments in Belarus, we can easily draw parallels between the situation in that country and the situation in Poland a few or a dozen years ago. Right now the opposition is proposing holding "roundtable" talks, which certainly resembles what happened in Poland a few years ago. Do you think this is a good idea? Does this idea stand a chance of being put into effect?

[Geremek] I think a politician should be rather cautious trying to answer this question. Nonetheless, I consider this question to be so important for Belarus that the language of political caution ought to be abandoned.

I believe that Belarus is going along its road to independence in very difficult conditions. Because the russification policy on the territory of Belarus proved very effective, the sense of national identity in Belarusian society is very weak. Only in recent years has the restoration of the Belarusian language and culture been taking place. This is taking place in confrontation with Russian culture on the one hand and Polish culture on the other. The most important thing is for this national identity to be finally formed. I think that the ineffectiveness of the measures taken by the democratic movements in Belarus has partially resulted from the weakness of the national identity. The recent developments in Belarus show that the situation is altering favorably and rather radically. It turns out that democratic slogans really galvanize the Belarusian people to action, and, quite importantly, we can see the young generation emerging on the political scene. It is a generation that has a sense of strong national identity and that wants to build an independent Belarus.

I believe that Poland's experiences in "roundtable" talks can be useful to the Belarusians. However, it is necessary that two partners sit at such a table, one representing society and the other the authorities. This was the Polish model. The current situation in Belarus does not fully correspond to this model. It must be remembered that President Lukashenka is the first Belarusian president elected in a democratic election, which means that he had social support, and, regardless of the motives that led people to support him, it must be respected. As a consequence, the possible "roundtable" strategies certainly differ from the strategies that were employed in Poland.

It is important for the forces representing society to sufficiently agree with each other, to be able to present one stand on the basic issues; they must speak as one on such issues as the existence of an independent Belarus or processes of democratization in public life. These conditions have not been met as yet.

[Laszyn] The seven biggest Belarusian parties—from the right wing to the communists—demand "roundtable" talks. And you think there is no agreement there?

[Geremek] The current situation in Belarus is astounding—this agreement among the political groups...! Now, as far as social support for those groups is concerned, it is still limited, and this is the reason they still do not feel they represent a large part of society. In such a situation there is a threat that a common stand taken by the various political groups will be undermined by their need to find social support. Therefore, I believe that this is still the beginning of a

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process that I hope will be successful. The recent developments have been signals of very positive changes.

[Laszyn] The foreign policy pursued by President Lukashenka is clearly oriented toward the East. Under Lukashenka, Belarus is drifting toward Moscow. The democratic opposition clearly says that it would prefer contacts with Europe, with the West. How should we behave in such a situation? Should we primarily count on the opposition? Should we hope that it will come to power one day and that it will be our proper partner when the incumbent president is gone? Or, instead, should we develop better relations with Lukashenka?

[Geremek] The authorities of a sovereign state must be respected because they have been elected in democratic elections. Such is the situation in Belarus, and it would be irresponsible for Poland to violate this rule in its relations with another country.

However, I believe that inasmuch as Poland is a country with a well-developed civil society and extragovernment institutions, a country in which there is great interest and great sympathy for Belarus, it is in this sphere of public life that we should be particularly active in our relations with Belarus. We should not have bad relations because this will not do any good to either Poland or Belarus.

Because there is a possibility of endorsing positive trends in the policies pursued by President Lukashenka, steps taken to do that should be greeted with satisfaction.

I do not think, however, that President Lukashenka should be given support when his policies show trends toward increasing his dictatorial power and violating democracy.

[Laszyn] A common neighbor of Poland and Belarus is Ukraine. Do you share the opinion that for a long time Poland neglected its relations with Ukraine?

[Geremek] First of all, I believe that relations with Ukraine are of fundamental importance to Poland's foreign policy. Their privileged character serves the reasons of the Polish state and strengthens peace in our region.

However, we have never been able to respond adequately to the challenge brought by Ukraine's independence.

Still, I must insist that what has been done so far should be appreciated. The moment Poland regained independence in 1989, we representatives of the Solidarity camp established relations with the Ukrainian opposition, which was still illegal at that time. We made the first attempt at dialogue about the history of Polish-Ukrainian relations. It must be borne in mind that this history is dramatic for both sides. I believe that this dialogue was conducted effectively. Poland was the first country to recognize Ukraine's independence, and I also consider this to be a reason for us to feel proud of the achievements of Poland's policies.

Nonetheless, I think we still have done too little, primarily because we have failed to put into political practice the unequivocally formulated intentions of Poland's foreign policy, which involved "strategic" cooperation between Poland and Ukraine. Certain gestures were made. Meetings were held. However, the very idea of "strategic" partnership was never filled with content. To make matter worse, if we ask what this partnership means, even politicians are unable to answer...

[Laszyn] It is very easy to find in Polish-German relations—for example, we have the Organization for Cooperation between Polish and German Young People. However, we lack something like that in our relations with Ukraine. Do you think we did not make enough of such practical steps?

[Geremek] We would like the model of our relations with Germany to be implemented in Polish-Ukrainian relations as well. As you have mentioned, there are concrete examples, such as the Polish-German Forum or the institutionally established exchange of young people. There are commissions that are working on history textbooks. All of this should also be implemented in our relations with Ukraine, especially as far as the exchange of young people is concerned.

All of this is happening on a smaller scale than in the relations with Germany. It should be pointed out that, aside from the traditional problem in the history of Poland—relations with Germany and Russia—our new relations with Ukraine are equally important from the point of view of Poland's national interests. However, certain Polish political circles still cannot get rid of the traditional fear that our contacts with Ukraine may be detrimental to Polish-Russian relations.

Leaving all that aside, I must say that there is one basic problem. The work of transformation, the work of not only reconciliation but also partnership-based cooperation between Poland and Ukraine, requires money. So far we have failed to earmark enough money...

[Laszyn] Ukraine has failed to earmark it as well...

[Geremek] Yes, it has. Ukraine's capabilities are far smaller.

Polish experts have helped Ukraine mold its economic policy. Now we have launched the initiative to set up a Polish-Ukrainian Forum similar to the already existing institutions of Polish-German, Polish-British, and Polish-French cooperation.

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The Forum has already come into being, and we are hoping that people on both sides will launch initiatives concerning concrete people. I am thinking about initiatives involving not only politicians, but also young people, academic communities, and economic circles. After all, commonality of political interests in the contemporary world requires commonality of economic interests.

[Laszyn] If we look at a map showing power-supply networks in the former Soviet Union, we can see that the economic ties between Russia and Ukraine will remain unbreakable for decades to come. This is a perfect tool with which Russia may try to reconstruct the empire; such trends have recently become more and more noticeable in Russia, and they will continue to gain momentum despite Zyuganov's defeat. Reconstruction of the Soviet empire is impossible if Russia fails to attract Ukraine to itself. This arouses certain fears...

[Geremek] I hope Ukraine will be able to maintain the current trend toward developing the country. Unless this trend is reversed, Ukraine will not become dependent on Russia or join the structures of economic, political, and military dependence on the Kremlin. This is important not only for Ukraine, but also for Poland. In my view, it is also good for Russia. I believe that the reemerging imperial tendencies in Russia are dangerous to Russia itself. Recently Russia was given a chance to change the model of its existence and to sever its links not only to the reality of Soviet imperialism, but also to Czarist imperialism. It stands a chance of severing the ties to its past and of joining the family of democratic nations, which respect the sovereign rights of other nations. However, under the veneer of priorities for contacts with the Commonwealth of Independent States, Russia is now implementing its imperialist policies. As you have rightly noted, not only Zyuganov, but also representatives of those who are now in power are formulating such policies. Yet they cannot be implemented without Ukraine. Therefore, what is going on in Belarus does not worry me very much as long as Ukraine stays out of such a configuration.

[Laszyn] How can Poland exert any influence on the development of this situation?

[Geremek] I have mentioned that Poland has only limited capabilities of providing economic aid to Ukraine. However, I believe that one of the most important issues determining the political situation in our region, particularly in the post-Soviet region, is the issue of energy management, which you have mentioned. Every country should see its security not only in terms of treaties, international politics, and diplomacy, but also in terms of the economic reality. In the contemporary world, energetic security means a state that prevents a situation in which communist Poland found itself in the 1970's and 1980's; the blackmail of "turning off the faucet" was one of the instruments of exerting pressure on those who governed in Poland at that time.

I believe that the situations in Poland and Ukraine are very similar in this respect. Both Ukraine and Poland want to use the cheapest source of gas and oil possible. Where oil supply is concerned, Poland is secure, but where gas supply goes, it is not. Such security can be achieved by increasing the number and diversity of sources from which oil and gas are imported. I believe that the last few Ukrainian governments have tried to implement the same model.

[Laszyn] Speaking about the Russian imperialistic tendencies, it is hard to overlook the war in Chechnya. What position do you think Poland should have toward that conflict? Are we supposed to treat it as Russia's internal affair or speak out in a more expressive voice?

[Geremek] I believe that Polish society has had the historic experience that prevents us from remaining silent over a smaller nation. Any form of public support for the cause of the Chechen nation seems to be legitimate. Working out a position that Poland, as a state, should adopt on this issue is surely a problem. With a certain degree of bitterness, you can see that moral standards are not applied in foreign politics and that Russia, which was admitted to the Council of Europe during the war in Chechnya, is currently outside the influence of the Council of Europe and international opinion.

Another dramatic thing is that the war in Chechnya abated at the end of Yeltsin's election campaign only for a short time. Back then, there was the possibility of peace talks. However, once the election campaign was over, the Russians resumed the war ruthlessly and violently.

This means that the Russian Government does not express the point of view of Russian society on this issue. The Russian people do not want this war, and this is exactly the reason President Yeltsin suspended it—to secure his reelection. Now it is rampaging back again, serving as an example of violence applied by the stronger party. This cannot help but cause outrage.

[Laszyn] The youngest historic piece of Russia with which Poland has a common border is Kaliningrad Oblast. This is the most militarized part of Europe, and, in the case of a possible black scenario, it could pose a potential threat to Poland's security. Do you not think that Poland should firmly and unequivocally raise the issue of demilitarization of that region?

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[Geremek] I believe that it is Europe that should raise the problem of demilitarization of Kaliningrad Oblast. From the standpoint of peace in Europe, the present situation is unacceptable. Russians explain the concentration of troops and military materiel in that region by the fact that they had nowhere to place the personnel and equipment after the pullout from the then German Democratic Republic. However, with more and more time passing and no changes in sight, this explanation hardly has a leg to stand on. What is more, the previous Russian defense minister once said that Kaliningrad Oblast would be an oblast of special military significance—in other words, a huge military base. This immediately raises the question: Who is this military base aimed against? To counter what countries bordering on Kaliningrad Oblast is the military power being amassed?

I believe that this situation is alarming and abnormal. One should search for rational solutions that could change it. In my opinion, Kaliningrad Oblast should by no means create any privileged arrangements, including roads, electricity lines, and gas and oil pipelines. One must apply here exactly the same standards as those applied to all other transit arrangements. Historic experience should teach Russians that history has already compromised all "corridor" ideas.

It is in the interests of Russia, Poland, and all of Europe to prevent Kaliningrad Oblast from becoming a geopolitical problem. This implies an intention of turning that region into a zone of special development connected with other European countries—both with its neighbors and the Baltic and Scandinavian states. Therefore, one needs to create changes in a direction that would suit Russian economic interests and, at the same time, reduce Russia's political and military presence in that region.

[Laszyn] Do you not think it is in the interests of Russia, facing Polish and Baltic aspirations for NATO membership, to retain the military nature of that region?

[Geremek] It is in the interests of the Russian empire but not a modern and democratic Russia. If Russia remains on the democratic transformation track, it will need a Kaliningrad Oblast that brings in profits instead of being a burden. If, on the contrary, Russia chooses to pursue imperialist policies, this military stronghold, a source of tensions and conflicts, will surely perpetuate this situation. At present, however, one should not dramatize this issue, and I would expect positive solutions from the standpoint of European peace because Russia is a weak and sick organism right now. It is a paradox of the late 20th century that this European and Asian giant, a nuclear state, is at the same time an ailing element of the modern world. In this context, however, I think we can foresee a period of seven to 10 years in which the international situation will evolve to the point where Russia, on the one hand, will have a sense of its own security and, on the other, will not be a threat to anyone in the world.

[Laszyn] And what about Russian opposition to the expansion of NATO?

[Geremek] I hope it is not excessively optimistic to say that Russia's opposition toward Poland's NATO membership is flagging. Angry murmurs over this issue coming from the East should be viewed not so much as examples of an aggressive veto but as elements of bargaining.

I believe that Russia already is accustomed to the thought that the enlargement of NATO by Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will occur some day. The Polish side should now counter the Russian propaganda, pitching Poland as being in a quarrel with Russia. This image of our country hurts the interests of our country also in the eyes of Western public opinion.

Also, we should expect that decisions on NATO expansion will not be delayed. In history, there are situations that never repeat themselves. The present situation and the period within the next two years is unique for us. In those two years, a decision in favor of Poland's admission to NATO will either be made or stand under a big question mark.

Poland: SDRP Criticizes Rosati's Comments on Concordat

LD1108181296 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1700 GMT 11 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SDRP] has maintained its hitherto position on the ratification of the Concordat and described as inappropriate Foreign Minister Dariusz Rosati's critical statements on the party's policy on this matter.

The SDRP has come out in favor of calm continuation of the coalition with the Polish Peasant Party, but, at the same time, it said that there was considerable similarity between the programs of the SDRP and the Union of Labor [UP]. An alliance with UP is possible and would also be beneficial.

Poland: Concordat Row Causes Rift Between SdRP, Rosati

LD1108204396 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 2000 GMT 11 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP] said at a news conference today

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that the party's position on the Concordat issue had not changed. They think that the ratification of the agreement with the Holy See should take place after the new constitution is adopted.

Deputy Tadeusz Iwinski expressed disapproval of the recent statements by Foreign Minister Dariusz Rosati on the subject of the Concordat.

[Begin Iwinski recording] We think it is wrong when the minister of foreign affairs lectures the Sejm and questions its sovereign decision, particularly because he is subordinate to it.

Second, it is a very sad matter to us that the minister of foreign affairs took the liberty to judge to what extent the SdRP and the SLD [Democratic Left Alliance] were left-wing and European. We regard ourselves as a truly modern and European left-wing party. It is exactly for this reason that we do not identify our attitude toward a specific international agreement with our attitude toward religion and the Roman Catholic Church. [end recording]

Poland: SdRP Wants Wants Coalition To Continue

LD1108181196 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1500 GMT 11 Aug 96

[Relayed by Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP] has come out in favor of holding the parliamentary elections in the fall of next year, as envisaged by the constitution. The SdRP leaders said that they wanted to preserve the coalition with the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] at least until the end of the parliament's term of office.

[Correspondent] SdRP Chairman Jozef Oleksy said that the discussion on early parliamentary elections was now closed. The SdRP believes that the most important task for the current parliament is to conduct the constitutional referendum.

Next week, the SdRP leaders want to start talks with the PSL on the central government reform. They firmly rejected the possibility of dismissing the prime minister and the entire Cabinet. According to Jozef Oleksy, the main subject of the coalition meeting will be the selection of a candidate for Treasury minister. Both the PSL and the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] want to see their own member in this post.

Poland: URM Head: Reform Will Create Tension in Ruling Coalition

LD0908132996 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1200 GMT 9 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Leszek Miller, head of the Council of Ministers' Office [URM], said that personnel decisions connected with implementing a reform of the administrative and economic center would cause tensions in the Democratic Left Alliance-Polish Peasant Party [SLD-PSL] coalition.

Minister Miller met PSL Chairman Waldemar Pawlak today.

In an interview for Polish radio, the head of URM gave assurances that PSL opposition to strengthening the prime minister's position will not be an obstacle in the reform of the center.

[Begin Miller recording] Colleagues from the PSL have presented a different opinion, but decisions have been made and now they will be implemented. Certainly there will be some tension when personnel decisions have to be made; such cases always cause plenty of emotion. However, I do not think these complicated personnel matters will have any adverse influence on the reform process we have just started. [end recording]

Poland: Further From URM Head on Government Reform

LD1108184296 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1700 GMT 11 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] According to Leszek Miller, the head of the Office of the Council of Ministers [URM], the suggestions that a new government should be appointed together with the introduction of the central government reform are unjustified.

[Begin Miller recording] By adopting the package of government reforms, the parliament expressed its confidence in Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz's government. The government reshuffle resulting from the package of central government reform laws will be quite spread out in time. That is, there will be no specific point when the government can resign and no specific point when it can be again appointed as a body. Ministers will be appointed not at one specific time, but at the time individual laws come into force. [end recording]

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Romania: Opposition To Contest Iliescu Run for Reelection

AU0808202796 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1900 GMT 7 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A debate took place at the headquarters of the Group for Social Dialogue this evening over President Ion Iliescu's candidacy for reelection. Along with jurists and experts in political science and law, the representatives of political groups, including the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR], the Social Democratic Union [USD], and the Civic Alliance Party [PAC], reached the conclusion that President Ion Iliescu is actually running for a third presidential term, which is in violation of the Constitution. But those present also discussed the possibility that he is only running for a second term after all. However, they emphasized that the only period that comes into consideration for establishing whether it is a second or third term for President Ion Iliescu is the period after 8 December 1991—when Romania's Constitution became valid—which should be carefully examined.

At the end of the meeting, the representatives of the political groups present concluded that the parties should initiate a coordinate action so that they should submit—together or separately—substantiated objections to the Constitutional Court, when President Iliescu officially presents his candidacy for a new term—our correspondent Silvia Ilies reports.

Romania: Prime Minister Denies Rumors of Cabinet Reshuffle

AU1008172696 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1000 GMT 10 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] In an interview broadcast by radio Bucharest in its "Political Week" program, Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu outlined some of the government's priorities for the coming period, including the stabilization of prices and fighting corruption and fiscal evasion. The prime minister said the price index will fall within anticipated levels in August and that inflation will reach 30 percent this year. Other targets include guaranteeing energy reserves for the winter and full implementation of special social protection measures in accordance with the government program.

On another issue, the prime minister expressed surprise at reports in the mass media of a would-be government reshuffle. He said this week's meeting with the Romanian president focused strictly on current issues. Nicolae Vacaroiu considers the news of possible government changes as an attempt at disinformation. In the interview granted to our radio station, the prime minister said the government expects a number of concerted attacks against it in the coming period, something which is typical not only for our country but for all democratic countries during an electoral campaign, when the cabinet is blamed for all sorts of things that do not fall within its sphere of competence.

The prime minister said he wants a constructive and open dialogue with the press to make sure that the problems discussed in this period are real and that the message to the public is correct.

Romania: Spokesman Welcomes Kovacs Statement Urging Negotiations

AU0908200896 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1920 GMT 9 Aug 96

[Telephone interview with Romanian Foreign Ministry spokesman Sorin Ducaru by Bucharest Radio correspondent Doina Saiciuc in Bucharest on 9 August—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Saiciuc] Good evening, Mr. Sorin Ducaru. Why do you think the head of Budapest diplomacy made that statement today?

[Ducaru] I do not know the circumstances in which that statement was made, but in any case I believe that it represents an answer, a positive response given to the readiness displayed by Romania to continue the negotiations on the Romanian-Hungarian basic treaty with the intent of concluding it as soon as possible.

As a matter of fact, I would point out that we have conveyed to them, by means of an aide-memoir, our proposal to continue the negotiations with the Hungarian party as soon as possible. Answering this proposal, they confirmed that the talks could be set forth in the month of September. I believe that the fact that they accepted represents an important step, which opens the way to overcoming the last difficulties in the Romanian-Hungarian negotiations. An even more recent development, which is in concordance with a mechanism that we have already consecrated during our dialogue on the treaty, is the fact that a Hungarian delegation headed by State Secretary Ferenc Somogyi is to come to Bucharest as soon as next week to consult with us on the Romanian-Hungarian basic treaty and, generally, on the documents that are being elaborated, and I am referring to the reconciliation documents. We have always held such consultations prior to the negotiating rounds proper.

We thus believe that this was a response to the offer made by the Romanian side, which we made during the last round of talks, inviting them to overcome the last difficult points in the negotiation of the basic treaty by

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virtue of the existing mandates of the delegations of the two countries. [passage omitted]

[Saiciuc] Bucharest is known to have made considerable efforts to continue the negotiations, but Budapest repeatedly came up with the claim that the current electoral year would not favor making the compromises needed to negotiate the text of the treaty.

[Ducaru] We pointed out as early as the beginning of this year that the electoral year in Romania does not represent any impediment to beginning the negotiations and finalizing the treaty. This is the case because like the [words indistinct] of our foreign policy, there also is a consensus within the Romanian political spectrum regarding our relations with Hungary and the basic treaty with that country. Furthermore, we pointed out that it is our duty as diplomats to find sufficient energy, imagination, and resources of cleverness to work out formulas that suit the interests of both parties, that is, a final treaty that could be ratified by the parliaments of the two countries—that is, a very clear treaty text, which should not raise any ambiguity regarding the rights of the persons belonging to ethnic minorities, rights based on generally accepted international norms on that issue. The politicians then could decide when to sign that finalized text. As for us, we would like to complete it as soon as possible.

Romania: Nuclear Authority Details 3 Aug 'Incident' at Cernavoda

AU0908161796 Bucharest COTIDIANUL in Romanian 7 Aug 96 p 1

[Report by ROMPRES: "Details About the Incident at Cernavoda"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The incident that occurred on 3 August 1996 at the CNE [nuclear power plant] in Cernavoda, Unit 1, happened in the yard of the plant, and consisted of a gas cylinder containing freon suddenly having lost pressure outdoors—informs the National Commission for the Control of Nuclear Activity (CNCAN) in a communique sent to the ROMPRES agency.

Due to the place where the gas cylinder was situated, its small dimensions, as well as the nature of its contents, the incident did not affect either the running—under full nuclear safety conditions—or the availability [disponibilitatea] of the plant. Furthermore, no material damage or injured personnel were reported.

The plant continued to run within normal parameters, at 50 percent of its nominal capacity, in concordance with the program on rendering the plant operational.

The incident was classified as one that does not fit the International Scale of Nuclear Events (INES) of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. Its causes are to be examined by the experts of the ISCIR [expansion unknown] together with the specialists of the Cernavoda nuclear plant.

Romania: Officials Warn of 'Russian Mafia' Trying To Launder Money

AU0908192696 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 7 Aug 96 p 12

[Article by V.A.: "Russian Companies Trying To Take Control of Certain Romanian Banks"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Officials belonging to the leadership of certain government and financial-banking institutions have pointed out to us that certain Russian companies and banks are trying to take some of the Romanian banks under their control. Following careful investigations, it has emerged that the Russian companies in question boast impressive names and visiting cards, but specialized international bodies have records on them that prove that they serve as fronts to launder money coming from not exactly legal business operations. As it is generally known, the Russian mafia would have been unable to expand internationally as rapidly as it did, had it not benefited from impressive financial support.

This is precisely why we consider that it is the duty of every bank president in our country thoroughly to check on all business partners offering them suspiciously advantageous terms in the augmentation of their bank's capital or take control over financial-banking institutions.

Romania: Poll Shows Majority Reject CDR-UDMR Alliance

AU0908193196 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 7 Aug 96 p 3

[Article by Ralu Filip: "According to an IMAS Poll, the Majority of Population Rejects a CDR-UDMR Alliance"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On Monday [5 August] the results of an IMAS [Applied Media Research Institute] poll were published, which had been ordered by the CDR [Democratic Convention of Romania]. The great surprise of the poll is that the majority of the population, that is, over 51 percent, reject a possible postelectoral alliance between the CDR and the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania].

This confirms that the ousting of the UDMR from the CDR was the right decision, but, on the other hand, puts

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the CDR in a delicate, if not complicated, situation. This is because, if the CDR emerges as the winner of the 3 November elections, it will be impossible for it to set up an alliance with the UDMR and thus obtain an absolute majority in Parliament, unless it is ready to risk losing its electorate.

The poll also shows that the population favors a possible postelectoral alliance between the CDR and the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania] more than one between the CDR and the USD [Social-Democratic Union]. This indicates that the electorate will not oppose a CDR-PDSR alliance, but rather the contrary.

As far as the candidates to the presidency are concerned, the popularity of both Ion Iliescu and Emil Constantinescu is descending in the CURS [Urban and Regional Sociology Center] barometer. Furthermore, the IMAS poll did not take into consideration that Gyorgy Frunda [UDMR candidate] is also running for the presidency, which certainly affects the proportion of the electorate favoring Emil Constantinescu.

Today they are to present the results of the poll conducted by CURS, which was also completed at the request of the CDR, while next Monday they will publish the results of a third poll, conducted by the IRSOP [Romanian Institute for Public Opinion Polling].

At the risk of being somewhat spiteful, one cannot help noticing the great trouble to which the CDR has gone over the completion of the three polls, as well the considerable financial means they have spent on them, as all together they cost approximately 100 million lei.

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Slovenia: $146 Million in FRY Assets Discovered in Cyprus

AU0908151596 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 9 Aug 96

[Vanja Vardjan report from Skopje—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] At today's court hearing [in Nicosia, Cyprus], the attorneys representing Slovenia and Branka Primec, director of the Succession Fund of the Republic of Slovenia, presented the court with the findings they had obtained during the inspection of the business books of the Cypriot branch of Beogradska Bank. At all three previous hearings, the attorney for Beogradska Bank had contested Slovenia's claim that the National Bank of Yugoslavia, following the suspension of sanctions against the FRY, had transferred over $100 million of its assets on the account of the Cypriot branch of Beogradska Bank.

The court in Nicosia yesterday rejected as evidence the two documents submitted by the Slovene representatives.

Today things took a more favorable turn for Slovenia. Branka Primec stated in court that the claims of the Beogradska Bank attorneys were not true. During the inspection of the business books of Beogradska Bank, Slovenia ascertained that the bank's account houses $146 million that is attributed to the National Bank of Yugoslavia.

The debate was interrupted at this point and will resume in September.

Slovenia: SDS Challenges Parliament Decree on Referendum

AU0908145996 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 9 Aug 96

[Report by Karmen Leban on a news conference held by the Social Democratic Party in Lepenje on 9 August—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Leban] At their news conference, the Social Democratic Party [SDS] leadership briefed all those present on the party's filing of an initiative for an assessment of the constitutionality and legality of the State Chamber decree on legislative referenda for the State Chamber elections:

[Janez Jansa, president of the Social Democrats] The Social Democratic Party of Slovenia today filed an initiative at the Constitutional Court contesting the legality and constitutionality of the State Chamber decree, with which the State Chamber has practically obstructed the realization of the people's will and postponed the decisionmaking on the new electoral systems until after the elections or in some foggy, distant future. This decree, whose essence undermines democracy in Slovenia, is blatantly in contradiction with Article 19 of the Law on Referendum and the People's Initiative, which clearly states that a referendum must be called within the deadlines specified by this law, which have long since expired.

The Social Democrats propose that because of the blatant and repeated violations by the State Chamber, the Constitutional Court itself determine the date that would mark the onset of the preparations necessary for the realization of the referenda, as well as the date on which the referenda would be held—namely, Sunday 29 September.

[Leban] The party is of the opinion that the people are in power in Slovenia, that citizens exercise this authority of theirs directly in the elections, and that they have the right to participate in the public affairs directly, pursuant to the law. For that reason, the State Chamber decision, which is unconstitutional and unlawful, comes across as irrational. Something of the kind should not have happened in a democratic society such as that of Slovenia. Precisely this, Jansa added, implies that legal care is no longer guaranteed in Slovenia and that anyone can do what he pleases.

At the news conference they also touched upon the media. Many critical words were addressed at the expense of the national media for supposedly not devoting enough space to the Social Democratic Party, which, however, does not apply to the United List and the Liberal Democracy, which, with their power, evidently have an influence over media, too.

Slovenia: Poll Assesses Popularity of Parties, Politicians

AU0708084396 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 5 Aug 96 pp 1, 3

[FBIS Summary] A 500-word report by S.P. sums up the results of the paper's monthly opinion poll on the popularity of Slovene politicians and political parties. As the author explains, the poll was carried out on 30 July among 713 randomly chosen telephone subscribers, and the pollees again elected Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek as the political personality of the month, the title he won in the poll the previous month. He is reportedly followed "closely" by President Milan Kucan, while third place went to Former Foreign Minister Zoran Thaler. "That the title of personality of the month is linked more to the post than to the personality itself was proved by new Foreign Minister Davorin Kracun, who, upon taking the post, not only broke out of anonymity, but also took a respectable

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fifth place, which brings him close to the 'eternally' fourth [Social Democratic Party President] Jansa," the report states. People's Party President Podobnik came sixth, and, as it is written, Christian Democratic Party President Lojze Peterle, [Defense Minister] Jelko Kacin, and [Finance Minister] Mitja Gasapri also won "a noteworthy number of votes."

Asked which party they would vote for were the elections held tomorrow, the pollees gave the following answers:

	Percent
Democratic Party	3.0
Liberal Democracy of Slovenia	15.5
Democratic Party of Retirees	1.7
Slovene National Right	0.4
Slovene Christian Democrats	4.5
Slovene People's Party	5.6
Slovene National Party	2.3
Social Democratic Party of Slovenia	8.6
United List of Social Democrats	4.8
Greens of Slovenia	1.7
None	10.1
Do not know	32.1
Would not vote	9.8

An accompanying commentary of the above results states that "as 'the real elections' are drawing closer, there is growing uncertainly among the people for which party to cast their vote—that is, their portion of trust. At least this is suggested by the latest trial elections that DELO's research agency Stik carries out regularly at the end of each month." As it is observed, "the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia maintained its status as the electoral favorite, although it won fewer votes that the previous month. The Social Democrats, who are still second according to the number of votes, reaped exactly the same amount of trust as in the previous month. The Slovene People's Party came third, as in the previous month. Likewise, the fourth-placed United List of Social Democrats won a little less, and the fifth-placed Slovene Christian Democrats slightly more votes, but still not enough to alter the ratings on the table. The Democratic Party and the Slovene National Party won considerably more votes among this lot of 'voters' than the previous month, which, with the percentages won, brings them closer to the threshold for entry into parliament," the article concludes.

Two accompanying pie charts also depict the respondents assessment of the performance of the government and the parliament in the previous month.

	Percent
Government	
Poor performance	49.1
Good performance	27.6
Average performance	5.1
Do not know	18.3
Parliament	
Poor performance	62.6
Good performance	16.6
Average performance	4.4
Do not know	16.4

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Federal

FRY: 'Expert' Says U.S., German Agencies Plotted SFRY Breakup

AU1108135596 Belgrade POLITIKA EKSPRES in Serbo-Croatian 9 Aug 96 p 5

["Excerpts" of article by Dejan Ristanovic: "Spy in FRY Leadership"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Retired Lieutenant Colonel Dusan Vilic, expert and intelligence analyst, said that foreign espionage agencies did not carry out their mission in the former Yugoslavia as planned.

Vilic told EKSPRES POLITIKA that the plan was to "conduct a single, furious attack to divide Yugoslavia into five or six banana republics with American-controlled puppet regimes."

Vilic said the problem arose in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the civil war lasted much longer than had been planned and where the secret services "got stuck."

He said the breakup of Yugoslavia was "under the direct command of Warren Zimmermann," head of the American intelligence center in Belgrade and the last ambassador.

According to Vilic, there were many participants in the plan—the United Nations, the European Union, the German and Turkish secret services..., as well as internal factors—influential agents and many nongovernmental organizations.

"The novelty in the work of the American and German intelligence services—the CIA, DIA, NSA, BND [Federal Intelligence Service]—over the last several decades is not only collecting information but being actively involved in effecting certain changes, or, more precisely, in acquiring an executive function," Vilic claims.

Vilic said "an agent of the CIA had infiltrated the last Presidency of the SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] and played a crucial role in the famous session of 15 March 1991, when his (the agent's) father enabled the secessionist forces to prevail in the highest state institution of the SFRY."

"Only one vote was needed to make a decision that would save the SFRY from civil war and preserve the unity of the country. In spite of that, he remained loyal to a foreign secret service and to Zimmermann, who was standing by to receive the results of the session and the services of his associate. He betrayed his own people—the Serbs, who as a result of that vote fought a four-year war in Bosnia and were exposed to the most terrible vilification," Vilic said.

Vilic added that the mentioned agent was not the only influential agent on the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

He said that "our counterintelligence service filmed in Croatia certain high-ranking officials of the Croatian MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] openly staing that the BND had ordered them to accept an agent in their ranks.

"Milan Kucan, Janez Drnovsek, and Franjo Tudjman are also influential agents. The American and German secret services used them and will dispose of them when they are no longer needed, like they did with Marcos in the Philippines," Vilic said.

According to him, there were many more important agents at universities, academies, and foundations. "For a long time the 'Fulbright Foundation' had been recruiting people for the American secret services, and now that task has been taken over by the 'Soros Foundation,' which disguises its basic operation with humanitarian activities.

"For foreign secret services that is better than open military aggression because the services of 'domestic traitors' have proven to be far more efficient in breaking up a number of states. The best proof of that is the three countries that have been broken up—the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and the SFRY," Vilic concluded.

Serbia

Serbia: Milosevic, U.S. Official Discuss Bosnian Peace Agreement

LD0908140996 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1332 GMT 9 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 9 Aug (TANJUG)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic had a meeting today with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State John Kornblum and NATO commander in Europe General George Joulwan, who arrived in Belgrade accompanied by their aides.

Comprehensive talks focused on the implementation of the peace agreement on Bosnia. They stressed the importance of intensive and concerted efforts aimed at a consistent and full implementation of the agreement, in which the successful holding of the forthcoming elections on 14 September had a particularly important role.

They said they expected the elections for legal institutions in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina to give the most important impetus to the overall normalization of

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the situation, which should make possible a speedy return of refugees to their homes and facilitate the process of restoring trust among citizens.

It was also established that IFOR [Implementation Force] had contributed to the successful course of implementing the peace agreement so far and had fulfilled the obligations entrusted to it by the international community.

They also discussed current issues relating to bilateral relations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the United States.

The talks were attended by Federal Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic and the U.S. charge d'affaires in the FRY, Ambassador Richard Miles.

Serbia: RSNP Sees Athens Summit as Preparing Prevlaka Solution

AU0908152896 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1107 GMT 9 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 9 August (BETA)—Jovan Glamocanin, chairman of the Radical Party Nikola Pasic [RSNP], assessed today that the Athens talks between the presidents of Serbia and Croatia, Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman respectively, "are very significant for the further implementation of the Dayton Accords and for the continuation of the normalization of relations in the Balkans."

"The statement issued after the talks clearly shows that President Milosevic has succeeded in preserving all our national and state interests, and that he has secured conditions for the survival of the Serb people in eastern Slavonia," Glamocanin said at a news conference.

He said that Milosevic "has created the preconditions for the reversion of Prevlaka to FRY's authority, in exchange for territories in the Dubrovnik hinterland."

"Nothing more could be done at the meeting, and therefore there is nothing for which Slobodan Milosevic should be reproached," Glamocanin assessed.

He said that the Serbs in eastern Slavonia need autonomy "in securing national rights" and welcomed the proposal of UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali to extend the UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration for East Slavonia] mandate for one more year.

Glamocanin pointed out that the United Nations has "a commitment to create conditions for the survival of the Serbs in eastern Slavonia because the international community has not done anything to secure the return of refugees to the Knin Krajina."

Montenegro

Montenegro: SDP Sees Athens Summit as 'Humiliation' for Podgorica

AU0908195096 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1437 GMT 9 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Podgorica, 9 Aug (BETA)—The Social Democratic Party of Montenegro (SDP CG) said today that the meeting between Serbian and Croatian Presidents Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudiman "again confirmed that the humiliation of the state of Montenegro and its citizens is continuing."

In the statement, the SDP accuses the Montenegrin authorities of "sacrificing the statehood of Montenegro to Milosevic's altar for the sake of their own selfish interests."

"The president of Serbia orchestrates both the conflicts and reconciliation with our neighbors and decides on issues of war and peace, on Prevlaka, on the normalization of relations with Croatia, on mutual recognition—of course within AVNOJ [Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia] borders—and on the reintroduction of brotherhood and unity," the SDP says.

"At the same time the Montenegrin authorities are sovereign in deciding on communal services, festivals, football matches on the beach, and similar issues," the SDP says, adding that Milosevic and Tudjman "are in fact continuing their job of segregation forever, the one they started so long ago." [passage omitted]

Montenegro: 'Montenegro Airlines' Fails To Lift Off

AU0908075696 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 2 Aug 96 p 5

[Article by B. Plamenac: "Is Montenegro Airlines Being Abolished?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the latest reports from Podgorica, the Montenegrin company "Montenegro Airlines" does not exist anymore. The company has been abolished, and the founding personnel, as well as the name of the company, will be attached to the republic's air company that takes care of the smaller fleet of Montenegrin Government planes.

These shocking, but not officially confirmed, reports also state that the entire project was put on ice and indefinitely postponed on the order of the president of the republic of Montenegro, Momir Bulatovic!

None of the officials were prepared to comment on the unexpected collapse of the idea of the first state airline in Montenegro. For two years the company had

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attempted to form an air fleet, and take off this tourist season—as was announced from the highest positions. In the management of Montenegro Airlines the news was received as an unexpected shock. None of the panic stricken workers and managers wanted to confirm nor deny the claims. "We unfortunately have nothing good to tell you. For now we have no official statement. Come back in a few days," was everything that they were willing to say to the public.

This shameful change had been accepted with disbelief. The expert teams, put together by the director, Zoran Djurisic, were full of experts employed by JAT [Yugoslav Airlines] and Aviogeneks. These teams had, after two years of work, finalized all the preparations for the purchase of two airplanes for the first Montenegrin national airline.

After a few unsuccessful attempts, a contract between the Montenegrin government, as the founder of Montenegro Airlines, and a London bank was made. The contract regarded the purchase of two Boeing 727 airplanes. The planes were the property of Aviogeneks, and were bought with a loan from the aforementioned bank. As the Belgrade charter company [Aviogeneks] had run into debt without the possibility of paying back its loans, the debt to the bank was compensated by the return of the two Boeings, worth $14 million. The bank offered the planes for sale, and the Montenegrins found this opportunity extremely convenient, and thus the purchase contract was recently signed.

The only inconvenient factor was that the payment had to be made in cash, which is otherwise unusual for such deals around the world. The money was put onto a bank account in Zurich, and so, with approval from the government, director Djurisic and financial experts first traveled to Zurich, and then to London. That was where Djurisic signed the historic contract. All that was left was for the $14 million to be transferred to London, and that the Aviogeneks Boeings be painted in Montenegrin colors.

All of a sudden, after the work had been done, everything stopped. The deal was cancelled in a mysterious way. No one in Montenegro Airlines knows what happened, nor does anyone know who is making the decisions. The first state airline nevertheless did not succeed in getting off the ground. All that remains is director Djurisic's signature in London, and a real disgrace of Montnegro in the business and banking western world. The state of Montenegro and its reputation backed the signature of the director of the national airline, Zoran Djurisic. He is the husband of Milica Pejanovic-Djurisic, the vice president of the ruling Democratic Party of Socialists. The unexpected change in the story of a Montenegrin airline is undoubtedly a result of political misunderstandings within the leadership of the republic, and especially in the relations between Serbia and Montenegro.

Montenegro: Parties' Applications for Elections in Dispute

LD0508101496 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0958 GMT 5 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Podgorica, July 31 (TANJUG)—The applications of three parties for participating at elections in Montenegro scheduled for Nov. 3 are in dispute, said the republican elections committee on Monday.

The Nikola Pasic Radical Party was not registered in the Montenegrin Justice Ministry, which is a prerequisite for participation in the elections.

The Democratic Party of Communists is not registered as well, but the application said the registration procedure was under way at the Justice Ministry, said the committee.

The Association of 1991/92 Veterans for the municipality of Podgorica has applied for participation in the elections, though this has been denied by the association's leadership, who said this was an abuse of the association's seal and name.

The association had reached a decision on June 5 not to take part in the elections.

The committee said the solving of the dispute was in process.

Montenegro: Two Parties To Form Opposition Coalition

LD0608205496 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1409 GMT 6 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Podgorica, 6 Aug (TANJUG)—The People's Party [NS] of Montenegro and the Liberal Alliance [LS] have signed a framework agreement on a platform for a united opposition to fight the elections in Montenegro on 3 November, Zelidrag Nikcevic, NS spokesman, said at a news conference today.

According to him, the parties to the agreement will fully retain their political identity and goals. [passage omitted]

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Montenegro: LS Head Threatens To Resign Over Lack of Campaign Funds

AU0808163796 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1504 GMT 7 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Podgorica, 7 August (BETA)—Slavko Perovic, the chairman of the Liberal Alliance of Montenegro [LS], has today warned the party's membership that he will submit his irrevocable resignation if the funds necessary for the party's participation in the elections are not collected by 25 August.

"Ladies and gentlemen Liberals, the election campaign is already in full swing and the LS is penniless. Recently the party's leadership has determined the minimum amount that would guarantee the party's ability to run in the elections," Perovic told the membership and the public.

He has warned that on 26 August, one day after the expiry of the deadline for the collection of the funds to enable the party to run in the elections, he will submit his irrevocable resignation as LS chairman will delegate the entire authority to the chairman of the party assembly.

Perovic has also announced that in that case he will take part in the forthcoming elections as an ordinary member of the LS.

Kosovo

Kosovo: Rugova Asks U.S. To Mediate Albanian-Serb Negotiations

AU0908201196 Tirana ATA in English 1416 GMT 9 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Prishtina, August 9 (ATA)—The stand of Kosova is that the U.S., in cooperation and in agreement with the European Union countries, should lead the Kosova question and intermediate in the Albanian-Serbian negotiations, said Mr. Ibrahim Rugova, president of Kosova, today in a news conference.

The statement was made after he commented some press reports that Belgrade is seeking a mediator in the talks with Prishtina [Pristina].

"It is our policy and demand that the solution to the Kosova issue be reached through negotiations, this is the stand of the international community," said Rugova, asked about the readiness to start talks with Serbian President Milosevic.

"As in all the talks even in those between Belgrade and Prishtina each party has its own stands. We are defending and will continue to defend our stands, those of the referendum for an independent and neutral Kosova, those of the Kosova leadership and people," said President Rugova.

Kosovo: Rugova Warns of 'Serb Criminal' Troops in Province

AU0908203696 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English 9 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The as yet unexplained explosions that occurred in the Serbian police stations in Podujeve [Podujevo] and Prishtina [Pristina] last week have been exploited by the Serbian regime to crack down on a large number of Albanians, President of the Republic of Kosova Dr. Ibrahim Rugova said today (Friday [9 August]) in Prishtina, adding that Albanians have continued to be targeted on various pretexts, and warning against the presence of Serbian paramilitary troops in Kosova. "Their presence is very dangerous for Kosova and the entire Balkan region," he said, in an apparent reference to the reported roaming in Kosova of the Serb criminal Zeljko Raznjatovic Arkan's troops early this week.

Speaking to reporters, Dr. Rugova noted the notorious activities of Arkan's people during the wars in Bosnia and Croatia. "We have worked hard to avoid seeing such things happen in Kosova," President Rugova said, adding that paramilitary troops should be "far off Kosova."

The Serbian state propaganda has been trying to impute an upside down image of Kosova Albanians, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova said, noting that the goal has been to "distort the image and authority of the Albanian political movement and the Kosova nation" before the world. He recalled that shooting incidents in the past few years in Kosova, while never duly investigated ("the Serbs have never provided credible accounts") have turned out to be engineered by the Serbian regime itself. "Members of Serb police themselves have spoken of such staged incidents" in which Serb policemen shot at each other, President Rugova stressed, apparently referring to the May 1993 incident in Gllogovc [Glogovac], in which several Serb policemen were killed and others wounded.

The Kosova president said he has been calling on the people of Kosova to refrain themselves from any moves that might aggravate the already volatile situation. "We do not want to see the situation escalate, nor do we want to see any spiral of violence or terrorism in Kosova," he said, accusing the Serb regime and its propaganda machinery, who have been laboring to "impute" terrorism on the people of Kosova, "the Albanians who have won the respect of the world for their non-violent policies, patience and perseverance,

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as well as sacrifices in their struggle (for freedom and independence from Serbian occupation)."

President Rugova reasserted the need for an increased presence of the international community in Kosova (as a "preventative step") condemning the Serb propaganda for its bid to undermine international presence here alleging that it has been fostering terrorism. "These are absurd charges," he said, noting that the U.S. office as well as the eventual establishment of offices by European countries can have only a "positive, stabilizing" role.

Asked to comment about a news report broadcast by Swedish media, which said that Belgrade was urging EU countries supply an intermediator for talks on Kosova, President Rugova said Belgrade will engage in ploys, reconfirming that "our position is clear-cut: We want the U.S.A. to play the role of an intermediator, of course in a concerted effort and in agreement with the European Union." President of the Republic of Kosova told reporters he had met an official of the Swedish Embassy in Belgrade earlier today, and that the issue of the asylum-seekers was discussed too. We have no information that Sweden has decided to return them, but if and when that is done, the Swedish position is that the "repatriation will be organized, under the care of the Swedish government and the international organizations."

Dr. Ibrahim Rugova demanded the release of the University of Tetovo leaders, and called on the FYROM [Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] Government to legitimize the Albanian institution of higher education there.

Kosovo: PDSh Urges Resolution of Albanian Minorities Issue

AU1108172096 Zurich BOTA SOT in Albanian 8 Aug 96 p 5

["Full text" of memorandum of the Presevo-based PDSh sent to leading international bodies and renowned political personalities; date not given: "Serbia Has Violently Cut Off the Albanian Ethnic Territory"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Regarding the grave situation of Albanians in Presheve [Presevo], Bujanovc [Bujanovac], and Medvegje [Medveda] [eastern Kosovo], as well as the situation in Kosova, the Presheve-based Albanian Democratic Party [PDSh] sent a memorandum to leading international bodies and personalities, such as the European Parliament, [German Foreign Minister] Klaus Kinkel, [European Commissioner] Van den Broek, and [British Foreign Secretary] Malcolm Rifkind. The full text is provided here:

At a time when important decisions on the destiny of the people in the former Yugoslavia are expected to be taken, the Albanians of Presheve, Bujanovc, and Medvegje—which number about 100,000—are concerned about their future and are appropriately expecting international decisionmakers to prevent further abuse of their destiny.

This is in everyone's interest, as unsolved problems—although very minor in appearance—are still problems.

Reminding you that Presheve, Bujanovc, and Medvegje are communes under the current Serbian administration outside Kosova borders and inhabited by an Albanian-majority population; that after World War II they were cut off from Kosova and were placed under Serbia's direct administration with no consultation, and even less desire of its citizens; and that this ethnic region has a territorial, ethnic, and cultural continuity with Kosova; we draw your attention to the fact that, despite Serbia's administrative participation with regard to national and human rights, no significant improvement has been noted so far. We would like to remind you that the Serbian Constitution and laws do not represent any mechanism to defend the civil and national rights of Albanians as they are approved without them, and that this Constitution and these laws are not taken into consideration when it suits the official authorities to discriminate against the Albanians. Furthermore, we would like to remind you that, apart from controlling the political will of two million Albanians in the Republic of Kosova, currently under Serbian occupation, the Serbian regime is also suppressing the political will of about 100,000 ethnic Albanians in Presheve, Bujanovc, and Medvegje. For the first time in their history, the Albanians of this region expressed their political will in the referendum of 1 and 2 March 1992—in which they declared themselves in favor of a territorial and political autonomy with a right to be united to Kosova.

In view of the fact that the demands of the Albanians of this region do not endanger the acceptable and proper interests of the neighboring peoples and find support in the right to self-declaration defined in the international legislation; that these demands aim at creating efficient relevant mechanisms to stop discrimination and hamper assimilation; that the Albanian population of this area is closely related to that of Kosova in many aspects; that the Albanian people in Kosova and beyond have so far avoided armed conflict with great sacrifices and unequaled self-restraint by exclusively resisting Serbia's aggressive repression through political means; we think that the international community should start to be more energetically engaged in rendering adequate assistance to solving problems in these areas.

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Deeply convinced that a further delay of solutions to these problems may complicate them more, please allow us to make the following suggestions:

Negotiations between Prishtina and Belgrade regarding the political status of Kosova should start in the presence of a third party. Pressure should be exerted on the Belgrade government to stop its suppression of the unprotected Albanian population, and the issue of the Albanians of Presheve, Bujanovc, and Medvegje should be included within the framework of the talks on Kosova.

We thank you for reading this memorandum and invite you to commit yourselves to giving hope for a happier future to those who were and continue to be oppressed.

Kosovo: Liberation Army Claims Responsibility for Police Attacks

AU1008154996 Zurich BOTA SOT in Albanian 10 Aug 96 p 5

["Text" of Communique No. 22 issued by the Leading Staff of the Liberation Army of Kosova in Pristina on 4 August]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 2 August, in Operational Zone No. 1, our guerrilla units launched four armed attacks against the occupying Serbian police posts. Our attacks were intended to destroy Serbian police weapons and to inflict heavy material losses.

The target of the attacks was chosen on the basis of a decision made by the UCK [Liberation Army of Kosova] Leading Staff.

The Albanian people of Kosova will not be cheated by defeatists and rabbits who are overwhelmed with fear and panic. They know quite well that their best sons are leading the actions, and they will not lay down their arms until the occupied territories have been liberated.

Through this communique, we would like to state clearly to the current Serbian political leadership that they must withdraw from our territories as soon as possible or our attacks to liberate the country will be fierce and merciless.

Decisionmakers should be aware that we are not terrorists, as the Serbs are trying to call us, but freedom fighters. In view of the fact that the international authorities have so far ignored the demands of our people, we are obliged to use force to liberate our territories.

[Signed] The Leading Staff of the Liberation Army of Kosova

[Dated] Prishtina, 4 August 1996

Vojvodina

Vojvodina: Ethnic Hungarian Deputy Urges Party Unity

LD1208092696 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 2000 GMT 11 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The passage dealing with minority autonomy in the statement issued after the Hungarian-Hungarian summit [between representatives of the Hungarian Government and the ethnic Hungarian communities beyond the borders] has caused a dispute within the Democratic Union of Vojvodina Hungarians [DZVM]. Arpad Madarasz reports from Novi Sad:

[Madarasz] Sandor Pala, deputy chairman of the DZVM, said that it was a great mistake on the part of Andras Agoston, chairman of the organization, not to sign the closing document of the Hungarian-Hungarian summit at the beginning of July. Although the DZVM board supported the content of the document at its latest meeting, it did not decide about signing the document belatedly.

In his interview with MAGYAR SZO of Novi Sad, Sandor Pala, who, incidentally, is the most active Hungarian deputy in the Serb parliament, said that the present DZVM leadership has to be changed. He described the leadership style and policy of Andras Agoston and the organization's more rigid faction as autocratic. He especially criticized the fact that Agoston reduced his autonomy demands to the level of mere personal autonomy.

The DZVM deputy chairman regards it necessary to cooperate with other Hungarian organization, the Association of Vojvodina Hungarians [UVM] and especially a coalition alliance for the forthcoming elections, which is categorically rejected by Agoston. The lack of cooperation will result in a split in the vote, and the Serb Socialist Party will win even in the regions populated mainly by Hungarians, Pala said in his interview to MAGYAR SZO.

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